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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR


From: Frank Kelton
Sent: Monday, October 31, 2016 8:58 PM
To: smarson@nc.rr.com
Subject: Box D

Hello Stephen:

My name is Frank Kelton. I am a social worker (MSW, RSW, MBA) and CEO of a mental health non-profit non-govermentnal agency in Calgary, AB, Canada.

I wanted to thank you for your recent article/editorial in the JSWE entitled “Social Workers Must Carry a Gun.”

I think it raises more questions than answers, but it is a “dialogue-opening” piece that worthy of discourse within and outside the social worker profession.

We have much stricter gun-laws in Canada—along with less than US population-proportionate deaths from hand guns. Our regulations contribute to death prevention, but so does our system of social benefits contribute (cheaper University education, income supports, much bigger middle class and other demographic and systemic differences between our two great nations). I will tell you that as someone who grew up in great poverty in Montreal, I was able to work two jobs in my late teens and early twenties to pay for an “Ivy league” McGill University education for less than $3000 per year (back in the late 1980’s). This construct for poor Americans does not exist to my knowledge. Ban hand guns yes..but as you acknowledge, despite regulation, there will be unavoidable error. Combine effective regulation with economic opportunity, better mental health programming, free health care, blur the class distinctions, and maybe just maybe, the guns, and maybe it’ll just be long guns, will be all that is left for true hunters of game for food (not “sport”). I like your arguments and your matrix approach has much merit.

Personally, I have never owned a gun and can state without equivocation that I never intend to own one. I reside in your Box D, but I posit that lawmakers in the US have moved and will seemingly continue to move slowly to make the changes contemplated by your meritorious argument. Many murderers in Box A are good with guns and are afforded constitutional protection. Folks that have poor aim can buy guns for people with even worse aim putting the latter in Box B or C.

I would like to share your article with my facebook friends and email friends (that do not use social media). I would like to open discussion on this important topic. A dialogue inside and outside of subscribers to the JSWE is needed, wouldn’t you say?

Frank Kelton MSW, RSW, MBA
Executive Director
Potential Place Society
I must begin this editorial with full disclosure. On the issue of abortion, I am prochoice. I acknowledge that while a fetus, I was a prime candidate for an abortion. Under those conditions, one would think that I would become prolife. WRONG! That is another story for which there is no need for elaboration at this time. Rather, my prochoice position emerged from my experience in the arena of child welfare services. Like many social workers, I have seen unimaginable atrocities inflicted on unwanted babies. Like most prochoice advocates, I dislike the concept of abortion but do not disapprove of it. Rather than having governmental intervention prohibiting abortion, wouldn’t it be nice if women would choose not to have an abortion? This, in fact, has become our current social trend.

From the “Murphy Brown and Dan Quayle incident” emerged a sociological goldmine. Here, we find a major societal paradigm shift. The prolife movement grew into a real prolife movement. They did not merely advocate the antiabortion perspective but they embraced the sanctity of the out-of-wedlock birth. We can monitor social change through the popular media. Unlike the past, out-of-wedlock births have become pervasive on situation comedies. We have seen out-of-wedlock births in Boston Legal, Sex and the City, The Gilmore Girls, Reba, Last Man Standing, and Steven’s Universe (a cartoon show for children!). The key point is: People (including the prolife sector) no longer scorn the unmarried woman with a child. In some arenas, such births are celebrated. So what?!

The shift in our societal thinking about out-of-wedlock births has catapulted our society to reevaluate family values. Over the past few decades, the abortion rates have continued to decline. The abortion rates have declined NOT because of the “where life begins” debate, but rather because single parenthood became socially acceptable. Women are choosing birth over abortion NOT because they are forced by law, but rather because of free choice. The free choice to reject abortion emerged from the fact that female single parents are no longer subjected to scorn.

The acknowledgment of choice has flowed into other sectors of decision-making. There is a drop in teen pregnancy. I suspect that teenage girls are maturing in a new and different way. Like European teens, they are sexually active but they are not getting pregnant. If you’re not pregnant, there is no need to have an abortion. The number of abortions
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has dropped; the number of teen pregnancies has dropped. This is a result of social change and not governmental intervention. Wow, I now see Adam Smith’s invisible hand at work! Who is responsible for this paradigm shift? The prolife movement and I must stand and applaud their actions in this regard.
Living Gurus, Their Ministries and Altruism as a Value: The Enterprise of Faith-Based Social Service

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Abstract
This article is based on a study of altruism as a value in Hindu inspired faith-based organizations. Based on data obtained from 1080 members of the monastic order or key office bearers of four contemporary Hindu inspired faith-based organizations, I attempt to understand their notions of altruism. All these organizations engage in social service and humanitarian activities in tangible ways. Findings showed that members of the order understood altruism as service to others, philanthropy or giving, having a global view and generous mindset, greater common good and general seva or social service sentiment. Altruistic experiences were derived from existing social projects of the organizations or developing new initiatives. The majority said that the purpose of altruism was spreading the message of the guru/teacher through service and some said it meant serving society at large. For that majority, the message of the guru/teacher was believed to encompass altruistic values and related practical sentiments. For social work in India, this paper argues that it is important to recognize these organizations as crucial actors contributing to the social welfare mandate.

Keywords: Altruism, Hindu inspired faith-based organizations, monastic order, gurus, social work, values

Introduction
Altruism is the principle or practice of concern for the welfare of others. It is a motivation to provide something of value to a party who must be anyone but one’s self. Pure altruism consists of giving or serving with no expectation of any compensation or benefits, either direct or indirect. Much debate exists as to whether “true” altruism is possible. The theory of psychological egoism suggests that no act of sharing, helping or sacrificing can be described as truly altruistic, as the actor may receive an intrinsic reward in the form of personal gratification. The validity of this argument depends on whether intrinsic rewards qualify as “benefits” (Batson, 2012).

Sociologists have long been concerned with how to build the good society. The structure of our societies and how individuals come to exhibit charitable, philanthropic, and other pro-social, altruistic actions for the common good is a topic within the field of public sociology. This type of sociology seeks contributions that aid grassroots and theoretical understandings of what motivates altruism and how it is organized, and promotes an altruistic focus in order to benefit the world and people it studies. How altruism is framed, organized, and carried out, and what motivates it at the group level, is an area of focus that sociologists seek to investigate in order to contribute back to the groups it studies and “build the good society” (Moen, Dempster-McClain and Williams, 1992).
There is also a wide range of philosophical views on man’s obligations or motivations to act altruistically. Proponents of ethical altruism maintain that individuals are morally obligated to act altruistically. The opposing view is ethical egoism, which maintains that moral agents should always act in their own self-interest. Both ethical altruism and ethical egoism contrast with utilitarianism, which is the view that every individual’s well-being is of equal moral importance. A related concept in descriptive ethics is psychological egoism, the thesis that humans always act in their own self-interest and that true altruism is impossible. Rational egoism is the view that rationality consists in acting in one’s self-interest (without specifying how this affects one’s moral obligations) (Batson, Ahmed and Stocks, 2011).

Altruism is thus a value, and it is often referenced in religion and faith (Lysenko and Hulin, 2007; Koenig, McGue, Krueger and Bouchard, 2007). Faith-based human services are aligned to organizations founded on principles of faith. Values such as altruism emerge from this position of faith. Several studies have examined altruism and the voluntary spirit with respect to churches and congregations in the western context (e.g., Wuthnow, 1990; Hodgkinson and Weitzman 1993; Yeung, 2004).

Some of the recent literature has linked altruism to giving not merely material or tangible goods or objects but also doing an act, doing something for others in which one has no stake or claim. In other words, the giving involves giving something from the depths of oneself, for the ‘good’ of another, without expecting anything in return (Lakshmi, 2013; Doepke, 2013; Carter, 2014). Huber and MacDonald (2012) investigated the relations between altruism, empathy, and spirituality in a sample of 186 university students in the United States. Zero-order and partial correlations controlling for age, sex, and social desirability indicated that altruism was most strongly linked to spiritual experiences, followed by spiritual cognitions. Gantt and Burton (2012) draw on the works of French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas to discuss the question of altruism. The focus is on an examination of the ontological necessity of a genuinely social and moral understanding of personhood that preserves the possibility of altruism. Whereas most scholars have taken a positive view of altruism, some have also argued that from a consequentialist standpoint, acts of altruism done without careful consideration may not always be in the larger good (D’Souza and Adams, 2014).

This paper is based on a study of altruism as a value in Hindu inspired faith-based organizations, typically headed by avatar gurus or teachers, an important dimension of whose earthly mission is setting up institutions. Gurus and their movements are prominent in contemporary times. The guru is charismatic and s/he forms the bedrock of the movement. Recent literature places them more generally in the context of their multiple roles in South Asian society (Huffer, 2011; Martin, Zablocki and Gunten 2012). The focus is on the domaining effects and the expansibility of the gurus, a discourse which has further been enhanced by their diaspora presence. Gurus clearly break with the more established orthodoxy in terms of the hybridized teaching traditions they transmit in their practices; their criteria for and methods of initiating devotees; and the disciples they are initiating as future lineage holders of their individually crafted teaching traditions. Maya Warrier (2003b) says that the language of guru recognition and choice is highly nuanced. There are exclusivists who see their attachment to the guru as precluding the possibility of simultaneous attachments to other gurus and inclusivists who attach themselves to several gurus (Fuller and Harris, 2005).

There is an upsurge of literature on guru-led and Hindu inspired faith-based organizations talking of their involvements in modern, secular, developmental activities such as relief work after major disasters, setting up hospitals and colleges, and so on (Shah 2006, Beckerlegge 2006, Srinivas 2008, Copeman 2009). Providing free eye operation and checkup camps and blood donation activities forms part of the common repertoire of social services undertaken by new guru-led organizations. Glorification of the guru and promoting his/her
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Spiritual message is an important constitutive component of these services. For those who actually do this service, it is seen as a component of spiritual development—a “meritorious activity that wears down the egotism and selfishness of modernity” (Warrier, 2006, p 186). It is a form of “practical spirituality,” which essentially placates the individual’s existential struggles and hence could have psychotherapeutic implications (Van Hoecke, 2006). It could also be a form of impure altruism as it entails consuming “clubbiness” (being a part of the guru/teacher coterie and gaining the benefits of his/her grace for oneself) as a private good along with altruism as a public good (Bowman, 2004).

Hindu-inspired faith organizations thus have elaborate mechanics of institution building and it has been observed that the ethics of seva, or “service,” are crucial to the spirit of institution building (Warrier, 2003a). It has been argued that seva is done with an altruistic motive and spirit and is essentially an evangelical import. Hence there are aspects of “mission”-isation, spiritual rejuvenation and re-creation of communities (Gupta, 1973; Beckerlegge, 2000, 2010). Altruism and social service are essentially seen as strategies of proliferation and world affirmation across guru-led movements (Walliss, 2007; Locklin & Lauwers, 2009; Srinivas, 2010; Zavos, 2012). Seva is an important characteristic of these institutions where quite frequently guru seva is equated to manav seva (service to humanity) (Copeman and Ikegame, 2012) or more precisely manav seva is done so as to obtain proximity to and grace of the guru who is believed to be divine. Altruism which finds its expression in this service is a value that is rooted in communal orientation.

Altruism in practice for the Hindu inspired guru-led organizations is their mandate of social service. Social service may be either serendipitous or planned and systematised. Social service is justified through the faith ideals. There is a need to create a world of shared meanings and practices through tangible service. Social service efforts of the guru led movements have also meant a paradigm shift from the traditional private role of faith with a focus on the spiritual and sacred towards a more public role which embodies social capital.

The idea/mandate is to bring faith to the public realm in a visible way—beyond rituals, towards a community orientation. Here we can draw parallels to Isaac’s (2003) proposal that the faith-based initiatives are a promising “civil society” approach to public policy in a post-liberal, post-welfare state political moment. It is looked at as part of a broader strategy of “third way” public policy pioneered by Bill Clinton in the U.S. and Tony Blair in the U.K. The mandate also entails a “re-authoring” where guru led movements navigate the process and reconfigure socialities through their faith knowledge. The mission is to respond to a religious calling and cultivate a faith-informed vision of care.

Based on a study done with members of the monastic order or key office bearers of four contemporary Hindu inspired faith-based organizations, I attempt to understand their notions of altruism as a value. All these organizations engage in social service and humanitarian activities in tangible ways. The study offers a picture of living gurus, their ministries and the nature/nuances of altruism as a value expressed through the enterprise of faith-based human services.

Methodology

The broad objective of the study was to understand altruism as a value in faith-based organizations through the lenses of the core coterie of the organizations comprising members of the order and office bearers.

In the absence of any large-scale surveys on altruism among Hindu faith-based organizations in the Indian context, this study adopted the cross-sectional, quantitative questionnaire survey. The specific objectives were to understand the perceptions of members of the order and/or office bearers on: 1) meanings of altruism; 2) altruistic beliefs, practices, and experiences; 3) scores on the self-reported altruism and philanthropy scales; and 4) background profile predictors of the purpose of altruism. Through that I formed an understanding
of gurus, their ministries and the enterprise of faith-based human services.

I selected four contemporary Hindu faith-based organizations headed by living gurus, namely Swaminarayan Sanstha, Chinmaya Mission, Mata Amritanandamayi Mission and Art of Living. The Swaminarayan Sanstha, popularly known as BAPS (Bochasanwasi Shree Akshar Purushottam Swaminarayan Sanstha), is a branch of the Swaminarayan sect. It is headed by Pramukh Swami and currently is headquartered in Shahibaug Ahmedabad with centres across the globe. The Chinmaya Mission, started by Swami Chinmayananda, is currently headed by Swami Tejomayananda and has one of its core centres in Sandeepany Sadhanalaya Powai, Mumbai. The Mata Amritanandamayi Mission is headed by the charismatic woman teacher Mata Amritanandamayi, also known worldwide as “the hugging saint.” It is headquartered in Kollam Kerala and has branches across the globe. The Art of Living Foundation was started by Sri Sri Ravi Shankar and is popularly known for its Sudarshan Kriya. It is headquartered in Udayapura Bangalore. BAPS, Chinmaya Mission and Mata Maritanandamayi Mission have a coterie of members of the monastic order. Art of Living Foundation has trained teachers of Sudarshan Kriya and office bearers who comprise the core group. All the organizations are actively engaged in social service activities and have large scale projects in the areas of education, health and livelihood development. Social service is a mandate within each of their vision-mission statements.

The rationale for selecting these organizations is that all of them have a presence in India and have engaged in social welfare activities which enable the possibility of studying altruism in their ministries. Further, the members of the order and the office bearers were willing and inclined to share data and views on the subject. Since most of these organizations are relatively commune oriented and at times even closed on certain matters to the larger public, access to data and permissions also played a key role in determining their selection.

Lists and contact information for members of the order and office bearers were obtained from each of the organizations. The total number of members of the order and office bearers was 1358 for BAPS, 1310 for Chinmaya Mission, 1329 for Mata Maritanandamayi Mission and 1299 for Art of Living. Using systematic sampling (k=5), an equal number of respondents (270) were sampled from each of the organizations. With an average response rate of 87.88% (across the four organizations), a total of 1080 members of the order and office bearers across the four organizations comprised the sample.

I used a self-administered questionnaire with questions pertaining to their socio-demographic profile, reasons for joining the organization/order, duration of association and work profile, meaning of altruism, beliefs, practices, experiences and purpose of altruism. The questionnaire was prepared in English and Hindi. All the respondents were well versed in either one or both of the languages. The questionnaire also included two scales—the self reported altruism scale and the philanthropy scale. Questions on meaning of altruism, beliefs, practices and experiences and purpose of altruism were open-ended and I manually coded the answers obtained prior to further statistical calculations. The respondents were asked four open-ended questions: a) What is the meaning of altruism? b) What are the altruistic beliefs that you firmly have? c) What are the altruistic practices that you generally follow under the aegis of the organization? and d) What are the experiences that you have had of practicing altruism? The responses obtained were then coded to arrive at thematic categories as mentioned in Table 1.

The self-reported altruism scale developed by Rushton et.al. (1981) is a Likert type scale containing a list of 20 statements describing altruistic behaviours. Higher total scores on the scale indicates greater altruism. In this study, I use the adapted self-reported altruism scale developed by Peter Witt and Chris Boleman (2009) as a more generalised and universally applicable version of the original Rushton scale. The adapted scale has 14 generalised items to understand altruism (eg. I would give directions to someone I did not know, I would make changes for someone I did not know). The scale is a Likert type scale where respondents
check the responses from 0 = never to 4 = very often. A higher total score indicates greater altruism. The Cronbach α for the scale for this study is 0.82.

The philanthropy scale developed by Schuyt, Smit and Bekkers (2006) is a Likert-type scale containing a list of seven items of which three are reverse coded. The statements are: 1) We have to leave this world a better place for the next generation. 2) Each generation has to solve its own problems (reverse coded). 3) Society is in danger because people are less concerned about each other nowadays. 4) The world needs responsible citizens. 5) The world community relies on international politics and corporations, and that is a good thing (reverse coded). 6) I give money to charitable causes, no matter what the government does. 7) Charity and public benefit should be supported by the government, and not by citizens and business corporations (reverse coded). Ratings are done on a five-point scale ranging from Completely Disagree to Completely Agree. A higher total score indicates greater belief in social responsibility. The Cronbach α for the scale for this study is 0.83.

Both the scales were checked for replicability in the Indian context and a pre-test was administered to ensure the possibility of its execution with the study respondent group. The justification for using the scales developed in different cultures in the Indian context is twofold: 1) unavailability of similar measures and 2) the need to define the contours of the key concept of the study (altruism) beyond the respondents’ definitions and voices towards a more universal measure. The latter is in keeping with the quantitative paradigm of the study.

I have utilized a logistic regression analysis to determine the predictors of the purpose of altruism (i.e., whether it was spreading the message of the teacher/guru or serving society). Through the analysis, I attempt to bring out the nuances of altruism as a value by members of these faith-based organizations.

Respondent profile

Equal numbers of respondents were identified from all the four faith based organizations. The majority (58.80%) were in the age groups 30–59 years. The respondents comprised 67.59% men and 32.41% women. While all respondents had completed training programs within their organization, most (51.31%) also had a bachelor’s degree and over a quarter (27.59%) had a master’s degree. In the sample, 44.54% were full time members of the order and 55.46% were office bearers and had other occupations outside. Most had a fairly long association with the organization (i.e. 5–10 years [18.89%], 10–20 years [63.06%] and 20 years and above [18.06%]). Further, most of the respondents said that they had joined the organization as they were attracted by and attached to the guru/teacher’s charisma and teachings (76.94%). Some, however, said that their families urged them to join the organizations (23.06%). In terms of work profile, 52.31% did work related to faith proliferation and social service while 47.69% undertook seva of all kinds, ranging from routine tasks to managerial work and specialised tasks such as managing the computer centre.

Limitations

The main limitation of the study is the use of a quantitative paradigm for a subject like altruism. This entails collapsing definitions and meanings of altruism, altruistic beliefs, practices and experiences as well as the purpose of altruism as specified by the respondents. A qualitative exploration would have highlighted the nuances of these meanings. However, the present study does fill in the gap of the absence of any large scale quantitative data on ministries of living gurus and the views of the order members on altruism emanating from social
service, the raison d’être of most of them in the contemporary times.

The other limitation is that the analysis has been mostly descriptive in nature, discussing the views of the respondents on the various parameters along with simple measures of association and logistic regression. Advanced renditions would have further brought out the nuances. However, given the nature of the data as obtained through open-ended questions, the size of the sample and the reduced possibilities of developing any hypothesis, the following section on findings and analysis does open spaces for further exploration. Lastly, the general limitations of using a cross sectional survey type design with probability sampling are also applicable for this study.

Findings
Meanings of altruism
Several meanings of altruism existed among the respondents: service to others (14.44%), philanthropy or giving (33.80%), global view and generous mindset (21.48%), greater common good (15.46%) and a general seva sentiment (14.81%) (Table 1). Organizational affiliation had a significant association with the meaning of altruism \( \chi^2(12) = 38.63, p < 0.00 \). For 20.37% of the MAM associates, altruism meant service to others. For 41.11% of the CM associates, it meant philanthropy or giving and for 21.85% of the BAPS and AOL associates respectively, altruism meant a global view and generous mindset. Further for 21.11% of the BAPS associates, altruism meant a greater common good and for 17.04% of them it was a general seva sentiment. Age of the respondents also had a significant association with meaning of altruism \( \chi^2(24) = 4305.59, p < 0.00 \). For all the respondents in the age group 30–59 years, altruism meant philanthropy and giving, a global view and generous mindset and a greater common good. For all the respondents in the youngest age group (20–29 years), altruism meant service to others. Gender also had a significant association with meaning of altruism \( \chi^2(4) = 9.68, p = 0.04 \). More of the women (36.29%) said that altruism meant philanthropy and giving than men (32.6%). A higher proportion of men (17.4%) said that philanthropy meant greater common good vs. 11.43% of the women.

Educational qualifications also had a significant association with the meaning of altruism \( \chi^2(8) = 37.29, p < 0.00 \). Among those who had a master’s, 44.63% said that altruism meant philanthropy and giving and 15.44% said that it meant a greater common good. Of those who had bachelor’s degree, 16.8% said that altruism meant service to others and 22.13% said that it meant a global view and generous mindset. Around 19% of those who had formal (secondary) school level qualifications said that altruism meant a general seva sentiment.

Being a member of the monastic order or being an office bearer also had a significant association with the meanings attributed to altruism \( \chi^2(4) = 51.77, p < 0.00 \). Members of the monastic order generally felt that altruism meant service to others, global view and generous mindset and a general seva sentiment. Office bearers generally proposed that altruism meant philanthropy and giving and a greater common good.

The reasons for joining the organizations (guru or family) also had a significant association with the meaning of altruism \( \chi^2(4) = 11.66, p = 0.02 \). Most of those who had joined due to attachment to the teacher/guru said that altruism meant service to others, global view and generous mindset and general seva sentiment. Those who had joined the organizations due to the influences of their families said that altruism meant philanthropy and giving and a greater common good.

Altruistic beliefs
In terms of altruistic beliefs, some respondents said that it meant helping others (51.02%) and some said that it meant doing a good deed a day (48.98%). Gender had a significant association with the nature of altruistic beliefs \( \chi^2(1) = 8.51, p = 0.003 \). A higher proportion of women (57.43%) said that altruism meant helping others and 52.05% of the men said that it meant doing good deed a day. Work profile of the respondents within the organizations also had a significant association with altruistic beliefs \( \chi^2(1) = 8.03, p = 0.00 \). Among those who
did seva of all kinds, 55.53% held the altruistic belief of helping others while 53.10% of those who did faith proliferation and social service held the altruistic belief of doing one good deed a day.

**Altruistic practices**

For the majority (90.46%), altruistic practices meant organizational efforts of social service and philanthropic engagements and few said that it meant participating in large scale social projects. All the male respondents and 82.51% of the female respondents said that altruistic practices mean organizational efforts of social service and philanthropic engagements. Roughly 89% of the full-time members of the order and 92% of those who had joined the organization as they are attracted and attached to the charisma and teachings of the guru/teacher were in favour of organizational efforts. Promoting organisational efforts of social service and philanthropic engagements as an important altruistic practice was attested by 79% of those whose work profile was faith proliferation and social service and 89% of those who did seva. On the Pearson’s chi-square test of significance of association, gender [c2(1) = 11.12, p = 0.00], work profile [c2(1) = 15.08, p = 0.00] and type of membership (full-time member of the order or office bearer) [c2(1) = 17.14, p = 0.00] were significantly associated with views on altruistic practices.

**Altruistic experiences**

Altruistic experiences were derived from existing social projects of the organizations (51.20%) or developing new initiatives (48.80%). Gender had a significant association with altruistic experiences of the respondents [c2(1) = 7.31, p = 0.00]. For women (57.14%) the experiences were generally derived from existing social projects of the organizations and 51.64% of the men said that it was through the development of new social service initiatives. Being a member of the monastic order or being an office bearer also had a significant association with altruistic experiences [c2(1) = 5.25, p = 0.02]. Interestingly, 55.09% of the monastic order members derived their altruistic experiences through joining existing social initiatives. A majority (51.92%) of the office bearers gained experiences through new initiatives. This could be due to the reality that members of the monastic order have as their first mandate the proliferation of the organization’s faith while social service or seva is contingent on factors such as interest, time availability and other predispositions. Essentially, committing to monastic life may not necessarily ensure committing to social causes. Similarly, the work profile of the respondents was also significantly associated with altruistic experiences [c2(1) = 6.74, p = 0.009]. Among those whose work profile was faith proliferation and social service, 52.57% said that their core altruistic experiences were derived out of joining existing social service projects of the organizations while 55.34% of those who undertook seva of all kinds said that their core altruistic experience was derived out of undertaking new social service initiatives.
Table 1: Altruism Meaning, Beliefs, Practices and Experiences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meaning of Altruism</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Service to Others</td>
<td>14.44</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philanthropy - Giving</td>
<td>33.80</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global View and Generous Mindset</td>
<td>21.48</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Common Good</td>
<td>15.46</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Seva Sentiment</td>
<td>14.81</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Altruistic Beliefs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help Others</td>
<td>51.02</td>
<td>551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good Deed a Day</td>
<td>48.98</td>
<td>529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Altruistic Practices</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Organizations’ social service Efforts</td>
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<td>977</td>
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<td>New Initiatives</td>
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<td><strong>Purpose of Altruism</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Spreading the Guru Message</td>
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<td>808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serving Society</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Altruism Scale</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>15 – 42 average</td>
<td>45.46</td>
<td>491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43 – 56 good</td>
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<td>467</td>
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<tr>
<td>22- 23 good</td>
<td>42.41</td>
<td>458</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td>1080</td>
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Scale scores
Most respondents (74.81%) said that the purpose of altruism was spreading the message of the guru/teacher and some said it meant serving society at large (25.19%). A little less than half (45.46%) had moderately good and very good scores, ranging from 43–56, on the adapted self-reported altruism scale (Table 2). Around one tenth of the respondents in the youngest age group (20–29 years) and the oldest (80 and above) age group had low scores. Roughly half (49.70%) of the respondents in the age group 50–59 and 48.74% in the age group 30–39 years had good scores while 35.14% in the oldest age group had good scores. Looking at gender, 9.45% of the men and 8.29% of the women respondents had low scores while 45.75% of the men and 44.86% of the women had good scores. On the Pearson’s chi-square test of significance of association sex of the respondents had a significant association with scores on the altruism scale [$\chi^2(2) = 18.14, p < 0.05$]. A higher proportion of the respondents with a bachelor’s
degree had good scores (46.04%). A slightly higher percentage of members of the order than office bearers, 45.74% and 45.24% respectively, had scores in the good range. Further, 47.69% of those who were associated with the organizations for longer (i.e., 20 years and above) had scores in the good range. Among those who were associated for 5–10 years, 11.76% had lower scores. More of those who had joined the organization due to the charismatic influence of the guru (45.85%) than those who had joined due to their family influences (44.18%) had good scores. Finally, 45.66% of those who did faith work and social service and 45.24% of those who performed seva of all kinds had better scores on the altruism scale.

<table>
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<th>Background Variables</th>
<th>Altruism Scale Scores</th>
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<td>CM</td>
<td>9.26</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAM</td>
<td>8.89</td>
<td>45.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOL</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
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<td>Guru</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seva of all Kinds</td>
<td>9.52</td>
<td>45.24</td>
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Table 2: Adapted Self Reported Altruism Scale Scores
In terms of the philanthropy scale, 43.24% had average scores and 42.41% had good scores (Table 3). Roughly half the respondents aged 70 and above (51.35%) and 47.31% of the respondents in the age group 50–59 had good scores. Looking at gender, 43.14% of the female respondents and 42.05% of the male respondents had scores in the good range on the philanthropy scale. Considering education, 46.64% of the respondents having master’s degree, 39.58% with bachelors’ degree and 45.40% having secondary school level education had scores in the good range. In terms of duration of association, 43.47% of those who were associated with the respective organizations for 10–20 years, 38.97% of those associated for 20 years or more and 42.16% of those associated for 5–10 years had good scores. On the Pearson’s chi-square test, duration of association of the respondents had a significant association with philanthropy scale scores \( \chi^2(2) = 29.25, p < 0.05 \). There was little difference between those who had joined the organization due to the charismatic influence of the guru (42.36%) and of those who had joined due to family influences (42.57%) with good scores. Of those who did faith work and social service, 42.65% had good scores while among those who did general service of all kinds including admin work, 42.14% had good scores. On the Pearson’s chi-square test, work profile had a significant association with philanthropy scale scores \( \chi^2(2) = 27.18, p < 0.05 \).

**Table 3: Philanthropy Scale Scores**

<table>
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<tr>
<td>Seva of all Kinds</td>
<td>13.79</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

\[ \text{Total} = \text{Low} + \text{Average} + \text{Good} \]
Logistic regression: Predictors of the purpose of altruism

A logistic regression analysis was conducted to understand the purpose of altruism (spreading the Guru message or serving society) (Table 4). A test of the full model against a constant only model was statistically significant, indicating that the predictors as a set reliably distinguished between perceptions on purpose of altruism \([LR \chi^2(12) = 104.46, \text{ prob } \chi^2 = 0.0086]\). Prediction success was 57.60% (pseudo \(R^2 = 0.5760\)). The \(z\) test showed that age, duration of association, reasons for joining, work profile, meaning of altruism, and altruistic beliefs, practices and experiences, made a significant difference to the prediction of whether the purpose of altruism was spreading the guru message or serving society. To look at the effect size of the predictors, the odds ratio of predictors such as age, sex, duration of association, reasons for joining, work profile, meaning of altruism and altruistic beliefs, practices and experiences is greater than one. This means that for young male adults who joined because of attraction and attachment to the charisma and teachings of the guru and were associated with the organizations for 10–20 years; whose work profile combined faith proliferation and social service; who defined altruism in terms of general good and service sentiment; had a core altruistic belief in helping others and altruistic practice of individual efforts; and whose altruistic experiences were derived from joining existing projects of organizations; the core purpose of altruism was spreading the guru message which was believed to encompass altruistic values and related practical sentiments.

In general, the results showed that members of the order understood altruism as service to others, philanthropy or giving, global view and generous mindset, greater common good and general seva or social service sentiment. Altruistic beliefs were helping others and doing a good deed a day. The majority felt that altruistic practices meant efforts of the organizations in social service. Altruistic experiences were derived from existing social projects of the organizations or developing new initiatives. All the respondents had relatively

| Purpose of Altruism       | Odds Ratio | Std. Error | z     | P>|z| | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|---------------------------|------------|------------|-------|------|---------------------|
| Constant                  | 1.12       | 0.08       | -3.10 | 0.00 | 0.0334, 0.4648      |
| Organization              | 0.98       | 0.08       | -0.16 | 0.87 | 0.8416, 1.1581      |
| Age                       | 1.00       | 0.05       | 0.98  | 0.02 | 0.9014, 1.1116      |
| Sex                       | 1.32       | 0.35       | 1.05  | 0.29 | 0.7832, 2.2324      |
| Education                 | 0.86       | 0.08       | -1.38 | 0.06 | 0.7134, 1.0601      |
| Occupation                | 0.83       | 0.14       | -1.08 | 0.28 | 0.5996, 1.1603      |
| Association Duration      | 1.04       | 0.12       | 0.36  | 0.02 | 0.8285, 1.3123      |
| Joining Reasons           | 1.07       | 0.21       | 0.34  | 0.03 | 0.7278, 1.5723      |
| Work Profile              | 1.05       | 0.25       | 0.19  | 0.04 | 0.6500, 1.6898      |
| Altruism Meaning          | 1.02       | 0.06       | 0.78  | 0.03 | 0.8919, 1.1651      |
| Altruistic Beliefs        | 1.23       | 0.18       | 1.42  | 0.01 | 0.9256, 1.6286      |
| Altruistic Practices      | 1.17       | 0.28       | 0.65  | 0.01 | 0.7338, 1.8581      |
| Experiences               | 1.28       | 0.18       | 1.74  | 0.01 | 0.9693, 1.7081      |
good scores on the self reported altruism scale and the philanthropy scale. The majority said that the purpose of altruism was spreading the message of the guru/teacher and some said it meant serving society at large. For that majority, the message of the guru/teacher was believed to encompass altruistic values and related practical sentiments.

Concluding Remarks

The results of the study have shown that members of the order and office bearers of the faith-based organizations under study had construed different meanings of altruism, altruistic beliefs, practices and experiences as well as the purpose of altruism. The two core purposes of altruism discerned through the data are spreading the guru message and service to society. In contemporary times, this effort on the part of faith-based organizations is a move in the direction of asserting their presence in the realm of the third or nonprofit sector, the main distinction being their ideological frame of reference and guru charisma as the core of all operations and outreach. In that sense, they forward a model of faith-based social work through the projection of altruism as a value.

This enterprise of faith-based organizations to engage in altruistic endeavours is a move to develop culturally relevant theology—influencing behaviours, worldviews and lifestyles. The findings of this paper show that for the members of the order of these organizations, altruism is a desired value which enables simultaneously a spiritual maturation for self/associates and contribution to social development at large.

The idea is that altruism is a kind of social learning process for the faith-based organizations which links their faith to society at large. The guru or teacher is the authority, the faith-based enterprise/organization is the context and altruism then serves to be the moral behaviour pattern. Altruism enables transcending existential struggles towards a social emancipation based on the logic of the greater common good. Using the terms of existentialist philosopher Jean Paul Sartre, this is the exploration of the limits of individuality (in this case that of the faith-based organizations) and using altruism’s yardstick for surmounting the limits (Zheng, 1997).

Hence in general, altruism is a manifestation of the social values of the living gurus and their ministries. It enables maintaining a social stake for these organizations and at the same time spreading the guru/teacher message. Certain shifts take place through this—from a general value orientation to the charismatic guru/teacher’s authority orientation; from individual choice to perform social service to the follower’s drive to do so to gain proximity to the teacher; and, from morality of altruistic values to defining the positivity of altruism through benefits of self-transcendence as determined by the ideals of the guru and hence the faith-based organizations. Messages promoting altruism go beyond simple instilling/extolling of virtues, but rather portray as vanguards of fulfilling social obligations. The operational ontology contains communitarian notions of social citizenship. There is a stylised form of faith-based altruism logic and public good.

What is of course prominent is a form of impure altruism as it entails consuming “clubbiness” (proximity to the guru/teacher and being part of his/her coterie) as a private good along with social service engagements and hence altruism as public good. Members of the order and key office bearers claim a personal gain in terms of becoming “wiser from the experience,” which propels them to continue. It becomes their way of responding to the guru/teacher and to the needs of others (including followers and beneficiaries). Further, altruism helps to form beneficial relationships with significant others and provides other personal gains such as subjective-psychological well-being.

Faith-based organizations in turn are institutional actors in civil society, having the requisite material and symbolic resources for organising meaningful action entailing prudent citizenship, civility and rights. It can be said that a combination of liberal and communitarian notions prevails—wherein there is a simultaneous emphasis on the associates’ self transcendence and freedom and the faith-based organization’s community sentiments. Faith thus becomes the epiphenomenon of civic life.
Altruism is beyond instrumental action or rationality for these organizations – it is a sort of a process-oriented experience. Both the organizations themselves and society mutually unfold through this act of altruism. In fact, through this altruism one can begin speaking of an increased orientation of the “other” (outside their ambit) of these living guru driven faith-based organizations or enterprises as sources of defining themselves, of relational intimacy, shared subjectivity and social integration.

The large-scale discharge/dissemination and conduct of social services is a driving force behind their object-centered altruism. Here, the object is the society and the cultures and subcultures which are not their own. The final purpose of this is the notion of integration. The fact that the normative consensus and shared values and traditions which the organizations seek through altruism is not possible in the growing, diverse cultural and ethnic consciousness, makes adequate room for the arguments of hegemony and domination which are part and parcel of their altruism.

Nevertheless, what guru led movements manage on the social playground is a socioculturally engineered consensus. Due to their resource endowments and partnering in the development goals in an essentially resource limited setting, the metaphor of ‘in thought collective’ (with civil society, state and market) may be applicable. One can assume that this kind of an objectual integration then gives the faith-based organizations an adequate grounding to be critical and powerful civil society actors.

**Implications for social work**

Several authors have promoted the enterprise of faith-based initiatives in social work (Ebaugh, Chafetz and Pipes, 2005; Harris, Hutchison and Cairns, 2005; Smith and Teasley, 2007; Harr and Yancey, 2007; Graham and Shier, 2007; Belcher and Deforge, 2008; Williams and Smolak, 2009; Gocmen, 2013; Crisp, 2013; Lee and Barrett, 2014). The findings of this study further corroborate that the ministries of living gurus and the mandate of social service pursued by their organizations promote altruism as a value which has immense potential.

For social work intervention, this has multiple implications. There are micro level implications for stakeholder groups that benefit from the altruistic sentiment. For social work in India and the empowerment of vulnerable groups, the findings of this study have implications specifically as they open up a sector of intervention which has resources to work with the poor. Particularly in a resource limited social welfare scenario such as India, this becomes critical. As the findings of this study have shown, the purpose of altruism, according to the members of the order and office bearers, is to serve society and spread the guru message. Even though spreading the message may have aspects of embedded hegemony, service to society remains a primary agenda. This opens up scope to evolve partnerships and collaborations with and to extend the social welfare and empowerment mandate of faith-based organizations.

The macro level implications highlight an argument in favour of faith-based and altruism driven social work by guru led faith-based organizations who place a premium on altruism as a value. This makes a case for social work practice to work in and with faith-based organizations as a part of social work practice and hence the discourse for developing an accompanying skill set among learners. Finally, this has epistemic implications for the social work discipline.

The social work discipline in India needs a generosity to do practical work with organizations whose aims, values and structures have arisen from a philosophical and value basis other than professional social work. This may mean interacting with the order-power, associates-adherents and possibly collaborating with them in a systematic way as non-state actors. Further, this entails utilising the altruistic sentiment and minimising/erasing the sense of antagonism/othering which may occur due to the faith-based organizations firm ideologies.

The epistemic implication for social work is the affirmative recognition of faith-based social work through the lynchpin of altruism as a value.
This would effectively mean an incorporation of and generosity towards faith-based worldviews, discourses on ‘being’, social ethics and visions of social transformation. Practice implications for social work in India are the consideration of living guru led faith-based organizations as potential sites of and for intervention and trainings thereof. Tackling the value based antagonisms-contradictions and skill set development are the crucial accompaniments. The exercise may entail at once a self reflexivity on the part of trainees in terms of their own faith belief system and faith organizations’ stances, and an active engagement with their worldviews.

References


Living Gurus, Their Ministries and Altruism as a Value: The Enterprise of Faith-Based Social Service


**Footnotes**

1The seven items blend together attitudes about intergenerational solidarity (items 1 and 2); the decline of solidarity in society (item 3); and personal responsibility for others’ well-being (items 4–7). Altogether, the authors contend that these components form the foundations of social responsibility. (The authors do not separate the scale into these three factors; rather, they measure the seven items together as a single factor.)
Use of Self in Social Work: Rhetoric or Reality

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archana_kaushik@rediffmail.com

Abstract
In social work literature, use of self implies consciously utilizing knowledge, skills, and values in interventions. Self-awareness is a critical skill used to be aware of one’s hidden personality traits for effective practice. This paper tries to delve deeper into the realms of the dynamic nature of self-differentiating between real Self and false selves. It is argued that knowing one’s biases and prejudices is learning more about the image of the self that we create and not the true Self. The paper asserts that knowing the true self is a pre-requisite of using self to ameliorate human sufferings.

Keywords: the Self; self-awareness; use of self; real self; self-concept

Social Workers’ Use of “Self”

Social work, in many ways, is defined as the provision of a relationship to facilitate service-users in the handling or negotiation of personal, family or community conflicts, transitions, and tensions. This definition suggests that social work practice must have the “use of self” at its core (see Cooper, 2012). The phrase “Use of Self” in social work has always entrapped me with confusion and curiosity. Literature on social work practice indicates that social workers themselves are the instruments of the profession. The “use of self” in social work is analogous to tools/instruments used in other professions—stethoscope by physicians, paint brush by artists, guitar or drum by musicians, and the like.

The Licensed Independent Clinical Social Workers (LICSW) define “Use of Self” as “sharing myself with my clients through skillful self-disclosure and empathy and authentically bringing all I’m made of into the therapeutic relationship for use as a therapeutic tool” (Daley, 2013, p.3). The use of Self means efficiently and rationally using the knowledge, skills, and values of the social work profession to enhance the well-being of a client—whether individual, group, community, or society as a whole. The notion of self forms the base of therapeutic social work. Cooper (2012) claims that use of self in social work is to engage with questions about how we experience ourselves in the work we do with our clients, how our complex and disturbing experiences can be symbolized, verbalized, and put in use in the context of client-worker relationships that are central to practice. Let us explore further what is “use of self,” which social workers utilize as a “tool” in their interventions.

Social work practitioners and educators claim the following about “Use of Self”: Since human service professions including social work deal with subtle aspects of human behaviors, intangibility dimension of modalities, and outcomes of interventions has a dominant presence. Social workers often look for subtle cues, gestures, or indications in behaviors of clients to diagnose the problem areas and design interventions. The indicators of successes and failures of activities and actions, too, are not readily observable and so are the components of “use of self.”

The term “conscious use of self” implies the skill of purposefully and intentionally using
motivation and capacity to communicate in ways that facilitate change (Sheafor & Horejsi, 2003). It means use of self is a skill. Dewane (2006) expands this definition by putting it as “the use of self in social work practice is the combining of knowledge, values, and skills gained in social work education with aspects of one’s personal self, including personality traits, belief systems, life experiences, and cultural heritage” (p. 545). On similar lines, Walters (2008) examines that successful students not only master the skill sets taught in social work practice courses, but also integrate these skills well with their authentic selves.

These definitions suggest there is a personal self. And since the need to qualify “self” as “personal” arose, it means there is “professional self” too. In addition, Walters mentions “authentic self.” The question arises, what is this “authentic self” and do we know “It”? As a logical corollary, this also implies that we have those parts of the self too that are not authentic…do we have only one “Self” with many shades or several “selves” (residing in one body)? Dewane (2006) propounds that to integrate social work skills into the authentic self-functioning of certain domains like personality, belief system, and relational dynamics are significant. These domains need further probing to understand the notion of “Self.”

**Personality** of a social worker plays critical role in use of self. Many scholars and educators (Edwards & Bess, 1998; Baldwin, 2000) assert that personality traits of a social worker have far more powerful impact on client satisfaction than his/her theoretical orientation and mastery of skills. They claim that exhibiting one’s “real self” in social work interventions is a potent therapeutic tool and “training” in social work comes second. This assertion raises certain queries—What is the relation between the self and personality? If we have a real-self, then, are there “false selves” too? Personality is also taken as a “mask” of the real (?) self. It also implies that this mask or personality is a “false self,” which seems to be integrated with true self.

**Belief System,** which comprises values, ideologies, attitudes, and perceptions, is the second aspect of the self that has an impact on social work practice. This belief system, which is the outcome of our socialization process, makes our “functional reality or subjective reality.” It is the lens through which we see the world and interpret meanings from social situations and interactions with individuals. Rogers (1959) claims the only reality people can possibly know is the world they individually perceive and there are as many realities as there are people.

Moreover, Oscar Wilde argued “most people are other people.” If personality is the product of beliefs and attitudes that one acquires during socialization, what is the “self” that gets concealed with perceptions and ideologies? And beliefs and attitudes, whether akin or against the notions of morality of the society, are merely acquired and imposed thoughts.

The third aspect of use of self is **Relational Dynamics.** Rogers (1957) asserts that congruence, unconditional positive regard, and empathy are the necessary and sufficient conditions that form the foundation of all helping relationships. Can we technically (and mechanically) incorporate congruence, unconditional positive regard, and empathy among social work trainees? Or will these traits reflect the presence of that real or true self inside each one of us that often get veiled under our belief systems and personality dispositions?

Social workers “use self” in their interactions and interventions with clients. Empathy, genuine concern and communication skills are crucial aspects of “using self” by social workers. However, our socialization and socio-cultural environment play crucial roles in determining relational skills and empathy. This explains the differences among social workers in application of values and skills in social work practice despite uniform education and training. If socialization is the critical variable in inculcation of values like empathy and compassion amongst people, can a couple of years of training in social work bring substantial changes in the value system of an individual social worker? Can empathy and genuine concern be “inculcated and refined” among social work students? Is it possible
that a dexterous social worker uses “Self” in all the situations and conditions with the same ease, even when there is incongruence between his/her values and attitudes in contrast to those of the clients?

This entails that empathy is the function of commonness between subjective realities of social workers and their clients—empathizing with the other becomes tough if there are no shared meanings of subjective realities. Can we truly practice empathy as a skill, which forms the base of “using self” in social work?

Self-Awareness

How do we learn to use self? Social workers are required to understand the subtle and hidden intra-psychic processes among clients reflected through their behaviors. This, indeed, is a tricky task, unless one is sensitive towards one’s own thoughts, feelings, and attitudes. Schneider-Corey and Corey (2002) have rightly claimed that any therapeutic person needs to be aware of one’s own identity, limitations, feelings, and frustrations in order to know his/her clients better. They assert:

A central characteristic for any therapeutic person is an awareness of self including one’s identity, cultural perspective, goals, motivations, needs, limitations, strengths, values, feelings, and problems. If you have a limited understanding of who you are, you will surely not be able to facilitate this kind of awareness in clients (p.32).

Likewise, Cournoyer (2000) also stresses that since social workers themselves become the medium through which knowledge, attitudes, and skills are conveyed, without self-awareness, despite best intentions, social work professionals fail to help the clients. Thus, the skill of self-awareness is of significance and it refers to the ability to recognize our own thoughts, beliefs, emotions, personality traits, personal values, habits, biases, strengths, weaknesses, and the psychological needs that drive our behaviors.

Knowing “self” is a pre-condition to know “others.” If one observes oneself identifying virtues and vices, attitudes and perceptions, seeing how the mind plays tricks, and how defense mechanisms operate, he/she becomes capable of locating the hidden and manifested emotional blockages among the clients. Negi, Bender, Furman, Fowler, and Prickett (2010) also highlight the importance of engaging students and practitioners of social work in the process of self-discovery and self-awareness, with the goal of helping them recognize their own biases, develop empathy, and become better prepared for conscious and effective use of self. Identifying one’s own feelings and thinking patterns aid in understanding the interplay of socio-cultural factors and psychological underpinnings that frame the human personality. Self-awareness, thus, makes a social work professional more dexterous and efficient in identifying and resolving intrapersonal and interpersonal conflicting areas (also see Jacobson, 2001).

In 2000, The National Association of Social Workers (NASW) emphasized the critical importance of self-awareness in culturally competent social work practice. The second of the ten standards directly addresses self-awareness stating, “Social workers shall seek to develop an understanding of their own personal, cultural values and beliefs as one way of appreciating the importance of multicultural identities in the lives of people” (p. 4). In the interpretation discussion of this standard, cultural competence is further defined as “knowing and acknowledging how fears, ignorance, and the “isms” (racism, sexism, ethnocentrism, heterosexism, ageism, and classism) have influenced their attitudes, beliefs, and feelings” (NASW, 2001; p. 17). Thus, self-awareness becomes a vital tool in developing cultural competence, and also in effective “use of self.”

Enhancing Self-Awareness Skill

How can we know the Self? There are certain aspects of self in the domain of experiential reality to which the concerned person can be the best authority. For instance, I can be the best judge
to tell whether I am feeling pain in my stomach or feeling hungry or thirsty. Yet, I may not be consciously aware of the defense mechanisms I am exhibiting in my behavior to hide my jealousy or hatred—the aspect of my “Self” that others may identify with relative ease. Nonetheless, conscious efforts to know about self through awareness and mindfulness go a long way in understanding the diverse realms of self. Social work practitioners and trainees employ several strategies and tools to enhance the vital skill of self-awareness. The prominent ones are introspecting—listing one’s salient personality traits and reflecting how these traits can act as facilitators or inhibitors in relating to clients, self administration of projective techniques and attitudinal scales, getting feedback from supervisors and peers, reviewing audio-video tapes, and/or process recordings to obtain feedback, rehearsing or role-playing problem-solving sessions, and the like.

External sources like attitudinal scales and feedback by others merely indicate the perceptions and traits we hold (or the Self holds). Then, how far self-knowledge can be gained through these tools and strategies? Can the skill of self-awareness help us in knowing about our true or real self? What is our existence beyond our values, attitudes, and perceptions? Who are we beyond our personality dispositions and traits? What is the “Self” that is being used as a tool in social work interventions? And how feasible is it to “use self” without knowing what is this self?

What Is the Self?

Quite ironically, defining the Self, which is the core of our existence or being, is not easily defined. It is the “I,” the “me,” the entity that exists... feels...experiences....Looking into the mirror, we see an image of our body, which we identify as ourselves. Self is defined as the representation or set of representations about oneself, parallel to the representations people have of other individuals (Swann & Bosson, 2008). It is the “me” “self-as-object,” about which James (1950) has written that it is the entire set of beliefs, evaluations, perceptions, and thoughts that people have about themselves. These definitions invariably reflect self-concept rather than “Self.”

More often than not, we identify with our body. Physical attributes of our body constitute a significant part of our identity. I am beautiful or ugly, fat or slim, young or old—all these characteristics reflect our identifications with our body. Our notion of birth and death is also related to the body. At the time the heart in the body is beating and lungs are breathing in air, the person is alive. When the body’s vital functioning stops, he/she is considered clinically dead. Scientists have estimated that on an average, we are composed of nearly fifteen trillion cells, each being an independent living unit (Zimmer, 2013). Furthermore, life span of these cells is far shorter than the human body, which is composed of them. Every second, thousands of cells of the body keep dying and being replaced by new ones. So, technically, an individual at the time of death does not have the same body he/she was born with. But still, someone/something inside the body remembers (and sees) the body passing through phases of childhood, youth, old age...Who is this someone or something that remembers this continuity? Seemingly, physical body is not the Self.

Another crucial aspect of our identity is our “psychological self.” Scientists have claimed strong inter-linkage between body and mind. Experiments in neurosciences bring out that “brain” is the chief organ in the body that does all the thinking, feeling, visualizing, experiencing, and sensing and there are specific areas in the brain to experience and feel different sensations. In fact, feelings of empathy and compassion are also subject to certain hormonal reactions in the brain. Recent research studies claim that the feeling of “I” and “me” are illusionary as there is no single place in the brain that generates this sense of “Self.” There is no single leader or commander-in-chief in our brain to direct our behavior. There are only ever-changing thoughts, feelings, and memories in the brain. Philosophers too confirm that there is no “Cartesian ego” unifying the consciousness (see Dainton, 2014; Ouellette, 2014). There have been ample scientific
proves against the Self. In psychopathology, cases of Cotard syndrome (where sufferers believe that they do not exist) and dissociative identity disorder (where a single body harbors multiple selves) claim against the sense of self. If the sense of Self is so fragile and fragmentary, where is the Self located and from where does this sense of “I” and “me” come from? It further entails questions basic to our existence—in essence, who am I? Where is the Self (or my identity) rooted—in the body or in the brain?

Akin to the cells of the physical body, thoughts are the building blocks of our psychological self. Repeated thoughts result in developing our core beliefs, which form our perceptions, attitudes, biases, value systems. Our thoughts also develop our “image of self”—our identity. This identity (rather, multiple identities) includes our name, family, religion, belongings, etc. This image of ourselves is developed to cover up our ignorance of who we actually are. This image, termed as “ego” by psychologists, gives rise to personality with competing core beliefs. Identification with the ego and the physical body creates a false identity, which is dependent on the views of “others” about us. The Self constitutes the central notion of an individual’s identity. Mead (1934) notes that meanings derived through social interactions shape an individual’s identity. Stryker (2000) reiterates this assumption as, among others, a person’s sense of self depends on the social environment to which he/she belongs. So, quite ironically, others define our “Self.”

The thought of “I am” is based on social constructs like gender, religion, nationality, personal achievements, and so on, which we learn from our social surroundings. It gives rise to a false self with which we create an attachment. This false identity or the ego always compares and competes with others and thrives on approval and appreciation of others. Thus, the false identity created moves between extremes of feelings of inferiority and superiority depending upon circumstances and people. We learn to defend our ego and create a false moral self, which is our “desired self.” This egoistic moral self, views everyone with conditioned perception. And so long as people behave in consonance with our core beliefs, they are good people. We believe that people like us are good, because we are good. In addition, any critical remarks or undesirable behaviors by others frequently hurt our ego. We desperately want to protect our ego and try to cover up our inferiority with defense mechanisms like rationalization and projection.

Much research attention has been paid to the “self” and its dimensions in recent decades. However, sociologists and psychologists are still struggling to articulate the presence of “Self” in the identity construction. James (1950), who pioneered the conception of the Self into the mainstream of social-psychology, asserted that “Self” is a source of continuity that gives the individual a sense of “connectedness and unbrokenness.” Aristotle (Barnes, 1984) asserts that the soul is an immaterial entity that unites the person’s various perceptions and sensations, which forms the nature of “I” or the Self. He demonstrated the conception of this abstract form of Self/Soul by distinguishing between the substance of an object and its form. For instance, the substance of a bronze statue is the element bronze, and the form is the statue. When melted, the form changes, though the substance remains the same. This view of identity is known as dualism as it postulates the existence of two entities: the body (the material) and the mind or soul (the immaterial).

Furthering Aristotle’s line of thought, the British philosopher John Locke made a distinction between man and person. To him, man is a substance and person is the form, while criterion for personhood is the ability to remember our perceptions in the prior situations of our lives and is a function of memory (Strawson, 2011).

Based on the theoretical framework of symbolic interactionism, Mead (1934) and Cooley (1902) postulate that knowledge about “Self” is rooted in reactions of others and the roles people play. So, the roles we play become the foundation of our self-knowledge. But, we perform numerous roles in our life time and many of them at the same time. Then, how is continuity maintained between these roles/selves? This assertion is not in tune with the notion of enduring self as demonstrated
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by James. This fallacy was addressed by Goffman (1959) who propounded that “people are like actors in a play who perform for different audiences. As people take on various identities, the Self is merely a consequence, rather than a cause of the performance” (p. 252).

Psychologists and social scientists have shown considerable interest in developing strategies and techniques to unveil the dynamic notion of self. Delving into the self as a mental representation, researchers have categorized self-knowledge as “active” or “phenomenal self” (Jones & Gerard, 1967), which includes information about oneself that is held in consciousness as against the “stored self knowledge” that comprises of the information about the self held in memory but not being attended to. However, people with cognitive impairments fail to recall their “identities.” Indeed, the Self, which is the core of our existence, cannot be dependent on the fragility of the memory.

All human beings, potentially, have co-existence of opposite traits—of vices and virtues—hate and love, anger and calm, violence and compassion, dominance and congeniality, apathy and empathy—seeds of these contrasting feelings and emotions are inside us. However, we accept only selective portions of “me” having virtues only as “desired self” and deny the “undesired self” with vices (see Ogilvie, 1987). The self with vices is pushed below to the realms of unconsciousness. And whenever characteristics of the “undesired self” such as hate, jealousy, surge to the surface we project these onto “others.” In fact, among others, Chopra (2012) has maintained that we “project” beliefs, motives, feelings, that we have disowned in ourselves onto another person. For instance, to avoid feeling that we are not good enough, we judge others as inadequate. Projection is destructive for two major reasons: First, it prevents us from truly knowing and accepting ourselves. Second, it prevents us from truly knowing and accepting others.

We are ignorant about our true “Self” and convincingly believe that we know ourselves. This false notion of knowing is extended to our clientele and their social situations too. Our pretention that we know prevents us from knowing our real “Self.” Current literature in psychology and sociology highlight plenty theories on self but almost all of them are confined to the images/roles of self rather than exploring the true nature of self (see also Snyder, 1974; McCall & Simmons, 1978; Tajfel, 1981; Tulving, 1983; Markus & Nurius, 1986; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; Klein & Loftus, 1993; and Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).

The conception of self soon becomes the social identities that are socially constructed meaningful categories accepted by individuals as descriptive of themselves or their groups (Ashmore & Jussim, 1997). Undeniably, these are the images or illusions of the Self or the false self. It suggests that when social workers employ skill of self-awareness, they tend to know more about the “image” of the Self, and not the true self. Attempts to know our Self by learning about our hidden attitudes and perceptions or employing strategies to increase our self-awareness may not lead us to our real Self. Knowing about our strengths and weaknesses, values and attitudes, does not equate to knowing the Self. Whether favorable or unfavorable, attitudes are the function of our unreal self. Only by knowing our true nature can we come out of the polarity of paradoxical traits (vices and virtues) that has fragmented our “Self.” And the skill of self-awareness we discussed largely limits itself to knowing our perceptions and traits as we hardly turn our focus to “who is bearing all the attitudes, values and perceptions.” The story below explains the case-point:

A lady had a beautiful garden blooming with beautiful flowers. She had spent years to nurture that garden and people from faraway places used to come to see it. She fell ill and was bed-ridden. Seeing the worry of his mother about the garden, that lady’s ten-year-old son promised to take care of plants and trees till she is recovered. The boy sincerely did his job—he would
daily remove dust from each leaf, caress and kiss the flowers, sprinkle water over leaves and flowers. After three months the lady returned back, only to see that her cherished garden had withered away—leaves had dried up, flowers had faded and wilted. Shocked and dismayed, she yelled at her son. With tears in his eyes, he asserted that he really cared for each and every flower and leaf. The mother, then said, “life of a plant is in its roots who are invisible, you forgot to water the roots and the result is visible in this devastation.

Are we not doing the same mistake that little boy did—ignoring the real “self” and paying attention to the images of self that we create and believe in (professional self, personal self)? Our training to inculcate professional expertise, values and skills among social work students can be equated with the boy’s efforts of caring for the garden (removing dust, weeding, tendering flowers, etc.). The hidden roots are comparable with our “real self,” which we forget to nurture. The values like compassion and empathy that form the base of the social work profession are the natural fallout of unveiling our true nature or real self. 

An egg when broken from outside loses life. But the same egg when it breaks open from inside, life comes out. Likewise, till the time our notion of self (or selves) is taught or created by the outside actors, the society, we cannot get rid of pains and sufferings. Contrarily, when the true knowledge about self comes from within, outside chaos remains the same but one achieves an unflinching calm and peace. Human service professionals “trained” to be empathetic and compassionate may not exhibit these skills/values every time, which is reflected in occasional instances of burnouts and frustration. Life of the individuals, who have known their true self, shows that their compassion and love for all beings remains unyielding in all circumstances. Our claim to use self in social work interventions is futile in the absence of true knowledge of the Self. What is the knowing of the “Self”? It is doing away with the conditioning of mind and dis-identifying ourselves with our physical body and thoughts. It is going beyond the constant chattering of mind. It is breaking away the attachment with the false self, the image we create of ourselves. Religious views mainly entail two types of Self—the “unreal self” that is the ego, also called the learned, superficial self of mind and body, and the “real self,” the “observing self,” or the “witness” or the soul. Spiritually, the real self or the witness is the pure consciousness, inside each one of us. The basic characteristic of being Self-aware is knowing that “I have a mind” instead of believing “I am a mind,” thereby distinguishing “being” from “thinking.” The process of knowing self includes dis-identifying from the mind and mental images of identity.

Dalai Lama (2006) has asserted that self-knowledge is the key to personal development and positive relationships. He states that in the absence of true self-knowledge, we hurt ourselves through misguided, exaggerated notions of self, others, external events, and physical things. Without knowing our real self, we may pretend, but cannot truly feel compassion and love for our fellow beings. Pretention that we know our Self (as we use self-awareness skill and “know” our attitudes and belief systems) has not only stopped our search for exploring the true self but also aided in hiding our negative emotions and vices. Pain, despair, and suffering equally affect us as they do to the clients we serve. We fail to heal ourselves. How can, we, the service providers, claim to help our clients deal with their suffering if we cannot ameliorate our own pain? Just as a drowning person cannot save other drowning people, we the social workers cannot heal others unless we heal ourselves. And any intention to heal ourselves keeping intact the false self or unreal identity would be in vain.

Conclusions

The core of our being, the pure consciousness is present in all of us as the real self. Identification with false notions and pretenses veil the true self and create an image of the Self which is named in
many forms—such as ego, personality, roles, self-concept—which we defend and protect throughout our life. Social work practitioners use “Self” in their interventions. Self-awareness is often directed to know the characteristics of the false self. Knowing the true self is our birthright as well as our prime duty. Knowing the real self is the pre-condition to using the self in social work. Lastly, acceptance of ignorance about our true nature would pave way to authentic knowledge. Searching for the “self,” which is to be used in social work, would set the foundation of a vibrant, loving, and caring society and facilitate realizing the goals of social work profession.

References


Navigating a Murky Landscape: The Application of Bowen Family Systems to Field Office Ethics

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Abstract
Ethical decision-making frameworks are good guides for monitoring students in the social work field setting but often fail to address the anxiety felt in ethical conflicts or murky situations. The authors posit a framework that uses three main concepts from Bowen family systems theory: triangles, differentiation of self, and both the nuclear family and multigenerational process.

Keywords: ethics, field work, social work, Bowen systems, field supervision

Although many of these situations may not actually cross the line into an ethical dilemma, they remain difficult to sort out and resolve. Educating students in the field can be an area full of a myriad of decisions, as one manages relationships between various stakeholders. It can also be challenging to guide social work students through sound decision making as they are first introduced to the varied needs and demands of an agency setting. Many field directors and liaisons struggle with how to maintain strong relationships with the field sites while also supporting students as the students question practices and decisions. This job can be challenging, as there is little guidance on best practices for supporting students in the field. This situation is ironic, considering how critical the field practicum is to social work education.

Introduction
Social work emphasizes sound ethical practice built on a professional code that distinguishes it from other professions. The Code of Ethics of the National Association of Social Workers (2008) is meant to provide guidance during difficult ethical conflicts. In addition, social work researchers have developed frameworks and offered guidance on how to teach social work ethics to students. However, the field office operations can be a murky place where little guidance is available. Many field directors, liaisons, and instructors can appreciate that there are often difficult situations that arise as part of placing and maintaining students in the field.
The relationships in field education can appear similar at times to those of family systems, which is especially apparent when one considers the possible multiple relationships and tensions that can exist among the field supervisor, the faculty liaison, and the student intern (Congress, 1997). Consequently, this framework lends much support to educators who are struggling to sort through the complexities in situations that often arise in the field. Congress’s (1997) discussion of value conflicts for field educators touches on the usefulness of incorporating Bowen theory in decision-making, and we propose the addition of several components from the Bowen family system’s lens (Chambers, 2009; Sagar & Wiseman, 1982) to the framework. With this addition, field educators can better maintain focus on who the “client” is, what anxiety exists surrounding the ethical issues, and how best to proceed in the given situation.

The NASW Code of Ethics, the Ethical Principles Screen (Dolgoff, Harrington, & Loewenberg, 2012), and the Essential Ethics Framework (Reamer, 2012) are also used, as it is important that educators be able to discern when an issue moves from being confusing and unclear to possibly unethical. In this article, we highlight the steps of the proposed framework: (a) pinpointing who the actual “client” is (Congress, 1997), with awareness of differing individual and organizational interests at stake; (b) being aware of anxiety, in oneself and others; (c) reviewing the situation and the NASW Code of Ethics to determine if an ethical violation occurred (using an ethical decision-making framework if needed); (d) knowing the specific role one has in the setting/situation—especially if one has several roles in the university (Chambers, 2009; Peluso, 2003; Weinberg, 2005); and (e) consulting and dialoguing with other colleagues and making a decision or reviewing other steps as needed (Hill, Ferguson, & Erickson, 2010; Reamer, 2012; Weinberg & Campbell, 2014). When these steps are followed, field educators and social work faculty liaisons can be better equipped to manage the many stakeholder relationships and the challenging situations that can arise in the field office.

**Bowen Family System’s Lens**

Bowen family systems adds to the framework by giving social work educators in the field office a lens through which to process their own anxiety and the role it plays in assessing the dynamics that may be occurring in field operations (Chambers, 2009). This added layer of critical self-awareness is an essential aspect of sound practice and ethical decision making (Abramson, 1996; Mattison, 2000). Three aspects of Bowen family systems theory can be helpful when navigating situations that arise in the field; triangles, differentiation of self, and both the nuclear family and multigenerational process (Kerr & Bowen, 1988).

The first aspect of Bowen family systems theory to be addressed is that of triangles as three-person relationships forming the building block of larger emotional systems (Kerr & Bowen, 1988). Bowen’s focus was on the family instead of the individual. Bowen saw the dyad as less stable than the triad relationships for managing tension. When anxiety and tension build up between two people it is common for one or both to attempt to engage a third person in the conflict. This may spread the tension or anxiety, but doesn’t solve the problem. There are many possible triangles (and interlocking triangles) that can be activated in the work of the field office. One example is the conflict between the field instructor (agency person who is supervising the student) and agency staff. The field instructor may try to get the students and faculty liaisons (faculty from the student’s school) to align with the field instructor against the other staff. Another example is the relationships between the faculty liaison, the field instructor, and the student. We have had several experiences of field instructors giving negative feedback about students to the faculty liaison, but not directly to the students. The field instructor may be uncomfortable with direct conflict and look to the faculty liaison to communicate difficult things to the student.

Multiple relationships can often highlight potential ethical questions. In the example of triangles, there is potential for faculty and administrative staff of social work programs to have
professional relationships with agency staff and administrators, leaving the student feeling uncertain whom to trust with complaints about supervision. Ethical considerations can also arise if the field coordinator feels pressured to place students in organizations that have a connection to faculty.

The commonly used model of assigning students both task and MSW field supervisors can also present challenges for student interns. Students may hear different expectations including conflicting instructions from the two supervisors and turn to the faculty liaison for assistance. This could also be an example of interlocking triangles. The two supervisors and the student could be one triangle, while the student, the field staff, and one or both of the supervisors could be another triangle.

All of these examples highlight a few of the many possible triangles in social work field instruction. It is apparent how these triangles often highlight the current tension and anxiety experienced by members of the field experience. We believe an awareness of this dynamic on the part of the field office will assist in both identifying the issues as well a course of action.

The second aspect of Bowen systems theory that can be useful for social work educators is differentiation of self. It speaks to how much a person is able to make calm, thoughtful decisions when in contact with emotionally reactive individuals and systems (Kerr & Bowen, 1988). In field education, students, field instructors, and faculty liaisons may all be emotionally reactive to various issues that arise. These reactions may be to direct-service client issues, agency issues (i.e., staff morale, budget issues, and space for the student), and student-field instructor relationship issues. All of these situations can be challenging. Those people in field education know that it is not uncommon to encounter many of these circumstances all in one setting. What commonly occurs is that one person involved has an emotional reaction to what transpires, and the situation is then relayed to the faculty liaison in an urgent or emotional manner. Once that happens, it can be easy for the person receiving the information to also react emotionally.

When approaching the situation through the lens of Bowen family systems, it is important not to react but to first take a deep breath and work to collect information in a calm and thoughtful way before making a decision.

Finally, Bowen’s focus on the nuclear family and multigenerational processes can be a helpful tool for the field office when dealing with difficult field education situations. Bowen provides a framework for understanding people’s patterns of coping with stress as well as their role and process in decision making (Kerr & Bowen, 1988). An understanding of one’s own decision-making process based on familial roles and coping patterns can provide an emotional distance to the situation. For example, people can better understand what is being triggered in themselves as well as what may be triggered in others who are engaged in the situation under review.

One possible tool for the exploration of possible triggers and decision-making styles based on the family of origin is the ethical genogram, which was introduced by Peluso (2003). He draws on Bowen’s work in utilizing genograms to understand the intergenerational family emotional process (Kerr & Bowen, 1988) and encourages using a genogram to look at decision making in families of origin. Although Peluso posits the ethical genogram as a tool for clinical supervisors (2003), the same concepts can apply to the field office (Figure 1).
Some of the factors to be considered in looking at the intergenerational process include the decision-makers’ gender, religion, culture, and emotional cut-offs (Peluso, 2003). Both field staff and students can reflect on the decision-making processes in their families of origin. Family roles and family-of-origin relationship issues are often brought into the work environment (Chambers, 2009). Individuals who have been in a caretaker role in their family of origin may bring a pattern of over-functioning into the workplace. They may get involved in triangles by inserting themselves into a situation instead of encouraging the two parties to work out a conflict. Another possibility is that someone who learned to use distance as a way of coping with conflicts in their family of origin may also be passive in the workplace and not be active when appropriate in the decision-making process. Another way that ethical genograms could be applied is looking at decision-making processes in schools of social work, universities, and the organizations that host students.

Proposed Approach to Ethical Decision-Making in the Field Office

The combination of the Bowen family systems lens, the NASW Code of Ethics, and an ethical decision-making framework when necessary, work together to shape the proposed approach to difficult decisions faced by the field office. The approach is highlighted below and followed by an actual example from the field.

As you can see from the diagram in Figure 2, the proposed model is cyclical. Decision-making models can often lead people to believe that the process of making difficult decisions is clear and linear in fashion. In practice, this is rarely the case. It is more common for decision makers to move in and out of different stages of the process. For example, anxiety may not go away just because a person is aware of it. The proposed approach is explained in further detail below.

First, it is important to identify who your client is in the given situation, which will help to determine what the starting point should be. As Congress (1997) highlighted, in issues related to field work, the student is always considered the
client. This means that a beginning point to the process is figuring out what makes most sense for the student. An important aspect of this question is to keep the students’ confidentiality and self-determination a priority unless otherwise indicated. Supporting what is best for the student while also managing relationships to the organizations, community, and to the university as a whole can feel akin to walking a tightrope over a raging river. However, when you focus on the student as the client and take a deep breath and a step back to see the larger picture, it is possible to move on to the next step in the framework.

Once this first step is achieved, the next step—the step we feel is arguably one of the most important to this approach—is being aware of your own anxiety as well as the anxiety in others who are involved in the situation. It is this anxiety that can potentially lead both students and educators to make quick decisions that fail to take into account all pertinent aspects of the situation. Drawing on the Bowen family system’s lens, it is important to think about the triangles that exist in the situation. It may be that the faculty liaison is being brought in to manage the tension or anxiety that has built up in the relationship between student and field instructor. The faculty liaison will need to talk with each of them separately to figure out the source of the anxiety and how best to address it. For example, it is normal for a student to have...
some level of anxiety while learning new things, and the student may need reassurance to feel more settled in placement. However, a higher level of anxiety may exist in a new field instructor who is contemplating how to give difficult feedback to a student, or possibly to fail them. Talking with the parties involved and analyzing the situation can help defray the instructor’s own anxiety and that of others. The ability to remain nonreactive is integral to the approach and to managing stressful field situations. This is not always easy when all parties involved want an answer or solution immediately. Important skills to use during this step are actually core clinical social work skills. They include staying centered and talking from an “I” position (Kerr & Bowen, 1988) as well as remembering not to attack or defend (Kerr & Bowen, 1988), trying to simply clarify one’s own position and the position of others. It is important to observe and ask questions when appropriate, keeping in mind how each party involved is situated in a larger system.

The third step in this model is application of the NASW Code of Ethics to the situation. Many difficult circumstances that arise in the course of field instruction do not actually cross the line to being an ethical violation. However, it is important to consult the NASW Code of Ethics as well as ethical decision-making frameworks. This consultation is helpful both for guidance and to determine whether an ethical violation has occurred. After reviewing the NASW Code to see if it has clear guidelines for the situation under review, it is also helpful and important to become familiar with an ethical decision-making framework and to use it as a guide. Two ethical frameworks that we have used for decision-making in field operations are the Ethical Principals Screen (EPS; Dolgoff et al., 2012) and Reamer’s Essential Ethics Framework (2012).

Dolgoff and colleagues (2012) offer the Ethical Principle’s Screen (EPS) as a unique way to approach the application of ethical principles to one’s work. They first stress that an individual should always check to see if the NASW Code of Ethics (2008) addresses the situation and gives direction to what should be done. If the NASW Code is not sufficient to address the situation, then they offer the EPS as a way to determine which ethical principles are at stake and which take priority (2012). We add that while there is currently no consensus on the ranking of professional ethical principles, the EPS was developed with consideration of what may be the agreed-upon order by social workers. The order they give to the ethical principles is (a) protect life, (b) preserve social justice—treat all people the same given the same circumstances, (c) foster clients’ self-determination, autonomy, and freedom, (d) ensure that the decision causes the least amount of harm, (e) promote a better quality of life, (f) strengthen people’s right to privacy and confidentiality, and (g) fully disclose relevant information to clients and others (Dolgoff et al., 2012, p. 80).

Reamer (2012) posits that to best meet the needs of students, the field office, practice settings, clients, and other stakeholders, it is important that field instruction focus on four key areas. These include (a) the value base of the social work profession and its relationship to students’ values; (b) ethical dilemmas in social work; (c) ethical decision making; and (d) ethics risk management (Reamer, 2012, p. 3). Most students are given a list of decision-making steps in their field manuals as well as in practice classes (Gray & Gibbons, 2007; Reamer, 2012). They are also encouraged to explore the intersection of their own personal values, the values of the profession, and how they may cause or intensify ethical questions. Risk management is also stressed today as a result of the increased attention on professional misconduct and the possibility of legal recourse (Corey, Corey, & Callanan, 2011; Reamer, 2013; Strom-Gottfried, 2007). These areas of concern are all essential for students in field internship settings.

The fourth step is knowing the role you have in the setting/situation (Chambers, 2009; Peluso, 2003; Weinberg, 2005). This step may seem straightforward on the surface. For example, if the student is the identified client and your role is that of the field director, you could imagine that you clearly need to act on behalf of the student and what is best
for the student’s learning. However, it is not always that straightforward. Some universities have field directors who may also act as liaisons. In this case, it is important for the field directors to think about how their function may be different in each of these given roles. In addition, students may lobby for a certain decision to be made but the field director or faculty liaison may think differently. It can be difficult to know when to allow for student self-determination if no ethical violation has occurred, and when to step in and make a decision that may be best for the student and his or her learning but may be unpopular.

Finally, consultation with others is important before making a decision. Always consult with those involved in the situation, but it can also be beneficial to consult with colleagues at other schools of social work who share similar roles. When dealing with difficult situations that potentially include ethical violations, it can be helpful to see what others have done in similar situations. And finally, remember that the process is cyclical. There are many points in the process where it is advantageous to go back and examine the various motives, anxieties, and issues being raised.

Case Example from the Field

A first-year MSW student attending a university in a large Midwestern city was placed at a small, grassroots community agency that was under severe financial stress. The agency had received MSW student interns from the university in the past and also currently had a relationship with two faculty members in the department for an ongoing research project. The agency was heavily dependent on state funding, and the state was behind in payments. However, this situation was not unique to this particular organization as many social service organizations in the state were in a similar situation. The field instructor of several years abruptly left the organization during the summer months, after the MSW student was connected with the placement for her first-year field experience. An administrator of the agency said that they were bringing back an experienced, clinically licensed social worker—who had previously worked with the organization as the new field instructor. The new field instructor would work on a contractual basis to supervise the field students (other schools had students placed there as well).

The agency provides culturally sensitive services to an immigrant population that is largely underserved by the community. Most of the agency staff identify with this same ethnic group while the student and current field instructor are part of the dominant white culture. During the time the new field instructor was there she raised concerns with the student and the faculty liaison about not getting paid. She also openly expressed concerns regarding how the agency was run. She had conversations with the faculty liaison, without the student, in which she said that if she left the student should be pulled out of the placement because of organization concerns and lack of supervision options. She said she wanted to honor her academic yearlong commitment to the students but as time went on she said she wasn’t sure if she could financially afford to last for the year. Mid-way through the academic year she left and said the student should be taken out of the internship. The student had heard mostly negative things about others in the organization from the field instructor and had some negative interactions herself, which seemed to reinforce the perception that the agency environment was not going to be conducive to student learning.

Application of Framework to Case Example

The initial step in the framework is to focus on the identified client while being mindful of the other stakeholders involved. The stakeholders in this example include the student, the field instructor, the agency administrators, the student’s clients, the faculty liaison, the social work department, the faculty members who partner with the organization for research, and the university. The faculty liaison followed Congress’s recommendation (1997) to keep the student’s self-determination as a primary focus in the decision-making process. The student’s initial impression was that she should be taken out of the placement. She felt allied with the field
instructor and did not think she would have a well-supported learning experience if she stayed on at the site. However, she also expressed concern at the thought of abruptly leaving clients. The concerns raised by the field instructor were considered. However, the viewpoint of the agency administrator was also taken into account.

The agency administrator was surprised by the abrupt departure of the field instructor and the possible effect on the internship. The administrator was concerned that the field instructor’s comments regarding the organization would be discussed in the larger community. Although not verbalized, the agency administrator may have been concerned about how the removal of the student would affect the collaboration with university faculty on an ongoing research project. The faculty members partnering with the agency may have been concerned about how the conflict between the agency and the social work department would affect the collaboration. However, this was not directly discussed. The student’s clients would have been affected by abrupt service termination, without someone to transfer the clients to. In the midst of all of this, the faculty liaison was most concerned about the quality of the student’s placement going forward. She was also mindful of the potential effect of her decision on the ongoing relationship with the agency.

The second step is to be aware of anxiety, in oneself and others (note triangles, differentiation of self, and patterns of coping with stress). The faculty liaison initially saw the removal of the student as the best option. The field instructor was very clear about her concerns regarding services to clients and the student’s learning experience. Prior to the mid-year departure of the field instructor, the faculty liaison had very limited direct contact with the agency administrator. The student and faculty liaison together discussed triangles in the setting. These included student–field instructor–administrator and student–field instructor–paraprofessional staff, student–faculty liaison–field instructor, faculty liaison–student–administrator, and faculty liaison–faculty–administrator. This was indeed a murky situation with many triangles. The student expressed feeling very uncomfortable with the tension and conflict between the field instructor and the agency administrator. As recommended by Vodde and Giddings (2000), the liaison and the student completed an internship eco-map and discussed some of the triangles in the setting. This was the first time the faculty liaison had experience of a field instructor, who was the primary contact for internships, recommending a student be removed from an internship. There was clear conflict between the administrator perspective and the field instructor perspective, and it was hard to know what was accurate. This all served to generate some anxiety for the liaison.

The third step is to review the situation and the NASW Code of Ethics and determine if an ethical violation occurred. One should use an ethical decision-making framework if needed. During this step, the faculty coordinator/liaison made a point to clarify the factual information from the parties involved. Knowing that anxiety can play a role in everyone’s initial response, she knew that obtaining the facts was important.

The NASW Code of Ethics connection in this example includes respect for student self-determination, mindfulness of the importance of planned versus abrupt termination of services to clients, ethical responsibility to treat colleagues with respect, and seeking consultation (NASW, 2008). The field instructor raised concerns that there would not be someone competent at the agency to provide supervision. The agency administrator raised concerns about cultural competency of the field instructor who did not share cultural knowledge with students.

The faculty liaison contacted agency administrators to discuss the student’s placement and supervision. Prior to this first contact by the faculty liaison, the administrator said they had not been contacted by the field instructor about the field instructor’s decision to terminate her employment. The agency administrator was surprised that removing the student was even being considered. It was agreed that a meeting was needed. The meeting was held at the agency site and included
administration, the liaison, and the student. The student learned from the agency administrator of some misperceptions she had regarding agency administration and ways that the field instructor had not been following expectations regarding sharing the organization’s cultural knowledge. It was clarified that whatever decision was made about the placement, the other university and agency collaborations would continue. The student’s initial anxiety about staying decreased after the meeting. With the student’s input, the faculty liaison made the decision to keep the student at the placement. One of the agency directors took on the student’s supervision responsibilities. The faculty liaison was glad that an agreement was worked out that allowed the student to stay in the placement and decreased some of the concerns that the student had about the organization.

The fourth step is to be aware of one’s role in the situation. The student’s self-determination remained a primary factor in the decision-making process. The faculty liaison was also aware of other partnerships the agency had with faculty in the social work program. She was conscious of the varied power differentials as well as the role of dominant culture and racial privilege in this scenario considering the student, faculty liaison, and the field instructor were all from the dominant culture. The faculty liaison knew the agency administrator was very concerned about the reputation of their organization and the effect the field instructor’s statements and actions could have on the organization. It is also important to keep in mind that some agency staff and administrators most likely were aware that the social work department faculty and staff have a role in affecting decisions not just about the current student but also future students and university collaborations, much like a multigenerational family. This was a case in which the agency administrator had multiple relationships with faculty and staff at the university. The faculty liaison was aware of the numerous roles but was careful to make certain that those other relationships did not affect her decision on what was best for the student and her placement.

Finally, the fifth step is consultation. Throughout the process the liaison consulted with the social work program director, with faculty familiar with the organization, with colleagues in other social work programs, and with a community service provider who was familiar with the organization. Consultation was helpful in reducing the anxiety surrounding the initial conflict between the differing perspectives among the student, the field instructor, and the agency administrator.

**Conclusion**

The literature cautions that the use of decision-making frameworks is merely a starting point (Dolgoff et al., 2012; Hardina, 2004). The truth is that even when followed, the framework is a guide and not an assurance of a positive outcome. However, we believe that the addition of Bowen family systems theory to current ethical decision-making frameworks is a positive one. This addition affords people the ability to address a range of difficult situations. Students, field instructors, and educators will benefit from the reminder to slow down the process, address any anxiety that exists, clarify facts, and think through the situation from all angles. There are many different perspectives to be considered when making decisions about student field placements. Combining Bowen family systems theory with ethical decision-making frameworks can help social work educators navigate their way through the murky situations inherent in field operations. Social work field placements are an integral part of students’ learning and thus call for critical attention and further research to ensure that we are best meeting the students’ learning needs.

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Navigating a Murky Landscape: The Application of Bowen Family Systems to Field Office Ethics


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Ethical Values in Social Work Practice: A Qualitative Study

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Abstract
This paper is the result of research carried out during 2012–2013 in the social work field to determine the structural framework of a welfare model centered on ethical values, based on Grounded Theory (GT) qualitative data analysis obtained through individual and group interviews with social workers in the North-Eastern region of Romania. The objective of this research was to identify the ethical values “considered by social care professionals to be constitutive of the social work profession.” We have attempted to generate a theoretical model of social work, centered on the ethical values that underpin the construction of ethical expertise in social services. We have identified a hierarchy of ethical values, which starts from the operational values “demonstrated in the discourse of the respondents and in their professional practices and leads ultimately to a set of corresponding constitutive values.” The analysis model is consistent with recent models of the development of expertise in social work, through implementing the “supervision of ethics.”

Keywords: constitutive values, operational values, ethical values, social work practice, ethics, Romania

Introduction
Values such as freedom, duty, charity (Sandu & Caras, 2013, pp. 72-99) and justice can be considered the foundations of social practices, as they operate through a series of simple actions, on which there are added legitimating structures, which justify social action against one’s conscience (Frunză, 2016; Frunză & Sandu 2016). This type of action itself is an invariant, independent of cultural context, but our perception of its significance is deeply determined by the paradigmatic model through which we interpret it. An example would be the action to redistribute the surplus value. The legitimate context for welfare practice might be Christian charity, social usefulness, social justice as fairness, etc.

In this research, we encountered a number of instances of social development centered on ethical values, in relation to social practice. The objective of this research is to identify those ethical values considered by social care professionals to be constitutive of the social work profession in Romania, as well as those values that appear to be operational within the current practice of social services, considering the responses of the interviewees. We attempt to generate a theoretical model of social work, centered on the ethical
values that underpin the construction of ethical expertise in social services. We consider this model to be reliable for Romanian social work context of practice, but also it can be used as a start point in reflection on ethical framework for social work system from different countries.

**Romanian context of ethics expertise in social services**

Starting from the current reality of ethics expertise in the medical field, in which it appears necessary, due to an awareness of the ethical dilemmas that can affect medical practice (genetics, reproductive medicine, palliative care, emergency medicine, organ transplantation technology and nanotechnology), we consider such ethical reflection (accompanied by the development of ethics expertise) equally appropriate in social services, especially in social work (Frunză, 2016; Caras, 2014; Frunză & Sandu, 2016). At least in Romania, such expertise is not yet acknowledged by most professionals, ethical reflection being reduced to a minimal ethical compliance to the general standards for public servants (codes of conduct). In Romania there is a deontological code at the level of The National College of Social Workers (equivalent to national associations of social workers from other countries), but the institutions that provide social services (both private and public) do not have specific ethical guidelines in providing services (except hospitals). There is no specific national legislation on social work research or social work practice ethics, so no unitary framework for ethical guidance in social services providing. It may prove advantageous to have a larger discussion on the deontological code of social workers from Romania, but in the present paper we will refer shortly the context:

The deontological code of the social work profession, published in the Official Gazette of Romania, applies uniform across the country, being the code of CNASR/NCSWR (National College of Social Workers from Romania). CNASR is based on just deontological code that by its structure supports the ethical principles—such as the principle of autonomy, the principle of beneficence, the principle of non-maleficence, and nondiscrimination.

In the following conditions, we consider necessary the construction of codes of ethics in Romanian social work organizations and the establishment of ethics committees to ensure the respect for ethical principles and compliance to ethical practice of welfare. Starting from Eggleston’s (2005) distinction between the virtuous individual and the ethics expert, we consider that the social work practice (at least in Romania) is rather an application of ethical principles—which are dominant at the community level through social policies. Without involving an ethical reflective action on the ethical consideration of practice, we can see an analogy between Eggleston’s virtuous individual and the social worker as professional—mostly because both of them have practical knowledge of how to implement their ethical values. Both Eggleston’s virtuous individual and the social work professional need ethical guidance or supervision.

**Methodology of Research**

**Method: Grounded Theory**

We developed individual interviews and analysed the subsequent data using a Grounded Theory (GT) qualitative approach. The research aims not to validate a hypothesis but to identify the meaning given to ethical tools by the professionals who are using them. The interview guide was progressively revised and improved in the GT data interpretation analysis. During the construction of conceptual categories, clarifications were necessary and they were included in the interview guide.

For this current analysis we used a constructionist Grounded Theory (GT) method for the analysis of collected data and theory development. This constructionist GT approach aims at understanding the constructs through which subjects operate and give meaning to their actions; it includes elements of deconstruction, which is used in the language analysis and identification of metastories, which become the referential to the practice of subjects.

Researchers and participants alike reconstruct the data, with the researcher having an active role in tinting discursive elements considered
by him/her as significant. We concur with the idea that such analysis could be understood as having a large subjective nature of the interpretation. Some can consider this nature as bias when referring to the validity of the results. In this regard, we argue that the constructionist sociology is not necessarily oriented towards the validity of the results, but rather the generative potential of the model resulted as starting future research on the same topic. The generative nature of the methodology aims at theoretical construction through inductive strategies that tend to construct a new and more and more coherent theory.

During an inductive process, conceptual categories are created with an increasingly high level of generality, which help explain the research topic. Glaser and Strauss describe analytic induction as concerned with the generation and demonstration of a causal theory to represent a specific behavior, which is limited, precise, integrated and universally applicable (Glaser & Strauss, 1965, p. 10). The coding process starts with reading data from the interview transcripts, accompanied by notes on the transcript, such as notations, comments and observations. The categories' sources must clearly derive from the research data while, being above their level of generality, they may refer to similar data later.

In this particular research, two researchers were responsible for the data analysis. The data interpretations were based on alternative reading of the data to establish a consensus about the possible significance of those.

**Research thematic axes**

The research started by reflecting on the existence of a social work system centered on ethical values, and wishing to identify the ethical values that underpin this social work from the perspective of the professionals interviewed.

The focus group employed an unstructured interview technique based on a series of thematic axes to encourage specialists to report their ethical values and how they “punctuate” their professional practice. The individual interview’s thematic axes included the use of tools in social work practice and the analysis of their potential ethical components. It focused on the construction of autonomy through informed consent, inasmuch as it exists, and the specific tools used in welfare practice (e.g., individualized service plans, individualized protection plans, etc.) The customization of the interviews was achieved by including values such as autonomy, fairness, and responsibility within the thematic axes, from which respondents were free to refer to any other values that they considered as justifying their own practice.

We addressed questions related to the contribution brought by social workers to the achieving of welfare of the beneficiary development, what is the social worker understanding of the autonomous behavior of the social work clients—being asked to describe such situations in which social workers contributed to the clients’ autonomy construction. We asked similar questions related to dignity, justice, responsibility. Also, we asked the participants to refer to the professional values they adhere to and the relation between the professional values and their own personal values.

**Participants and data collection**

The research was based on individual and focus group interviews. There were two focus groups, attended by a total of 20 social workers, with various practical and management functions in both public and private organizations, in the fields of family and child protection, elders’ social work, adult training, and probation. There was one individual interview, which was conducted with a social worker in the family and child protection field. The selection of participants was based on the snowball method; we made an appeal to a social workers’ National College representative, who invited participants from all active fields of social practice from the research region. The most important criterion of selection was experience in the field. Considering gender, because Romanian social work practitioners are mainly representative of feminine gender, this gender was predominant in the sample. Participants ranged between 10 and 20 years.

Following the first data analysis, we
identified the saturation of data. We concur with the Strauss and Corbin suggestion (1990) that saturation is a “matter of degree,” sustaining that saturation should be more concerned with reaching the point where it becomes “counterproductive” and that “the new” that is discovered does not necessarily add anything to the overall story, model, theory or framework (Strauss, Corbin, 1990, p. 136; Mason, 2010). Data collection was conducted from August 2012 to November 2013 in the North-Eastern region of Romania.

Discussions, Ethical Concerns, and Limits
The research was conducted with non-vulnerable individuals who were representative of social work practice from private and public institutions. No stress, physical, psychological, social, or economic harm was incurred by participation in this research. The data collected did not relate to illegal activities.

In terms of methods for providing anonymity or confidentiality, the following parameters were established: The transcription of the interviews did not contain any identification data of the subjects. The subjects were informed about the confidentiality of the data. In the cases in which the subjects mentioned data that could lead to their identification or of the affiliation institution, those were anonymized at the data transcription. The records from voice recorders were deleted at the end of the project.

After the GT analysis of the data, we established meetings (workshops) with social workers, including the participants in the initial interviews (individual and groups interviews). In these workshops we presented and discussed the results of the research. The participants in workshops generally agreed with our analysis, and we considered in the final paper some of their opinions that were quite different from our initial perceptions. In accordance with Strauss & Corbin (1990), the data are characterized as having a specific context, being specific to welfare practice in the North-Eastern Romanian region. The potential for generalization refers to the model proposed, which can be extracted from the theoretical analysis of social work centered on ethical values, and may constitute a justification for future projects aimed at implementing the “supervision of ethics” in social services.

As limits, this research has an exploratory value, with large interpretative characteristics. Given this research nature, the investigator’s opinion strongly influences the research results. In order to diminish the influence of researcher’s opinion on the data, we used the triangulation of methods and researchers (Denzin, 1970). Another limit is the representativeness of the participants, who were selected only from the North-Eastern region of Romania. The generated model could stand as a starting point for some larger studies, but we do not have data to validate the model for another social, cultural and professional context. In this current paper we use the term “beneficiary/beneficiaries,” which has the meaning of “persons who benefit from social services, as clients of social work systems; socially assisted persons.” The term “beneficiary” is used in the Romanian legislative framework.

Data analysis
Open coding
By studying the responses of the interviewees, we were able to establish the defining categories for the content analysis. During analysis, we selected from each response the representative keywords for each category. The working tool can be represented in a table containing four items of analysis: categories; keywords; keyword frequency in speech of interviewees; and the text itself, which lists keywords. The frequency of keywords in the text could determine the importance of the role they played in the analysis. The initial coding led to the identification of a number of sets of keywords, which were subsequently categorized as shown in Table 1. We concur with the idea that in qualitative research, the frequency of keywords may have no bearing on how important each theme is; nevertheless, the repeated appearance of a term or its synonyms could lead us to the interpretation of a high importance of a specific fact/thing/value to which they refer.
### Table 1: Categories & keywords – open coding stage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Keywords</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Social work practice focused on ethical values”</td>
<td>defining social work, self-discovery, lack of reflection on the significance of the practice, native over-qualification, interpretation of the law, humanity, customer welfare, vocation, helping others, work, involvement and responsibility, skills, self-awareness, vocation, change, empathy, reorientation;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Responsibility for the welfare of the client”</td>
<td>welfare, awareness of responsibility, respect for children's rights, balance, awareness, community self-help;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Welfare as a manifestation of relational autonomy”</td>
<td>material and financial instruments, crisis relief, vocation, education, addiction, complacency, disability, needs, victims of the system, assisted living, assistance perpetuated and learned, a helping hand, providing, benefits, system, beneficiary, perpetuating, vicious cycle, smoothness of social system, beneficiaries, customer benefits, customer perspective, financial benefits, grants, assistance, counseling, empowerment, lack of autonomy, unethical system, professional ethics, insincere beneficiaries, minimum income, unemployment, unethical, beneficiary of trade, state of crisis, financial aid, responsibilities, legal obligation, prevention of potential crisis, inappropriate;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Professional autonomy of the social worker”</td>
<td>conflict, professional, own organizational values, legislative limitations, conflict of values, compliance values, professional values, conflicting values, the rule of law, professional heteronomy, professional autonomy, entrepreneurship, advocacy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Axial coding: Constructing categories

Category 1: Social work practice focused on ethical values

An analysis of social work focusing on ethical values requires a redefinition of the profession and a reconsideration of the self as a professional.

“I think we need to get the definition of social work.” (SW1, FG2013)

“I think I need to find myself as a professional.” (SW 2, FG2013)

“I confess that I’ve never asked what social work means.” (SW3, FG2013)

Social workers understand the nature of professional ethics, suggesting that the central value of welfare practice is helping others. This “helping” orientation is a personal calling for professionals. We believe that the respondents focus their professional activities on those values that can be made into an ethics of care. Along with care and vocation, respondents identified humanity as a constitutive value of the social work profession. Humanity is understood as a framework for interpreting and humanizing the law, in order to ensure customer well-being.

I think, regardless of the institutions in which they work, the social worker is a person who must be overqualified, [must have a] native overqualification that cannot be gained in years of study. I think this skill takes humanity; and if we have humanity, we must use and interpret the law to ensure the customer’s welfare. (SW 13, FG2013)

Caring as a “calling” can be interpreted within a Weberian paradigm of the professional as a vocational person, which involves a move beyond mere bureaucracy to the internalization of professional values and their translation into practice.

“Beyond being a job, it is a vocation and its essence lies in helping others.” (SW3, FG2013)

We consider that, beyond the ethical standards of the profession of social work, its practice is based on ethical actions, even if they do not always involve ethical reflection. In practice, we are speaking of an “ethical act,” which stems from the internalization of constitutive values. In this case, the values are derived from charity and its deconstruction (Sandu & Caras, 2013, pp. 72-99): solidarity, caring, and responsibility towards the Other (Levinas, 1969). The theoretical construction of social support systems can be identified as having core values that come from an ethics of justice, which configures social policies on the principle of redistribution and equity (Arneson, 1989, pp. 77-93; Rawls, 2001). This approach is in contrast with that of the intuitive professional vocation.

We identify in each respondent’s discourse a number of ethical values constitutive of his/her profession, as he/she has internalized these in his/her work: namely, commitment and responsibility, which confirms our previous assessment that oriented social work practice in relation to an ethics of care (Gilligan, 1977, pp. 481-517; Nodding, 2002). Starting from this discourse, we cannot make interpretations concerning actual practice; it only relates to personal perceptions regarding this practice, which we consider the foundation of self-esteem, with self-motivational potential for professionals. We see these statements more as constituting a metamodel of the concept of the “professional” rather than the result of reflection on their practice, which, moreover, the respondent reports as being spontaneous, during the focus group.

The respondent (Social Worker 3) refers to an ethics of work, which he considers to be of supreme value and which correlates to the efficiency of the phrase “near impossible to accomplish anything.” The ethics of work within the Weberian paradigm (Weber et al, 2002) is based on the individual’s spiritual duty to others and to divinity.

“Without [a sense of] involvement and responsibility at/in the work,
it would be near impossible to accomplish anything?” (SW 3, FG2013)

Success is not a direct result of labor, but as it is the result of divine grace, work is essential to a spiritual mode of living. The fact that this respondent places supreme value in work can be interpreted in terms of a metastory, in which work grounds the individual as a professional and puts him/her in relation to pseudo-transcendence. Even though the respondent did not appeal to spiritual values, the way he/she legitimizes work as a supreme value actually spiritualizes it, leading us to believe that—within the inner horizon of respondent—the statement is a spiritualist one.

“Work is of supreme value.” (SW3, FG2013)

Social Worker 3 appealed to the same notion of the vocation of social workers who support beneficiaries, specifically by developing skills of empathy that allow a reorientation of conduct after identifying needs, in order to produce change. The objective of this is to build social worker autonomy, both reflective and relational, and, based on this autonomy, to drive forward the process of change.

Unlike in the previous respondent’s discourse, this respondent (Social worker 4) rejects paternalism, and is aware of the need for a correlation between respect for the autonomy of beneficiary and professional expertise, based on empathy. Professional expertise is based on the responsibility of the social worker towards the beneficiary, and towards his/her own professional practice.

“[It is important] to empathize with him/her [the beneficiary] as a social worker, because what you think is good for him/her might not be in agreement with what he/she needs.” (SW4, FG2013)

The rejection of paternalism and of offering guidance to beneficiaries, in order that social workers can approach the specificity of their problems, was confirmed in the interviews conducted individually, allowing us to consider the data saturation criterion to be satisfied.

The expectations of the people with special needs who come to us must be accurate, and they must know that, in the social work system, we have obligations too. A social worker is one who provides solutions to problems, but for the more legislative problems he will give you information and help you find solutions to solve the problem yourself. You cannot expect to get solutions from the social worker without doing anything yourself. (SW, Individual Interview 2012)

This also emphasizes the references to legislative framework as a particular dimension of social work, which will also emerge from the discourse of the focus group participants and will be further analyzed.

**Category 2: Responsibility for the welfare of the client**

In regards to the second category identified, Social Worker 3 answers relied on the idea of responsibility for the client’s welfare, welfare that we interpret as an operational value derived from the respect for dignity. The priority of this value is assigned by the respondent as a value of (professional) duty that the respondent internalizes and personalizes. On the other hand, the statement may be interpreted as referring to a generic “us” (i.e., the community of social workers).

“[Their [the beneficiaries] welfare directly concerns us.” (SW3, FG2013)

The respondent’s discourse regarding the definition of “welfare” here becomes divergent and brings into the definition of welfare two ideas from contradictory ethical systems, namely an ethics of care—the well-being—and an ethics of justice—children’s rights.”
“I see welfare as well-being, respect for child rights.” (SW3, FG2013)

Another attempt to define welfare was made by another social worker, with a role as a probation officer. The officer saw welfare in terms of a balance between obtaining desirable outcomes after intervening on behalf of the beneficiary, and benefiting from existing resources without erasing the moral agency of the subject and his/her respect for his/her own autonomy. The above selection quoted from the respondent discourse could expose how the intervention produces wealth, independent of the beneficiary; therefore, we consider the statement as having a paternalistic nature, denoting a “peripheral centrality” of the beneficiary of social services. The term “peripheral centrality” (Cojocaru, 2009, pp. 87-98) covers a cognitive dissonance between the centrality of the beneficiary in professional discourse, which is accompanied by their being sent to the periphery of practical interest, by eliminating the moral agency of the beneficiary.

The term “balance” used by Social Worker 4 in the following fragments also encapsulates how the social worker community reacts to the situation of the beneficiaries, and the social worker’s awareness of the limits to the aid beneficiaries can receive from the community. The balance suggested as constitutive of welfare can be interpreted from a utilitarian perspective, as the maximum of good that a society can exercise for the individual. In terms of the compensation that a society provides for the disadvantages of the beneficiary, this discourse introduces the idea of subsidiarity, as “balance.” The society can offset some of the disadvantages, but it is the responsibility of the individual to act in accordance with the society; the society’s compensation therefore aims to be limited. The result of this approach could be interpreted in terms of the construction of the relational autonomy of the individual.

What welfare means for me is that balance between what is desired and what is possible. … A balance that makes the person aware of what can be done for him/her, what the community can do in order to help him/her. (SW4, FG2013)

Responsibility is identified in the discourse of respondents from two perspectives; the first of these is the responsibility of the parent, which is desired and sought after by the community in the form of community work and the childcare institutions that cover the cost of protection.

There are legislative changes in Law 272 (Law 272/2004 on the protection and promotion of children’s rights) [meaning that], for parents who have children in care, the parent may be required to perform 40 hours of community service, but this depends on how municipalities manage their work and services like these.”(SW10, FG2013)

A second form of responsibility inferred from the discourse describes the social workers’ own professional responsibility. It has a double nature, one side being oriented to the system and the other directly to the beneficiary. We see the call to co-responsibility (Jonas, 1984) in terms of the social worker who is aware of the need for cooperation between the various agents in the field, in order to carry out professional tasks, the result of which is addressed to the social services’ beneficiaries (Social Worker 11).

Our goal is to reintegrate children from the care system with their families of origin, but this does not depend on us. It depends on other services offered by local communities. It depends on the individual and their degree of dependence.” (SW11, FG2013).

The fragment below exposes the difference between the theoretical specifics of social work and its actual practice, whereby the literature is not consistent with the possibilities of implementing the methodologies and best practice guides, leading to professional dissatisfaction, which is also generated by the lack of success. As a manifestation of their...
professional responsibilities, social workers desire the cultivation of a practice culminating with the client’s empowerment. This is achieved by developing a progressive individualized plan to help in identifying the crisis, offering counselling to establish the needs to get out of it, and monitoring clients to ensure their empowerment is effective. We prefer to give the discontinuity in the manifestation of professional responsibility the term clipped responsibility.

It is lovely to read in the literature about successful cases, but I do not know if I could talk about a successful situation in which I have worked with a client by the book, in a professional manner, starting from the identification of the crisis situation and proceeding to help the client, to offer him/her counselling for different situations, such as that of identifying a proper job, to monitor his/her evolution. … It is very difficult … (SW11, FG2013)

Category 3: Welfare as a manifestation of relational autonomy

Elsewhere in the respondents’ discourse, welfare is defined in terms of relational autonomy, as opposed to the definition that is supposed to be given by beneficiaries: that of financial and material autonomy. Relational autonomy consists mainly in finding solutions to encourage an awareness of the situation in which the recipient finds themselves, and strategies to overcome it. The role of the agent of change, which the social worker assumes, is related to the empowerment that the beneficiary produces in order to manage potential future crises. Basically, this empowerment aims at establishing and developing moral agency. This moral agency is not absolute, but situational—subjective decisions being dependent on all social constructs—and undertaken by the individual within his/her social environment.

Welfare does not mean that the social worker brings financial and material aids. Using tools, materials, and financial instruments, that our country legislative framework gives you, allow you to take a person out of their crisis moment. Then, by working with him/her, having the necessary vocation and training in the field, you can manage to make him/her aware of his/her situation, and help him/her overcome the crisis and identify possible solutions. (SW5, FG2013)

The idea of independence from welfare instruments is in line with that of the constitution of the beneficiary’s relational autonomy. Using the respondent’s phrase “but not necessarily” in relation to the heteronomy generated by welfare tools can—in our view—be an indication that the issue of autonomy is managed for rational discourse, but not necessarily internalized as a practical value.

But not necessarily creating a dependency on these tools (social work tools). (SW 5, FG2013)

Auto-vulnerability is a survival strategy of beneficiaries who indulge in being considered victims of the system, having been taught to be assisted by society. Victimizing strategies are perpetually taking on a trans-generational character. At its most fundamental, we can talk about the strategy of the beneficiary as being a result of an expressive autonomy-speculating welfare system, based solely on the provision of benefits in logic of care. Care without accountability is seen as generating a lack of autonomy. The definition of autonomy, which the respondent him/herself uses, concerns a socially acceptable, relational autonomy: the individual’s ability to function effectively and independently in the social environment.

The respondent indicates the possibility of failure in the self-determination of the moral agent, which is not rendered to the beneficiary but is voluntary oriented, so as to allow him/her to obtain benefits. The precariousness of the social existence of the beneficiary may be the result of his/her own choosing, after which, according to Rawlsian theory, society has no obligation to compensate their
disadvantage; on the contrary, this compensation can even become a source of inequity. Social work that works exclusively on the basis of an ethics of care, without taking into account the responsibility of the subject to self-care, perpetuates the vulnerability context of the beneficiary and maintains their dependency on the system.

Many of those we deal with indulge in the situations in which they find themselves; beyond the inability to identify their needs, let alone their action strategies, they are indulging. (SW2, FG2013)

There is a tendency to see themselves as victims of the system. So they have learned to go there, to be assisted. Even though the public and private institutions do nothing but give a helping hand and offer all kinds of benefits, it creates nothing but dependency—a dependency between the system and the recipient which is perpetuated through generations. It is a vicious circle. (SW2, FG2013)

We also identify, in the discourse of one of the respondents (Social Worker 2), the idea that the language practices associated with social work constitute a further vulnerability for the beneficiaries. Simply by naming them beneficiaries, certain expectations of the benefits are constituted, creating a favorable context for a dependency system and the rejection on the part of the beneficiaries of the need for relational autonomy.

If we’re talking about the smoothness of the social system, then we should also refer to the terms, because we speak of “beneficiaries.” The term was changed from “client” into “beneficiary” and now we talk of beneficiaries for the purposes of benefits—benefits and nothing else to come ... (SW2, FG2013)

We can correlate this with the discourse of legal content semantics; by using terms that only cover the material benefits that a subject is entitled to receive, the specific character of the actual material practice that the respondents are assumed to provide is limited to the material aid given to beneficiaries. The functions of support, counselling and empowerment are substituted for a process of direct allocation of resources, which can give the illusion of a temporary settlement of the crisis, but with the risk to beneficiaries of a chronicity of vulnerability and dependence on the system.

From a beneficiary’s perspective, there are certain expected benefits, allowances and grants, and less of a social meaning, (i.e., counselling to help clients to help themselves, so that they can become autonomous. But that does not happen. (SW2, FG2013)

One of the respondents considered the system based on social benefits and [material/other] benefits to be unethical, as it failed to identify a link between the values of the social welfare system, as established by the regulations (as of the date of the interview), and his personal values.

The system is unethical, even if we are ethical, everyone in their own workplace. (SW10, FG2013)

We can identify a double approach to a sense of ethical welfare in practice, with assumptions taken from a model of care—focused on care and maintenance of the status quo of the beneficiary—but also from a social justice-oriented model. In this model, the entitlement to receive benefits, which would meet the terms of the law, should be subsidiary to other practices centered on the equitable distribution of resources, which the community itself can mobilize for the beneficiary, and on the beneficiary’s responsibility towards his/her own social status.

In our opinion, the idea of a lack of sincerity on the part of the beneficiary, discernible in the
respondents’ discourse, actually shows the existence of the expressive autonomy of the beneficiaries, which, as we have noted, is geared towards meeting their needs at the expense of immediate-term strategies to resolve the situations they are facing. Legislation can be an advantage in the maintenance of addictive behavior towards materials from the beneficiary and the cultivation of a subsistence strategy based on it. The respondent emphasized that the establishment of a networking of addiction is supported by the legal permissiveness around addressing the same problem to a number of different social services providers.

Beneficiaries are insincere; they take into account legislation. They come and say, ‘Anyway, if you do not give us money for supplies, we’ll go to… [Author’s note: interviewee nominates a certain state institution].’ (SW10, FG2013)

Respondents are particularly critical of the social welfare system by providing a minimum income guarantee (MIG). It is considered unethical in the sense that it perpetuates inequalities between social groups that adopt a strategy of subsistence based on benefit hunting and social groups that place work at the center of their strategies to access resources.

I think we’re among the few states that have a guaranteed minimum income. As a social worker, if I become unemployed and the state did not give me any guaranteed minimum income, I’d remain unemployed; but then I’d have to deal with the situation. This system [MIG] is unethical. (SW10, FG2013)

I’ll give you a specific case: It is clear to you as a social worker that you have to deal with ‘professional beneficiaries’ who hunt social services because they do not want to get involved or to make the minimum effort required to change their situation or state of crisis, because I know they receive aid from the state. (SW10, FG2013)

They [Beneficiaries] must assume family responsibilities, community, and so on because the new law requires us, upon their notification, to try to prevent a potential crisis. (SW10, FG2013)

The interviewee in child protection referred to a particular case from [his/her] own practice, exemplifying the possibility of building a beneficiary’s relational autonomy, which correlates with his/her ability to assume responsibilities:

The young girl was unable to assume such responsibilities. A child requires the ability to exercise responsibility and take them on. (SW, Individual Interview 2012).

This statement on the state of the child was in favor of the formation and development of autonomous behavior; in this situation, it is all the more necessary as the child’s lack of judgment can be a factor directly influencing the risk of future pregnancy (Matei, 2014, pp. 111–118). The interviewee basically confirms the centrality of autonomy as the key value of welfare practice, referring to autonomy in relational terms. We note the relative ignorance of the ethical dimension of autonomy as informed consent, and in terms of the ability of the beneficiary to develop its own moral agency. The data obtained from this individual interview was supported by the focus group, indicating a saturation model.

Category 4: Professional autonomy of the social worker

We noticed that the legal framework is still recognized as a limitation to the professional autonomy of the social worker; “the corset” is associated primarily with practice in public services. The respondents’ discourse indicates a fundamental understanding of the difference
between value-based social work, attributed to the private sector and recognized as professional, and social work based on the simple application of minimum regulatory frameworks, as seen in public institutions. In our opinion, the difference comes from the fact that public institutions are obliged to implement public policies that come into force for all beneficiaries, at least at a basic level (utilitarian approach), while non-governmental organizations are able to select beneficiaries based on their claims, the mission criteria of the organization, and the project for which funding has been obtained.

Moreover, the contradiction between the personal values and professional values of the organization can be seen as ambivalent. These statements from two of the respondents are contradictory:

There is a conflict: on the one hand, to be professional at work, in an organization with its own values, or on the other, to work after you a legislation that constrains you, as we all know how to work at... [Author’s note: interviewee nominates a public institution]. (SW10, FG2013)

In terms of a conflict of values, I would not be able to give such contrary values; I personally do not see a conflict. (SW11, FG2013)

I see my values as contrary to those of the organization. It is true that we cannot select beneficiaries, but there are measures and solutions to individualize services; not all those who come to us are in need of protection. (SW11, FG2013)

The statements of these two respondents generate a series of dilemmas that focus on the source of contradiction raised by respondents. They underline the opposition between the values imposed by the legal framework, based on (our point of perspective) a utilitarian ethics, and the professional values, ranging from an ethics of justice and liberal perspective (empowering the client) to the promotion of an ethics of individual autonomy (relational). But they also demonstrate a difference between the position of professionals in relation to the social values of their own professional practice, and the position described by the literature in terms of good practice.

We have identified two facets of professional responsibility: first, a responsibility to the welfare system, as it is covered by legislature, and second, to the welfare of the client, according to their operational definitions of “professional” and not necessarily as acquired by the client too.

We can also notice differences occurring in the discourse towards the legal system. On one side, there is the expression of desire to demonstrate autonomy in relation to the system, through the intervention involved in changing laws, practicing advocacy and on behalf of the beneficiary. On the other hand, the same discourse contains references to the heteronomous position of the professional, as expressed in the phrase “you are not there to comment [on the law],” which confirms the moral status of client.

Yes, indeed there may be inconsistencies between your personal opinions and workplace context, but you must follow the law. You are not there to comment on a client’s situation. (SW12, FG2013)

My concrete values conflicted with the concrete situations in which I personally felt that those people needed care and personal assistant. That does not prevent me as a professional from taking the necessary steps to approach decision makers, to try to help this group. This has involved legislative proposals, lobbying and advocacy to politicians and representatives of the system, and not least, this year in the summer, there were a few regulations that tried to cover these needs. (SW12, FG2013)
Generating Axes of Social Work Focused on Ethical Values

In the axial coding process, we have grouped the identified categories in ways that will help us later in the step of generating the theoretical construction of a paradigmatic model. These axes of social work focus on ethical values from the following perspectives:

- **Legislative perspective**, which generates a rights-based social work model (i.e., the rights of the beneficiaries). This model aims for a retributive and restorative practice, designed to compensate for social inequality through an affirmative attitude towards the poor. Between these practices, there can be observed additional compensatory policies regarding the minimum guaranteed income, which should at least allow a partial compensation for the inequality of opportunity in access to welfare. Through the minimum income, society has a duty to compensate those categories of beneficiaries, which, due to their specific vulnerability generators, are unable to be self-sufficient. However, this model is seen as a generator of inequity in itself, perpetuating dependence and self-vulnerability in some beneficiaries, who voluntarily choose welfare dependence as a lifestyle.

- **Idealized perspective**, grounded in the theoretical models originating from sociology, psychology and communication sciences. This view is employed by the social worker in the cultivation of self-esteem, arguing the social and ethical value of social practice. This perspective refers to a desirable aspect of the practice, a model of conduct, based on professionalism and best practice. The model is referred to as conflicting with current practice, which is declared to be oriented around rights-based social work.

- **Professional perspective**, which concerns their own position in the welfare system. The social worker sees himself/herself as a person of vocation, identifying the social utility of his/her work and the deeply humanistic character of the practice. The social worker is described as corseted by an imperfect legislative framework, which he/she considers to be deeply unethical and contrary to the social worker’s own morals as transposed into the ethics of professional responsibility.

- **The perspective of effective practice**, which aims for a balance between the beneficiaries’ rights model, the principles of good practice established in the literature, and the context in which the practice takes place.

There is the sense of a lack of consensus on the dominant ethical paradigm that acts as a benchmark within the practice of welfare services; at the discursive level, this conflict of values is recognized but poorly understood. The conflict is a tripartite one, in that it includes the values assigned by the individual to the profession and to the individual’s own role identity; the values of the operational framework to which the individual belongs, where the practice is conducted; and the standards of good practice that come from the organizational literature and the constructed frames of reference. We refer therefore to such an anticipatory socialization process of the social worker as being responsible for the transposition of ethical values into social action (Cojanu, 2014 p. 9–10).

The mission of social services providers should be the construction of a moral agency on the part of the beneficiary. In addition to the social workers’ discourse, there is a meta-discourse of providers of social services (i.e., the organizations), which sets the parameters for conducting social intervention based on public policy resulting from the implementation of various ethical paradigms.
Theoretical Generation Stage

Based on the analysis of previous stages of coding, we were able to build a model for understanding social work practice centered on ethical values. This representation of social work is divided into different ethical paradigms, generating a conflict of values. This conflict of values is simultaneously affirmed and denied by the respondents. We consider that the contradiction can be resolved from the perspective of the logic of “a secret third party” (Nicolescu, 2007), which essentially states that a certain level of discourse can act as a medium between two opposite terms of a contradiction, but that it is not on the same ontological level as the first two. The solving of any dilemma is achieved by the appeal to the existence of another ontological level, which is actually invoked in speech. Basarab Nicolescu takes from Lupascu the idea of a secretly included third, according to which the opposition between contradictions is resolved by the existence of an included secret third, which is in another plane of reality. Starting from the unifying claim of transdisciplinarity, we notice the incompleteness of the deconstruction of dialectic, between essence and appearance, where a medium term may occur, situated in a different term of reality. From the perspective of analyzing the social, the medium term we have identified is the idea of social construct. This works as essence, once it is instituted through the process of social negotiation of reality. For the subjects of social action, it has a constrictive nature, identical to the one of metastories, which legitimates social reality.

We argue, therefore, for the existence in the discourse of two different ontological levels, as two distinct ethical guidelines, which we have identified as relating, on the one hand, to the incorporation of social work’s constitutive values, in terms of its foundation, and on the other hand, as represented by its operational value—the implementation of the practice. We consider moral values as the outcomes of collective bargaining in relation to interpretations of what is truly valuable. Principles reflect the manner in which an interpretive community chooses to translate their dominant ethical values into social practice, as a result of this interpretative pact.

The category of ethical value is a convention of language, accepted as having value in itself, while the ethical principle is a social construct, resulting in communicative action (Habermas, 1984), formed around those ethical values. Within any social practices, we will find constitutive and operational ethical values. The first set of values (constitutive) establishes the ethical foundation of social practice, while the second set (operational) governs the social process for implementing the former. Once accepted, the values and principles within an interpretive community become an imperative constructive value, similar in essence to essentialist ethics (Frunză, 2016).

The constitutive ethical values of social work—among which we have mentioned the development of the beneficiaries’ autonomy and the achievement of social justice through fair redistribution of values, ensuring equal opportunities for persons belonging to vulnerable, discriminated, and marginalized groups—are precisely the practical implementation of the ethical vision contained in various public policies (Frunză, 2016). In the context of the present research, the determined constitutive values were dignity, responsibility towards others, charity, and justice. We understand constitutive values as the values that generate a certain social practice and justify its existence and necessity, constituting a metareference for that practice—a “foundation” in terms of social ontology.

Operational values are those values that are actually involved in the practice and that punctuate the ethics of an effective welfare practice. At a discursive level, we have identified a number of ethical values, which are as follows: autonomy, responsibility, fairness, kindness, and vocation.

Autonomy is understood in terms of the beneficiary’s relational autonomy, which is seen as an objective of social practice. We have identified relational autonomy as the only form supported by professionals; other manifestations of autonomy, although existing in the discourse at the metatext level, are not explicitly recognized by the interviewees. We recognize an instrumental character of autonomy; the professionals advocating
for the need to build relational autonomy are answering their own professional development needs. Once this autonomy is achieved, it can act as the networking facilitator between professionals, legal frameworks, and institutions.

Following the axial coding, we have built the category Welfare as a manifestation of relational autonomy, from keywords that define the relationship “independent/dependent beneficiary—welfare system,” which we interpret in terms of “autonomy–heteronomy.” This category is oriented towards autonomy as an operational value.

Values-based welfare practice also requires both professional construction and operation, on the basis of principles that comply with the ethical values of its constituent, as the ethical foundation of social practice. The social implementation of these constitutive values is characterized by the professional’s action, which operationalizes them.

In terms of individuals’ autonomy, according to the interviewees’ discourse, practice should be oriented towards the affirmation of the principle of respect for persons. The conversion of these principles is effected through strategies of empowerment and facilitating social change, and of the construction of development frameworks of relational autonomy, in order for the beneficiaries of social services to develop self-advocacy skills, for use in any potential future crises they might face.

Wealth is the manifestation of a client’s autonomy, from the professional’s perspective, and is also associated with the desirable results of their intervention, in terms of a balance of the individual’s well-being in relation to their social context. We consider the professional perspective that sees welfare as a manifestation of individual autonomy as referring to their own professional considerations. Achieving a client’s autonomy in relation to the welfare system is the desired result for the professional, who would sooner meet the professional and institutional parameters for intervention success, than respect the individual’s moral agency and capability of self-determination. In the construction of a beneficiary’s welfare, we identified, within the discourse level, the responsibility for the welfare of the client as a category defined by the principle of responsibility and respect for dignity. We identified the professionals’ discussion of the beneficiaries in terms of a Levinasian responsibility towards the other, as the manifestation of care to the beneficiary, but also in terms of their professional duty towards the institution.

The professional autonomy of the social worker can be analogous with professional vocation, while overshadowed by the conflict between the regulated welfare system and professional, whose development is thereby “constrained.” A conflict arises between the personal morals of the social worker—based on vocation and the feeling of duty, as translated into professional practice—and the ethics of institutional responsibility, supported by public policies—based on principles of justice and solidarity, which are perceived as competing principles.

As a result of generating a paradigmatic model of values-based social work practice, we have produced a table of analysis based on the operational values discernible in the discourse of respondents and in the professional practices they mention. Further induction can relate these with the ethical principles governing those practices, ultimately leading to the statement of a set of corresponding constitutive values.

We do not claim that this model is comprehensive or that it lists all the constitutive and operational values governing social work; neither do we claim that there is a strict correspondence between the identified constitutive and operational values. The table below serves as a set of hypotheses generated inductively, which can form the basis of future research aimed at validating the operational model. The logic established by such a model is that the ethical values detected in the professional discourse are not necessarily present as such, but rather manifest in the form of practices and principles.

Operational and constitutive values together with principles are constituents of a values-based social work metamodel, or—in other words—a legitimate metastory of the social work profession, as it exists in the practitioners’ consciousness.
### Table 2: Constituents of Values-based social work metamodel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational values</th>
<th>Practices</th>
<th>Principles of:</th>
<th>Constitutive values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>Advocacy, lobbying, counseling, training, empowerment, capacitating; The construction of independence</td>
<td>Respect for persons</td>
<td>Dignity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- of the beneficiary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- of the professional</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>Empowerment; Facilitating the behavioral and social change of the beneficiary; Establishing a balance concerning the beneficiary accountability</td>
<td>Beneficence; non-maleficence</td>
<td>Alterity (in terms of human essence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- of the beneficiary towards his/her own status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- of the professional towards beneficiary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- of the professional towards the institution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity of services offered to beneficiary</td>
<td>Distribution of services</td>
<td>Distributive justice; justification</td>
<td>Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity</td>
<td>Minimum guaranteed income; Humanitarian action</td>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td>Charity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionalism</td>
<td>Professionalization; Internalization of professional ethical values</td>
<td>Duty towards the profession</td>
<td>Vocation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The alteration of the metamodel through legislative or institutional intervention determines the professional’s ability to shape his/her ideal universe of practice, in contrast to the real situation, which he/she might consider unethical. Focusing on values “is legitimate for the social worker—and for the professional in general—when it allows a convergence or divergence of identity construction, depending on the situation, in relation to the perspective of the institutional and legal framework in which that social/communicative practice has been developed. In this context, we have proposed a theoretical model of the supervision of ethics, which may act to facilitate the internalizing of the ethical values” of the organization by professionals and the internalizing of practical values by the institutions. The supervision of ethics can help professionals to improve their performance in implementing ethics and motivating the development of an organizational environment centered on ethical value” (Caras & Sandu, 2014b, pp.75-94).

The supervision of ethics model to which we refer was presented in the article “Epistemic and Pragmatic Backgrounds of Supervision of Ethics” (Caras & Sandu, 2014a, pp. 142–151). The authors considered the supervision of ethics able to achieve at least the following functions: building ethics in organizations; ethical compliance monitoring; ethical counseling, support and advice; administrative and deliberative functions; mediation in order to achieve a reflective balance of the interests of each party within the organization; and the gatekeeping of ethical policies.

The level of convergence between decisions concerning practical activities and decisions concerning guiding values can be checked by the supervisor of ethics in terms of the epistemic and axiological compatibility between them. As a result of the need to obtain the abovementioned convergence, the necessity of a gatekeeping function for ethical policies arises (Caras & Sandu, 2014a). This allows for the definition of the interpretative frameworks necessary to establish an agreement of use by the organizational values, the supervisor of ethics supervisor therefore has a role in the construction of public policies and their implementation. By exercising a gatekeeping function, a relationship between constitutive and operational ethical values is ensured, in order for a transition to be made from these values to practical ethical principles.

Once the adherence of professionals to organizational culture has been guaranteed, it then intervenes in the monitoring of ethical compliance, when the compatibility of procedural methodology’s ethical standards is implicated. However, it also intervenes in the monitoring of their compliance by practitioners operating in areas with explicit an ethical impact and improves the ethical practices of professionals by implementing ethical audits of the organizational culture’s ethics and its ethics policies (Reamer, 2000, pp. 355-366; Caras, 2014).

The role of ethical gatekeeping comes in when, in discussing public policy, the supervisor points to the ethical characteristics of each option. This gatekeeping function is becoming instrumental, to the extent that supervisors are participating in ethical decisions themselves, by facilitating the deliberation on ethical values “and transposing instruments from the organization’s public policy into the actual practices” (Caras, 2014).

From a pragmatic perspective, the functions of ethical supervision complement those of classical ethical expertise, from which it partially takes over the role of ethical gatekeeping and the facilitation of obtaining an interpretative agreement between the organization, the professional and the beneficiary (or user).

Conclusions

We support the need for an awareness of ethical expertise to be developed in the field of social services, which is a key area for ethical action, in that it transfers public policies into social action on behalf of the beneficiary and, as such, requires the validation of an ethical consensus and ethical gatekeeping practice.

The supervision of ethics, in our view, is constructed as analogous to social supervision, as defined by Kadushin (1992), in terms of providing professional support to supervisees and facing tasks with a strong ethical weight. This support may be
Ethical Values in Social Work Practice: A Qualitative Study

The key objective of this paper was to identify the possibility of constructing a grid of the prevailing ethical values in social work and their hierarchy as constitutive and operational values, starting from the discourse of specialists interviewed about their actual practice. This has allowed us to highlight a number of mechanisms by which ethical values influence social practices, as an interpretative derivation that ethical values bear when they are transposed into social practices. A good example, highlighted during the research, is the value of autonomy, which is understood as relational autonomy, partially losing the ethical dimension of moral agency.

**Note:** In order to decrease the number of words/pages of the article we chose not to insert all the fragments extracted from the respondents’ discourse, but in some cases only the keywords and their interpretation. We presented the extracted fragments directly in English translation.

**References**


Moral Language in Child Protection Research

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Abstract
This article is based on a philosophical analysis of moral language in academic journal articles that concern child death cases. The analysis shows that research of child protection is a value-committed practice, and the language use reflects this in various ways. Direct moral language is relatively rare, and moral values are often implicitly referred to. Values in social work research bear resemblance to moral philosophical stances.

Keywords: moral language, child protection research, child death cases, moral stances, moral philosophy

Introduction
Child protection constantly deals with difficult moral problems. This article explores how child protection research discusses these moral issues and the kind of moral stances it takes or whether it is “value neutral.” In recent years there have been child death cases related to child protection occurring in different countries. Indications are that such cases have increased in the United Kingdom and other European countries, but the true incidence of child abuse homicides is unknown. But in the United States, 11,000 children die every year at the hands of their custodians (Herman-Giddens et al., 1999).

The various child abuse death cases that have occurred in Europe, the United States, and the United Kingdom represent crises in the respective societies. Moral language and moral stances in academic research concerning child abuse death cases is a pressing topic. This article concentrates on two cases in the United Kingdom that have received a great deal of attention. The data consist of academic journal articles on child protection research. A lot of research besides official inquiries has been published concerning the child death cases of Victoria Climbié in 2000 and Peter Connelly in 2007.

This article gives visibility to moral values and discussion in child protection research and uses a method of philosophical analysis to explain and recognize the moral stances found within that research. Moral philosophy aims at making moral stances and moral language clear, explicit, and well justified, and in the research of normative ethics, it also aims to find solutions for moral problems (Korsgaard et al., 1996). Both moral philosophy and social work research can benefit from being combined in multidisciplinary research. Moral philosophy has for centuries studied topics and questions that are crucial to child protection. Furthermore, academic child protection research can provide various understandings of practices instead of hypothetical cases for moral philosophical research (Haidt, 2001).

First, the key concepts and methods in the research used in this article will be presented, and then the results of an analysis of the research will be presented. Two themes in particular are discussed related to the results of an analysis. The first three sections of outcomes concern the moral values that are the most commonly present in the data. Two sections after that are about the consequences and ethics connected to moral language in the articles.
These normative moral philosophical stances match sequences of overt moral language, but it does not mean that they are the only options this moral language represents. The references are easily recognizable in texts because they are very influential and commonly applied in Western scientific discourses of ethics. Quotations are used from the articles that quite clearly provide moral standpoints.

Ethical Issues in Social Work and Child Protection Research

Victoria and Peter were victims of severe abuse before their deaths. Their lives ended violently, when they were killed by the adults who were responsible for them (Laming, 2003). Both were known to child protection social workers and other professionals. Identifications and interventions had been done, and the children had statuses as children who were potentially “at risk” of being possible victims of abuse. Victoria Climbié was sent from the Ivory Coast to England by her parents for a better education, and her great-aunt was supposed to take care of her (Rustin, 2005). Victoria was killed at the age of eight by her great-aunt and the great-aunt’s male friend. Professionals such as doctors, police officers, social workers, and nurses were in contact with Victoria and her great-aunt. Just like Victoria, Peter was at various times hospitalized, and his home was visited by the police and social workers. Peter was temporarily placed into foster care, but he was returned to his mother and her boyfriend. There, a lodger killed him at the age of 17 months. The evaluation has in various contexts been that the professionals did not take sufficient action based on the evidence of abuse (Laming, 2003).

Cases of deaths, such as the ones involving Victoria and Peter, have also caused wide academic discussion within social work. In child protection research, it is unavoidable for researchers to scrutinize moral problems. This article explores the influence this has on language used in research. Sometimes it is not helpful or possible for child protection research to remain neutral. It could even be regarded as unethical. Still, researchers don’t necessarily discuss moral values in research, use moral concepts or take a position (Blackburn, 1998). Analysis of moral language reveals whether and how moral values and ethics are discussed when the topic of research is child death cases.

For example, post-positivist or moral antirealist stances which view morals as non-rational and emotion-based judgments influence scientific language and its neutrality (London, 2010). Scientific research has traditionally had a tense relationship with moral language. Positivist philosophies which were popular in the philosophy of science in the 19th century sought to eliminate opinionated language of any kind (Bird, 1998). Social work research does not have the commonly idealized “objectivity” in research. The orientation in social work research is to recognize social problems, keeping in mind that one of its missions is to avoid having a negative impact on the lives of people already in weaker positions (Engel & Schutt, 2016). However, the use of moral language and moral stances has been little researched previously. For this reason, articles in academic journals that especially adhere to social work and child protection were chosen for analysis.

The two cases in the United Kingdom are the focus of this analysis because child protection and social work researchers have shown significant interest in them. They serve as an example of how such incidents have been processed on many different levels in society. These cases have brought major reforms at all levels of social work in the United Kingdom. Besides the research, there have been ongoing debates in the media and in political discourse regarding the cases (Warner, 2014). The United Kingdom has had a culture of public inquiries into child death cases ever since 1973, when a girl named Maria Colwell was killed (Stevenson, 2013). Victoria’s case initiated the Lord Laming report (2003) and Professor Eileen Munro contributed the “Munro review of child protection” after Peter’s death (Munro, 2011; Laming, 2003).

Because the cases have received massive attention in the United Kingdom, it is the hypothesis of this article that it is likely that researchers in the United Kingdom will discuss moral aspects
adhering to the cases. This in turn makes it easier to analyze their moral stances. Since there are significant differences in child protection from country to country, and even from state to state in the U.S., moral problems in these extreme cases are not context-specific. The outcomes are not bound by the context of the United Kingdom, but as academic discussion of child death cases has been especially vivid in the United Kingdom, they reveal much about how moral problems are approached in academic research.

Data and Analysis

The data consists of 24 research articles in scientific journals that were published between the years 2000–2014. Articles concern either Victoria Climbié’s death in the year 2000 or Peter Connelly’s death in 2007. The data were collected from ProQuest online database Social Services Abstracts by using the keywords: “child protection” and “Victoria Climbié”; “child protection” and “Peter Connelly”; and “child protection” and “Baby P.” Most of the articles are written by British social work researchers. All the articles focus on child death cases, but their exact topics differ. A clear majority of the articles are based on qualitative research, with only two of them being based on quantitative research. Many of the articles are based on literature reviews and many are commentaries on the inquiry report of Victoria Climbié’s death that was conducted by Lord Laming (2003). About half of the qualitative research articles are theoretical in nature.

Moral language and moral stances found expressed in the data are the key concepts in this article. Moral language means language use based on the deduction of moral concepts; such as what is permissible, good, bad, right, and wrong (Smith-Churchland, 2005). Moral stances can be understood as the totality of values and ideas people have about norms and what the moral concepts stand for. Moral stances resemble worldviews in that people have chosen them more or less consciously. They typically guide moral language use (Haidt, 2007). Moral stances do not only consist of value judgments of people but also of beliefs that could be called metaethical. These stances depend on and intertwine with other beliefs people have concerning what exists and what is true or possible (Walker & Wallace, 1970). In moral philosophy, metaethics is research that aims to explain the system of morality. Metaethicists insist that moral claims must have coherence with well-justified general accounts of ontology and semantics (McPherson, 2008).

The metaethical stance on which this article is based is moral realism, which is critical and fallibilist. Moral realists believe that some things have moral properties independently of the stances of people (Heathwood, 2011). Fallibilism means that even basic assumptions can turn out wrong (Horgan & Timmons, 2005). Moral realism is the stance of this article because it has influenced the analysis and the language used; for example, it is postulated on the understanding that moral accounts adhere to the well-being of living species (see Bloomfield, 2013; Geach, 1967). Thus moral language is not mostly based on cultural norms or substantive taste and sentiments (Lee & Ungar, 1989).

The method of coding moral language developed by John Alan Lee and Sheldon Ungar (1989; see also Warner, 2013, 2014) has been used in this article. This method has coding levels for moral discourses that are voice, topic, stances, rhetoric, and moral keywords. Lee and Ungar state that moral talk takes “sides” in debates and has a rhetorical structure. It often uses metaphors and expressions with emotive meanings. Furthermore, it represents the “voice” of someone. According to Lee and Ungar, “topics” refer to what the moral discourse in question concerns, and “voice” addresses the person who is doing the moral talk. Moral “side” stands for the standpoint of the speaker. Examples of “moral keywords” are “hunt,” “kill,” and “barbarians,” words that have been used by protestors in the seal hunting debate. “Moral rhetoric” is persuasion by which a talker hopes to move listeners towards adoption of their view of reality (Lee & Ungar, 1989).

But the method developed by Lee and Ungar (1989) has been applied with some changes. This analysis is based on open coding, whereas Lee and
Ungar had certain pre-determined codes they used. The coded parts of moral language were named by the author, and they have usually been connected to moral stances in philosophy which are normative or metaethical, such as “moral absolutism,” “deontology,” and “moral consequentialism.”

**Findings**

**Judgments about the wrongness of death cases and child abuse**

In the data, there were surprisingly few direct judgments that child death cases and child abuse are wrong. However, this is clearly the “side” child protection research takes on the moral problems (Lee & Ungar, 1989). There were plenty of expressions that adhered to the conviction of the moral wrongness of the cases. The message that the death cases ought to have never happened is more often expressed indirectly in articles, instead of being directly judged morally wrong, evil, or bad. For example, the article by Masson and Balen (2007) aims at re-evaluating child protection. They describe Victoria’s case by using moral concepts:

> The inquiry investigated the circumstances surrounding the tragic and horrific death of Victoria Climbié in February 2000 at the hands of her great-aunt, Marie-Therese Kouao and her boyfriend, Carl Manning, who were both found guilty of her murder. (Balen & Masson, 2007, p. 122.)

Expressing thick, or strongly-worded concepts of ethics, such as “horrible,” “coward,” or “cruelty” both describe and evaluate, whereas thin ones, the traditional moral concepts of “good,” “bad,” “right,” and “wrong” are more often understood by philosophers as not having metaphysical meanings (Korsgaard et al., 1996; Zangwill, 2013). Indirect moral language or expressions seem to judge the incidents as wrong and even moral stances are less explicit than in direct moral evaluations. “Ought to”—judgments and statements which are based on thin concepts of ethics (good, bad, right, or wrong)—represent moral evaluations that are the easiest to recognize (Cooper, 1969, p. 97). But in everyday discussions moral language is rarely found in formally analyzable forms and indirect expressions are used at all times (Hare, 1981). Thick moral concepts such as “horrible” can be described as moral metaphors (Zangwill, 2013).

The principle that child abuse is wrong rarely causes disagreement in modern societies (Harris, 2010). Because of that, it can be controversial if the moral principle needs to be defended, justified, or formulated in academic discourse, at least in short texts. There are disagreements concerning many other matters that relate to the protection of children; for example, what justifications should lead to different interventions or what should be done when there is evidence of child abuse. But participants in debates over child protection can expect that others agree on the wrongness of abuse and death cases. Discussions of child deaths do not divide people into strongly polarized camps. Use of moral language is often more judgmental when people have a need for naming an enemy and distinguishing a position from an opposing side (Lee & Ungar, 1989; Lowe, 2002).

It has been suggested that child protection represents universalistic and absolutistic ethics because it leans on universal human rights (Hämäläinen, 2001; Woodhouse, 1996). Moral absolutism is a stance in which some ethical principles are facts which could not be otherwise (Heathwood, 2011). Wrongness related to these child death cases is one of the strongest candidates for such an absolute. The argumentation in these articles can be seen as sharing similar characteristics, for example, with the deontological ethics of Immanuel Kant or moral absolutism. Basically, all ethical theories agree that child death cases are wrong. In particular, as Kantian ethics highlights the intrinsic value of all people, it is comparable to convictions in the reviewer for this article (Kant, 2012).

In an analysis it is not possible to interpret whether indirect moral convictions refer to moral absolutes or, for example, to universal rules that certain things are never right or tolerable. Absolutistic expressions are quite rare in the data,
but the ethos that there is nothing good or tolerable about the cases is visible in the articles:

I want to explore what states of mind the Inquiry Report embodies, evokes, and encourages—in the professions, in civil society, in the political sphere. ... In particular, does the report help us, professionally and socially, with the very difficult but absolutely basic task of bearing to know about the terrible emotional realities of child torture and murder. (Cooper, 2005, p. 3.)

Child torture and murder become labeled as terrible incidents that absolutely require responses and actions from “us.” By “us,” Cooper (2005) is referring to practitioners in professional and social fields. He speaks for the moral duty or task of everyone who has the possibility to influence things. This seems to be in accordance with Kantian duty ethics, in which moral duties are both rational and compulsory for all rational agents (Kant, 2003). The violent deaths are always tragic and unwanted, but authors are conscious that child protection is not an institution without its faults. It is realistic to expect that in the future, horrific things might happen to children and cases will “get through the system” (Ferguson, 2004; Warner, 2014). For example, Munro (2005) mentions that judgments and decisions have to be made in the conditions of uncertainty; so some degree of error is inevitable (p. 242). These realistic expectations about the outcomes might influence language use. Authors view death cases as being wrong and intolerable, but unlike the media they do not judge the actions of social workers as evil or bad (Warner, 2013, p. 219). Milder concepts and moral language that do not accuse any particular person involved are favored (see also Lee & Ungar, 1989).

**Duties of learning, listening, and preventing**

The authors included in the data review discuss a lot about responsibilities and duties, since the cases have been seen to bring awareness to certain things that have to be done. The talk of duties, prescriptive and instructive language, and expressions of how things “ought to be” have been coded because they often reveal moral stances and sides (Hare, 1961; Lee & Ungar, 1989). A code of “duty speech” for the data reviewed was formed, a code that is common and often overlaps with another one, that of deontology. Deontology refers to the moral theory of Immanuel Kant. Moral utilitarianism and professional ethics in some of their forms center on duties and rules (Banks, 2006, pp. 27–29). Duty utilitarianism, a form of consequence ethics, takes the position that the outcomes determine the moral duties (Lacey, 1982). Professional ethics has been a research area in social work since the 1990s and 2000s, and it is traditionally associated with codes of ethics and textbooks for professional education (Banks, 2003). The connections between this traditional professional ethics and Kantian ethics become visible in that both focus on principles, moral demands, rules, and responsibilities. Both have been viewed as procedural or formal ethics (Hugman, 2012).

In general, the philosophy regarding responsibilities is that if someone has a duty to act in some manner, there has to be a reason. The reason can be legal, moral, or professional, or it can come from an absolute source such as God or an authority, or it can be based on all of these at the same time (Pizarro et al., 2003). Changes for how child protection work is done are argued as compulsory in the data used, but it is often unclear whether these obligations are understood as moral duties inside the practice of child protection or as universal moral commands (MacIntyre, 1984).

Instructive statements seem to be the most often directed at social work professionals. Because the authors often comment on professional practices, the texts could be viewed as representing professional ethics. However, unlike the function of traditional formal ethics in deontology and social work ethics, it is not common for authors to refer to professional guidelines, formal convictions, laws, or ethical codes for social workers as justifiers of moral
opinions (Hodgson & Watts, 2016). Moral language could be described as being autonomous. Kantian deontology has received criticism that official codes, principles, and lists of principles represent “morality from distance” and that rationalized and technical moral approaches replace individual commitment (Herman, 1998; Gray, 2010).

Language use can be contextual in professional ethics. If only the forms of language are analyzed, it may appear that professional ethics discuss the best ethical approaches in practice but make no mention of what all people should do in moral dilemmas. Kantian moral universalism appears to have different language or rhetoric since, according to that universal approach, moral duties are the same under all circumstances and apply to everyone (Tilley, 1998). Moral contextualism means, for example, that the context in which an action is performed might determine whether the action is morally right or that the goodness of an action does not guarantee that it is morally good in all contexts (Björnsson & Finlay, 2010). Contextual moral language means situated expressions, for example, about the duties of certain professions.

Professional ethics is not committed to any particular metaethical stance, and it can be based on many different ethical approaches (Banks, 2008). In professional codes, the most important issue is not whether the codes are “true” but whether they are setting the demands for actions (Banks, 2003). The ideas of professional ethics concerning responsibilities are based on high ethical standards. Professionals become seen as being responsible for many directions—for the clients, the profession, the employer, and society at large (Haapakoski, 2015).

In the data review, certain duties seem to be especially important, such as that lessons must be learned from past failures (Duncan & Reder, 2004). Other tasks that are highlighted are to develop the profession, the practice, and the institution, to research the cases profoundly, and to make all necessary changes so that similar cases can be prevented (Parton, 2004, p. 82). Because learning from the cases is a primary mission, research and official inquiries play a morally important role. Cooper (2005) considers that the inquiries have “significance as forms of public memorial.” His opinion is that Victoria’s case ought not to be forgotten, even though it would be a relief to consign it to the past. As Cooper (2005) states, the reality of the child has to be confronted and learned from:

Whether or not we learn from professional experience through these exercises in the way we tell ourselves we are supposed to do, the conduct of a public inquiry obliges us to go on thinking about the child, about how and why he or she died and as representatives charged with responsibility in the public sphere, about our part in their living and dying as well as our responsibilities in the lives and struggles of other people we work with (pp. 2–3).

One commonly mentioned task is that children have to be heard. In child death cases social workers may have struggled to make home visits and contact family members after they received reports of children at risk for abuse. Victoria Climbié and Peter Connelly were never seen alone by social workers. A lot of important information about what these children experienced and how they lived was never gathered due to this lack of contact (Parton, 2004). When the authors discuss tasks related to listening and seeing the child, they do not highlight only concrete hearing such as interviewing or home visiting (for example Ferguson, 2009). Listening can be a partly metaphorical concept, which refers to respecting the children and adopting their perspectives. The task of listening to a child means paying close, detailed attention to everything that is going on in his or her life. The whole family needs to be at the center of the work and needs to be heard (Driscoll, 2009).

Cooper (2005, p.1) points out that workers avoid facing unwelcome knowledge or suspicion, which is understandable but not in accordance with ethical standards. The authors seem to commonly
agree that the emotionally demanding nature of the work can cause difficulty in attending adequately to the child (Parton, 2004). As Ferguson (2005) says:

The Laming report undoubtedly explains a lot as the source of the failures to protect Victoria are put down to a combination of events and ‘woefully incompetent practices’ …. There was poor or non-existent interagency communication and a consistent failure to engage with the child in any meaningful shape or form as a service user or to assess the child’s needs, coupled with a focus throughout on Kouao, Victoria’s carer, as the client in the case (Ferguson, 2005, p. 783).

The passage above highlights that Victoria ought to have been heard, but the workers kept their attention on her great-aunt. Here the researcher is using the “moral voice” of the Laming Report published in 2003. According to Lee and Ungar (1989), the voice in a moral sentence means the speaker whose opinion is presented.

Resisting moral blame

The inquiries and the general public have blamed social workers in the death cases. This is commonly criticized in the articles. The media especially has directed harsh moral criticism towards social workers, often naming the individuals involved in these cases (Warner, 2014). Social workers have been judged for lacking courage, common sense, care and empathy, or for not attempting to work for the benefit of the children.

They have been accused in similar terms as the actual murderers—convicted as evil persons, careless in regard to the children, or even guilty of the deaths (Warner, 2013). The authors notice that even though social workers failed in some of their basic tasks, the blame has often been overblown (Garrett, 2009; Warner, 2014; Munro, 2005). One of the moral stances in the articles is that blaming can have bad consequences. If accusations and blaming are guiding the development of child protection, then the focus is on the wrong issues, and this might make the situations worse (Munro, 2005; Duncan & Reder, 2004). Reder and Duncan (2004) argue that people under threat of disciplinary measures cannot contribute to a learning process. They become defensive and guarded (Reder & Duncan, 2004). Balen and Masson (2008) have noticed, in a literature review based on comments about the Victoria Climbié Inquiry in academic child protection research, that there is concern that the public inquiries may actualize criticism that accuses the involved individuals: “Most commentators are heavily skeptical about their value. … They are viewed as alienating and traumatic experiences for the individual professionals who are publicly ‘named and shamed’ ” (p. 123).

Parton (2004) compares the Lord Laming Victoria Climbié inquiry report (2003) with the Marie Colwell Inquiry report (1974) and notices that both identify numerous opportunities when the professionals failed to intervene. But both are of the view that “… failures were not simply a consequence of individual incompetence but a reflection of fundamental inadequacies in their respective systems” (Parton, 2004, p. 81).

Inquiries have not blamed individual workers, but the tendency in them has been to place greater accountability on the managers. Researchers view that blaming is not reasonable and necessary, but this does not mean that they would not be critical towards social work and child protection or that they were compliant with the “no blame” culture (Munro, 2009). In the data reviewed, the researchers are against blaming individuals, but they use similar terms as these inquiries. For example, they speak of failures as follows:

Mindlessness is a defensive solution which unfortunately fits all too well with complex bureaucratic systems. In an individual person, the failure to keep things in mind, to make connections and to have a perspective that connects past and present is readily seen to lead to
Moral Language in Child Protection Research

a fragmented sense of self and to disrupted relationships. Some of the individual workers who gave evidence sadly seem in their practice to have been functioning in this way (Rustin, 2005, pp. 18–19).

Failure is a concept which may stand for more technical than moral malfunctions. Failure always refers to something negative, but it can be in the form of non-moral, organizational, or technical failures. Moral failure can stand for failure of moral virtues, for example in truthfulness, trust, and social responsibility (Kung, 2014, p. 36). In professional ethics, bad quality of practices can be seen as being always unethical, regardless of the motives of people.

Consequence ethics and moral evaluation of outcomes

Munro (2005) approaches the case of Victoria Climbié by asking why, despite all the efforts made in the systematic inquiry, it has not been possible to prevent child death cases and why similar ones are still occurring. According to her, constant changes have been made to the system after each child death case. So far, the recommendations for preventing further tragedies could not be evaluated as having had a lot of success. Munro’s evaluation focuses on the results or consequences, and she criticizes both the quality of child protection and the inquiries of child death cases. Munro’s article “A systems approach to investigating child abuse deaths” (2005) is an example of consequence-centered ethical argumentation.

The problem Munro (2005) identifies is not that inquiries and professionals would not have desired to improve child protection but instead the consequences of that protection. If the word “moral” is understood as moral thinking or intentions, the problem here could be seen as having a more technical than moral nature. But consequence ethics always makes moral evaluations upon the consequences. A well-known form of consequence ethics is utilitarianism, which has been developed by various thinkers, the most famous of them being Jeremy Bentham and J. S. Mill (Lacey, 1982). Utilitarianism is a stance that may state, for example, that happiness, pleasure, or justice always is and has to be the aim of actions. The goal is to produce good for as many people as possible (Hugman, 2013, p. 122).

Consequence ethics has similarities with the standpoints in Munro’s article (2005) about a systems approach and is a technique developed to be applied in child protection. The systems-centered approach looks for causal explanations of error in all parts of the system and has a complicated picture of causality in which the human operator is only one factor, and the final outcome is a product of the interaction of the individual with the rest of the system. Part of Munro’s arguments emphasize the worth of evaluating matters on the basis of the consequences these have or may have. She argues that the good intentions of professionals do not guarantee good outcomes for clients (p. 539). Munro is also aware that the inquiries into several of the child death cases have aimed at doing good. But even with high intentions, these do not necessarily result in the desired improvements in outcomes. As Munro states, “The long series of public inquiries have been expensive and stressful. They have been intelligently conducted; their analyses of practice look accurate; and their recommendations seem very sensible” (p. 532).

Munro’s article (2005) is also an example of research which does not take a strong moral stance on the Victoria Climbié case. She writes of the system, not of ethics. It looks to be a text that is neutral or technical in its language, arguments, and justifications. This is not because child protection cannot be understood as a moral issue, but the explanation is rather that the topic is to introduce the systems approach, a technique that is used in everything from engineering to child protection. Munro is especially critical towards the practices of protection in the Victoria Climbié case and says that child protection has not developed in recent years: “The level of practice the inquiry describes is breathtakingly worse than in any of its forerunners.” (p. 532).

The previous statement is an evaluation that does not make reference to a moral aim or standard. It is possible that it is not intended as a
moral evaluation. This cannot be known, unless the background and justifications for the statement are visible; for example, why the author views the practice as bad or worse, what it is worse in relation to, and how and especially why it should be different. The expression “breathtakingly” could be seen as referring to a moral sentiment. But even “good” and “bad” are not automatically moral concepts (Anscombe, 1975). According to the pluralist interpretation of moral concepts by philosopher G. H. Von Wright (1963), “good and bad” have various uses. Evaluations can always be made in relation to other standards but moral ones; “Good” can mean “technical good” (Wright, 1963).

Even not all judgments of good and bad are able to make the moral opinions of the speaker visible. It is questionable as to whether the reasoning around child protection could ever be purely technical. The consequences of bad technical quality can be the death and suffering of children, and as such discussions involving the child death cases could possibly never focus on non-moral evaluations. Munro’s article (2005) does not include only implicit discussion of what is moral. Munro considers that there is both a moral and legal need to judge professional practice, which is a sign that she is offering a moral approach. She identifies “a steep drop in staff morale and an accompanying rise in problems in recruiting and keeping experienced workers” (p. 532).

It could be interpreted that Munro’s article (2005) is giving normative moral arguments especially adhering to two things: that blaming and judging individuals is not a solution or a right way to approach the problem, and that child protection absolutely needs to be changed. Moral language perhaps proposes that outcomes are more relevant for a moral evaluation than motives. At least these cannot be passed over or forgotten in the evaluation of what needs to be done.

The dimensions of moral language and care ethics

Many characteristics of the moral language in the articles resemble the moral philosophical stance of care ethics (Van Manen, 2015). The authors for example argue for evaluating the caring skills of the workers and the direct involvement of the child and family (Driscoll, 2009). Part of the research into child protection highlights the emotional aspects of work (for example Ferguson, 2009). This research seems to be sensitive and takes individual people and their emotions and thinking into account. It supports the values on which care ethics is based (e.g., Broughton, 1993).

It has been argued in this data analysis that inquiries into child abuse cases typically narrow down their focus to structures, policies, and procedures for managing practice (e.g., Balen & Masson, 2008, p. 125). Care ethics is sensitive to understanding individuals and often against proceduralism in ethics (Friedman, 1993). It avoids absolutism and judgments from a distance and from outside of the actual situations. It values, for example, spontaneous moral decisions or the capacity of making moral judgments in situations that are less stagnant. Characteristically, language in care ethics keeps the focus on current, real-life incidents and relationships (Welbourne, 2012).

In this research, language has been coded that favors caring, human-centered ethics as well as focus on the needs and nature of people as the stance of “care ethics.” It is not that other moral philosophical stances would not highlight these issues, but care ethics can be related especially with the research that criticizes proceduralism and the rationalistic look into child protection (Held, 1993). Authors in this research often oppose focus on systems, accountability, and bureaucracy in child protection which has increased in the 21st century (Munro, 2005). Care ethics is also connected to accounts that take an in-depth look at the personal lives and psychological factors of people in an effort to understand individuals (for example Rustin, 2005). According to Duncan and Reder (2003), inquiries into Victoria Climbié’s death referred to communication failures in professional practices. They emphasize that communication is a person-to-person activity, a process in which a number of the domains of human psychology have an impact.
Moral Language in Child Protection Research

(Duncan & Reder, 2003, p. 85). Communication is a complex matter and becomes simplified if it is understood as a technical transformation of information that the professionals have been failing to do. As Duncan and Reder (2004) state:

In human communication, the myriad of feelings, attitudes and desires that add up to interpersonal relationships also amount to ‘information’. In everyday life, communication is the means through which people relate to each other and give and receive moment-to-moment signals about themselves, the other person and the relationship between them (p. 85).

The importance of having knowledge of human psychology in order to understand practices is often emphasized in the data. Such an approach is not only a moral stance but also reveals what is found as relevant in an epistemological sense. Psychology has traditionally been free of moral evaluations. It has focused on different explanations of reality when compared to normative ethics, and it does not include a stance of moral ontology (Hugaas, 2010, p. 25). But the authors reviewed often discuss psychological findings to justify moral attitudes that are caring. The worth of psychological knowledge is in getting an understanding of people whose subjectivity has to be respected. Furthermore, psychological findings are used to defend the social workers too (Ferguson, 2009). Ferguson (2005), for example, argues that the psychological and emotional aspects of performing child protection have rarely been regarded as central when evaluating and researching practice (Ferguson, 2005). A psychological perspective may produce a realistic understanding of what people are capable of and what kind of reactions and moral behavior can be expected from them. Its ethical value lies in the evaluation; it allows a deeper understanding of people and may result in avoiding moral blaming and accusing. After all, the psychological and emotional aspects explain a lot about the “failures” or mistakes professionals make. Generally, these are normal human errors and are not the intentional ignoring of children by monstrous evil persons (Munro, 2005).

A common opinion in the data is that practices in child protection ought not to be rationalized too much. There is uncertainty about whether social work and child protection needs more procedures and accountability as it changes (Ferguson, 2005). Sometimes the researchers indicate that to avoid tragedies and to function in ethically sustainable ways, child protection needs to be developed into becoming a more humanistic practice rather than something distant and procedural. For example, the education of social workers is more important than putting pressure on them and more likely to bring about better outcomes (Balen & Masson, 2008).

Conclusions

This article presents a philosophical analysis of moral language in academic social work research, showing its diversity and analyzing its value base. Analysis is based on the idea that moral stances can be read from lingual expressions. But this requires that language is not wholly neutral and that there is at least some discussion of morality. The articles reviewed for the data most often include such discussion. But moral language is often implicit and it does not indicate much theoretical moral philosophy in which moral concepts and moral stances are discussed, explained and justified, and even defended in case the research is normative.

The shocking cases of child deaths bring about responses from people and always reveal our moral stances. The emotions we show, the language we use, and the actions we take signal moral motivation and what we believe is right and wrong (Wallace, 2006). But in scientific research it is possible that researchers don’t use moral language and choose not to discuss their values. Moral judgments are rare in the data derived from the articles reviewed, but less explicit moral language can be found more often.

Indirect moral language has implicit moral stances. It is postulated that ethics and moral philosophy should be discussed more explicitly in child protection research. It is understandable that some
articles favor neutral language or avoid judgments and taking a stand, but it is possible only within certain limits. As child abuse and child protection are related to moral opinions, and those opinions influence its reasoning and language use, it is good to explain these. It is not a necessity that all research has to include profound analysis of their moral understandings or metaethical stances. However, explicitness in philosophical moral stances deepens the perspective research takes to ethics.

Moral language cannot become developed to meet needs in social work practice and research unless it is explicit and put under theoretical scrutiny and awareness. The implicitness of moral stances and language in social work research indirectly complicates the work of social workers in practice. They need moral concepts and theories for understanding, and in the best case solving, various dilemma-like moral problems. Especially when opinions and evaluations adhere to power over others, or are for example reasons for interventions, they need to be made visible. It protects the rights of the clients that workers have the skills and tools to be explicit in how morality influences their work, formulates their moral principles and distinguishes moral and other values.

Moral theories provide tools and methods to analyze and understand practices in child protection. They do not solve the moral problems alone but they can be one of the ways of developing even more ambitious practices. More research should be undertaken of the use of moral language and its limits and resources when researching and practicing child protection. There should also be further analysis of moral language in the research of child death cases in other countries besides the United Kingdom.

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Leadership in the Field: Fostering Moral Courage

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Abstract
Moral courage requires commitment to moral principles and action on those principles in the face of a threat to personal well-being. Self-awareness is a critical first step in being able to commit to ethical principles (Mattison, 2000). Ethical decision-making is a process and requires that participants be aware of how values, assumptions, moral development, and emotional skills influence decision-making. This article focuses on strategies to ensure instructors, supervisors, and colleagues are responsive to the needs of clients when presented with challenges in practice. Clearly identifying moral structures consistent with social work standards is an effective way to foster moral courage. Facilitating moral decisions and ensuring least harm to all parties involved is at the core of social work ethical decision-making. Social workers need to not only act in an ethical manner; they must also be ethical beings.

Keywords: moral courage, ethical decision-making, leadership, social work practice, ethical principles

Does one support the policies of the employer knowing that these are contrary to the needs of the clients the agency serves? Or does one confront the policies to better serve those clients? While teaching a module within an ethics course, the author used an example scenario that highlighted these conflicting priorities. Several students responded that their primary responsibility was to the agency over their responsibility to clients. The students explained that they needed their jobs and to question the policies would endanger their employment. The students did not see the needs of clients as worth the risk. Regardless of their awareness of the National Association of Social Workers’ (NASW) Code of Ethics (2008) standard 1.01 commitment to clients as primary, students reported their intention to act contrary to the best interest of the client in situations where their jobs might be jeopardized. When considering choices such as this, what must be present in order to ensure that the values, principles, and standards of the profession are upheld in practice?

This paper will highlight the concept of moral courage. The paper will examine strategies to ensure that instructors, supervisors, and colleagues are responsive to the needs of clients when presented with challenges in practice that place social workers in precarious positions. Kidder (2005) defined moral courage as involving a commitment to moral principles and a willingness to endure the challenges involved in supporting those principles. Using that definition, one can surmise that moral courage has an impact on decision-making and its adherence to the standards of the profession.

Conceptualizing Moral Courage
The positive psychology movement has identified six core moral virtues of which courage is one. Peterson and Seligman articulate that “strength of courage entails the exercise of will to accomplish goals in the face of opposition, either external or internal” (2004, p. 199). Viewing courage as a virtue highlights courage as counteracting some inherent difficulty, motivation, or temptation to act otherwise. When applied to challenges within the workplace, one can examine those factors that
assist in defining virtuous workplace behavior. Specific practices can be developed that lead workers to react with courage in the face of opposition. Acting with integrity, authenticity, honesty, persistence in the face of temptation and with empathy and humanity are all reflective of key character strengths. Those character strengths are desired traits within social work identity.

**Model of Moral Courage**

Kidder (2005) developed a model of morally courageous actions as having three strands. Commitment to moral principles, awareness of danger in supporting those principles, and a willingness to endure the consequences are required components of moral courage. Motives for action must be related to a duty to the moral principle and private convictions. Moral courage may involve denouncing injustice. Moral courage may also be displayed in order for one to be at ease with one’s decisions.

Moral courage as outlined by Kidder (2005) is in line with the virtue ethics theory of Aristotle: “For the virtue ethicist, a ‘good’ person will act in a ‘good’ way not because of their principles or duty but because they are ‘good’” (Pullen-Sansfacon, 2010, p. 403). Peterson and Seligman (2004) note that virtue ethics provides the ability to explain moral motivation: the matter of degree to which one is virtuous determines motivation.

A key trait when acting with moral courage is integrity. Kidder describes this as the “ability to discern right from wrong, acting at personal cost to oneself and being able to openly admit to the choice for right over wrong publicly” (2005, p. 150). As a core value and principle of the profession (NASW, 2008), integrity becomes a crucial consideration when confronted with ethical dilemmas in practice. The student example proposed actions based not on integrity but rather on self-interest. Ethical decision-making would require a commitment to the profession’s ethics, including the belief that client interest is primary.

**Complexity of Working in Systems**

The social context within the workplace has created challenges for ethical thinking. Caffo (2011) noted technological advances and rapid increase in information as factors that impact how employees carry out their tasks. Unclear guidelines due to the rapid pace of change, requirements to do more with less, and diversity within work settings—racial, cultural, multigenerational, and language differences—all serve to create further workplace complexity.

Warren et al. (2014) found professional silence to be in the top five challenges in rural mental health practice settings. The authors noted that silence around ethical practice could be resulting from fear which leads to a lack of discussion of the issue and adds to the continuation of ethical problems. While investigating rural practice issues, the authors concluded that efforts to “encourage providers to share ethical issues need to be ongoing… [and supervisors] need to create training and offer support” (p. 72) for practitioners.

Social work training emphasizes the interactions between client and social worker, often neglecting attention to differing ethical perspectives of colleagues. The benefit of interprofessional practice includes focusing on the contextual nature of practice relationships with diverse groups. However, the shift toward more interprofessional practice can create challenges for workers. Weinberg (2010) noted the need to broaden perspectives of training to include the structures within which social workers practice in order to deal with systemic issues. The roles social workers fulfill are not always well-understood by others. Expectations can conflict with ethical and professional considerations (Graham & Shier, 2014) resulting in discrepancies between policy and the social work value stance.

As employees, individuals are obligated to adhere to agency policies and adhere to the NASW *Code of Ethics* (2008) while working collaboratively with others. Ethical practice can be considered to include developing the moral courage to confront and challenge issues in the workplace contrary to the Code. Valuing ethical behavior and carrying through requires more than familiarity with ethics: it also requires the strength of character to uphold
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the spirit of the code (Stevens, 2000). This can be difficult when the social worker does not feel empowered within the interprofessional team.

Manning (1997) highlighted the concept of moral citizenship as congruent with social work ethics and noted the need to develop independent thinkers. She noted social workers as moral citizens demonstrate independent judgment and refuse to go along with morally harmful actions. Manning’s contention can be related to the concept of organizational citizenship behavior (OCB). OCB can be explained as behaviors that foster good working relationships and helping others perform. In an early discussion of the concept in the business sector, Hoffman (1986) highlighted the need for morally excellent workplaces to allow space and time to engage in critical reflection. When applied to challenges in social work settings as noted earlier (Caffo, 2011), one can question whether time and space is being allocated for ethical discussions much less self-reflection.

Developmental Capabilities

The definition of what makes an ethical dilemma is not the same for all social workers (Weinberg & Campbell, 2014). How an individual makes meaning of a situation is in part defined by the level of development of that person. Individuals must be capable of recognizing when controlling or insensitive social contexts are leading to inauthentic behaviors (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). Caffo (2011) identified the need for self-awareness about how we influence and are influenced by others as a starting point of thoughtful approaches to ethical decision-making in the workplace.

In order to act with moral courage, people must possess a sense of responsibility, have the ability to know right from wrong, and have a spiritual base (Kidder, 2005), but individual developmental needs can interfere with the expression of moral courage. The desire to be liked, timidity, caving in to pressure from others, and acting regardless of principles are all linked to the developmental skill to discern and commit to principles. Social workers who do not commit to the values of the profession may have trouble defending the principles of social work when challenged.

Leadership Implications

Sekerka, Bagozzi, and Charmigo (2009) highlighted the need for managers to expect employees to go beyond the moral minimum. Although discussing business and not social work, the authors noted that to foster this commitment to moral decisions and moral courage, managers must first possess the capacity themselves. The authors described professional moral courage as value-driven achievement, doing good for the benefit of others, and aspiring to a moral ideal. Supervisors should encourage others to exercise their character strengths.

The role of supervisors and managers in promoting ethical workplace climates has been reinforced in the social work literature. Ulrich et al. (2007, p. 9) noted that “an important overlap exists between overall work climate and ethical climate, and overall work related stress and ethics stress.” Leadership plays a significant role in the creation of work and ethical climates. Erwin (2000) highlighted the need for supervisors to possess ethical sensitivity in order effectively to assist supervisees to navigate challenging ethical situations. The need is for leadership that is “ethically driven, [with] committed leaders, guided by deepest values rather than circumstances” (Kacmar, Bachrach, Harris, & Zivnuska, 2011, p. 260).

Manning (2003) notes that leadership in social work has not received enough attention, but social workers can play a role in building ethical organizations and supporting social responses. Organizational leadership lends itself toward ethical challenges that must be navigated, responsibilities to clients and employees, and the moral obligations inherent in social service agencies. Developmental levels of moral maturity in leaders affect how in tune they are with the moral challenges of the workplace. Moral maturity includes (but is not limited to) ethical sensitivity, moral action, and the ability to have those important ethical conversations (Carroll & Shaw, 2012).
Ethical Decision-Making and Moral Courage

The student example described previously is one which highlights the need for ongoing attention to development of social work ethics as students are socialized to expectations of the profession. The decision to comply with policies inconsistent with social work ethics and ignore client interests is one that can create dissonance and moral stress in the social worker. What would it take for these social work students to do what needs doing despite the fear of job loss?

Impact of Moral Courage

Much of the literature surrounding the concept of moral stress has been investigated within the nursing profession. A review of the literature highlighted that moral stress can be conceived as different from that of ethics stress. Ethics stress is seen to be associated with ethical issues or dilemmas, or is related more specifically to the ethical standards themselves. Moral stress can be delineated as that psychological disequilibrium or negative feeling state that results from placement in a situation whereby one’s moral standard conflicts with institutional constraints (DeTienne, Agle, Phillips, & Ingerson, 2012). Moral stress can go beyond that which is dictated by the profession to the underlying sense of what is right or wrong by the individual. DeTienne et al. further noted that when moral stress is ignored, or not acted upon, distress can result in physiological as well as psychological consequences.

Ethics failure operates within the realm of relationships and is a complex individual and organizational experience (Bruhn, Zajac, Al-Kazemi, & Prescott, 2002). Although Bruhn et al. were speaking primarily of academic settings, the concepts can apply to the workplace. Social workers can be supported through promoting ethical work climates, institutionalizing values supportive of that climate, and promoting good citizenship through service.

Additionally, social work has been increasingly influenced by the risk paradigm and its impact on practice was discussed in a case study by Robson (2014). Decisions made using only the rules as a foundation do not necessarily balance the issues of power, relationship, and control. Without challenging decisions, we may not identify the deeply embedded assumptions and ways of practicing which may be reinforced when policy or situational contexts may be rooted in oppression.

Giacolone & Promislo (2010) noted that ethical infractions challenge an individual’s values and assumptions and break trust in organizations and colleagues. They concluded that both individual and organizational well-being are diminished with ethical infractions. Although applied to business, their conclusions can easily be seen in social work practice settings. Workers experiencing burnout, secondary trauma, and compassion fatigue are unable fully to connect with the clients they serve, extending the scope of the issue beyond that of the workplace itself.

Bolino, Hsuing, Harvey, and LePine (2015) coined the term citizenship fatigue as occurring when employees feel lack of support from the organization. They describe this construct as different from burnout noting the primary feeling is frustration and under appreciation; unlike burnout, work production is not decreased but the employee is no longer connected to the workplace and contributing to the development of the organization.

Promoting connections to the workplace and reducing the risk of burnout can be influenced by leader behavior. Leaders within organizations can reward and encourage behaviors that are associated with traits of a moral identity (Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007). Organizations can improve individual moral judgments in their employees through modeling and providing opportunities for others to lead. When individuals have a strong sense of moral identity, they are more likely to have the moral courage to decide to act ethically.

Strategies to Foster Developing self-awareness surrounding the issues of personal and professional values is a critical first step in being able to commit to ethical principles (Mattison, 2000). All ethical decision-making is a process and requires that participants be aware of how
their values and assumptions, moral development, and emotional skills influence decision-making. Additionally, ethical conduct with colleagues involves understanding personal values and behaviors, responsibilities to practice settings, and effective management of conflicts that develop in practice.

Dialogue and idea exchange can facilitate ethical understanding through consideration of context, the unique nature of clients, our workplaces, and the impact of these factors on decision-making (Weinberg & Campbell, 2014). Such a process relies on a degree of comfort with ambiguity and a willingness to take responsibility as a moral change agent. Kidder (2005) expands on the need for discourse and discussion to include role modeling, mentoring, practice, and persistence as leading toward morally courageous actions.

The Australian Association of Social Work (AASW) has identified strategies for supporting ethical practice within the workplace (2012). Professional integrity as a fundamental value is outlined and operationalized as a need for employers to ensure that they are not requiring social workers to practice beyond their current level of competence, knowledge, and skills. AASW further contends that attention to the physical resources available to social workers can lessen the risk of ethical issues developing. Once ethical issues have developed, debriefing, support, and ongoing professional development can all serve to lessen moral stress and improve ethical decision-making.

Moral stress has been identified as a cause of burnout, job dissatisfaction, and turnover (DeTienne et al., 2012; Ulrich et al., 2007). DeTienne et al. noted that if organizations wish to lower employee fatigue and turnover or increase job satisfaction, decreasing moral stress is a “good place to start” (p. 387). Encouraging discussions of ethical issues in the workplace is one way to reduce role-related moral stress and encourage ethical work climates. Conversations that provide support for workers’ ethical thinking serve to enhance ethical decision-making by moving from compliance-based thinking to that of principle-based decision-making (Caffo, 2011). Gallina (2010) highlighted the need for advocacy by the profession itself to change work environments that foster ethical dissonance. Social workers can collaborate together to better equip organizations to support ethical practice.

### Role of Education, Supervision, Leadership

As social work educators, it is important that we provide students with strategies to address the moral and ethical challenges that develop within organizational contexts. McAuliffe (2005) completed a qualitative study of social workers who had negative stress reactions due to extreme ethical situations. She advocated teaching models and frameworks to assist workers to seek consultation and support when exposed to difficult situations. The use of Socratic dialogue allows for deeper examination of ethical and moral issues (Pullen-Sansfacon, 2010) allowing for the development of virtues such as courage and integrity.

A study by Cannon (2008) found that a structured internship that utilized new role taking, followed by guided reflection over a nine-month period, was more effective in providing psychological growth as measured by the DIT-2. The DIT-2 is a validated scale measuring moral development levels. The study measured scores using an intervention group and two comparison groups. The author concluded that during internship experiences individuals must incorporate new ideas into their cognitive schema. Use of guided reflection is an effective means for instructors to assist students in their development. Leadership in the form of mentoring and practice examples helps students to incorporate reflective strategies for practice, enhancing the likelihood of moral choices. A similar study using teachers emphasized social role taking (Reiman & Peace, 2002). For experienced teachers, guided inquiry promoted moral growth, as did collaborative interactions. The authors also highlighted roles of mentors. Further research utilizing this model could provide support for this strategy within social work students. Assisting student growth through guided reflection can foster the ability to express moral
outrage. The ability to take others’ perspectives increases as moral development levels rise. Handesman, Knapp, and Gottlieb (as cited in Peterson & Seligman, 2004, p. 209) noted that “more effective [ethics] courses would be those that pay more attention to what one should do to be an ethical professional as opposed to what one should not do to avoid being an unethical one.”

According to Gray and Gibbons (2007), the need to deal with the complexity and ambiguity of ethical situations requires dialogue and a process of moral reasoning, and as such, instruction needs to combine knowledge, theory, skills, values, and guidelines. When combined with self-reflection, tolerance for ambiguity or uncertainty and the ability to assess risk across situations are associated with developing a prosocial orientation (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). Curricula including consideration for self-care and the impact of practice on the quality of life of practitioners was described as a moral and ethical imperative (Newell & Nelson-Gardell, 2014). Both these approaches highlight the need to reduce the risk of unethical decisions through proactive training.

The need for a working environment that recognizes the impact of practice situations on the social worker and provides support for employee well-being has been outlined as a strategy to combat the stress of practice (Graham & Shier, 2014). Social workers can band together within our organizations, professional associations, and coalitions to work toward policy change to promote work structures that support ethical practice.

**Conclusion**

While instruction in ethics is important, situations arise in which individuals know what is considered ethical professional behavior and yet choose unethical solutions (Strom-Gottfried, 2000; Smith, McGuire, Abbott, & Blau, 1991). The need to protect and advocate for the most vulnerable within complex systems highlights the need for careful consideration of ethical issues and a foundation for decisions. If we can understand situations that trigger moral decision-making and attend to the character of the worker, it is more likely that moral responses will occur when ethics are challenged (Miller, 2003). Social workers need to be aware of the impact of values, both personal and professional, within the decision-making process to ensure least harm to all parties involved. “Explicit attention to character and moral development within professional education plays a significant role in supporting the development of effective and virtuous practitioners who are able to exercise sound judgment and wisdom within social work” (Holmstrom, 2014, p. 464). An effective way to foster moral courage is to ensure that social workers strongly identify with the moral structure that facilitates ethical decision-making. Social workers need to not only act in an ethical manner; they must also be ethical beings.

Moral courage is an inherently personal matter woven into our cultural identities (Kidder, 2005). The codification of one’s identity is necessary in order to develop morally (Valutis, Rubin, & Bell, 2012). As educators, our emphasis on reflection for personal growth can serve to socialize individuals effectively to the profession while also promoting moral development. A clear moral identity consistent with the social justice perspectives of the social work profession sets the stage for the demonstration of moral courage. As noted by Robson, “Social workers need to find the courage and resilience to stand out and often against the tide or risk being swept away with it” (2014, p. 91).

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Leadership in the Field: Fostering Moral Courage


Gray, M., & Gibbons, J. (2007). There are no answers, only choices: Teaching ethical decision making in social work. Australian Social Work, 60(2), 228–238.


Leadership in the Field: Fostering Moral Courage


Book Review


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*Whistleblowing and Ethics in Health and Social Care* was written by Angela Ash who has a doctorate in social science with expertise in health and social care policy in the United Kingdom. The author provides training and evaluation services and heads her own health and social care consulting firm ([http://ashassociates.co.uk/expertise.html](http://ashassociates.co.uk/expertise.html)). Dr. Ash is the author of a book about preventing elder abuse as well as published papers on evaluating services for persons with disabilities. Although Ash’s work is specific to the United Kingdom, *Whistleblowing and Ethics in Health and Social Care* also applies to the experience of social workers in the United States. This book is a culmination of studies that offer keen insight into the process and product of whistleblowing. More specifically, *Whistleblowing and Ethics in Health and Social Care* describes organizational climate and culture, ethical fading and distance, and devices of denial and scapegoating that are associated with whistleblowing. The result is a book that demonstrates how social workers are among those who are vulnerable to systemic conditions conducive to ethical violation.

The first six chapters concentrate on how unethical practices become institutionalized. Ash’s book makes the point that whistleblowing is a double bind for employees. Employees are exposed to organizational practices they must employ or risk job loss by upholding one’s professional obligation to ensure ethical practice. There are a range of significant consequences for whistleblowing in organizations that thwart exposure and normalize unethical practices. The consequences for exposure grow when the act of whistleblowing threatens top administrators and the operation of organizations as a whole. The process of normalizing can happen in small ways through procedural shortcuts that become institutionalized. Employees may not recognize adherence to unethical practices due to self-deception associated with ethical fading and organizational memory that sustains ethical blind spots; innate desire and social need for social community; and acculturation to group, organizational, and professional norms. Ethics trainings fail to be effective when the content is decontextualized or detached from larger systemic forces that deter whistleblowing if not ethical practice. Ethical distance occurs when top administrators are not unaware of the negative effect of organizational processes that are born out through service delivery.

The last three chapters are devoted to exploring how health and social care practitioners, health and social care organizations, and regulatory systems can improve protections by employing an ethic of care. The author contends that organizations at greatest risk for ethical violation are not likely to assume responsibility for creating a culture that is truly supportive of whistleblowing. However, there are steps organizations can take to ensure transparency and quality that protects employees and those the organization serves. This requires leadership and policies that communicate an ethic of care.
An ethic of care emphasizes individualized care in response to human need rather than focusing on aggregate outcomes associated with task completion. The author described how emotional intelligence coupled with leadership qualities such as attentiveness, responsibility, competence, and responsiveness can be used to manifest an ethic of care. When whistleblowing occurs in health and social care organizations that employ an ethic of care, leaders can gain the benefits of organizational reflection and deep learning to enhance functioning. Policy changes are likewise necessary to facilitate safe conditions for employees to express their concerns before they escalate rather than expect employees to expose ethical violations at their own peril.

_Whistleblowing and Ethics in Health and Social Care_ illustrates the power of organizational culture and climate as well as the interface of organizational policies and governmental regulations. It is also addresses why it is in the best interests of employees and organizations to support whistleblowing but recognizes why many do not, as it exposes them to the potential for negative consequences for unethical practices. Although this book is short, the narrative can be somewhat difficult to read and slightly repetitious at times—perhaps due to the density of content about such an emotionally charged subject. The last three chapters are particularly small relative to the rest of the book. It would have been helpful to have had more discussion and examples in each chapter with special attention to how an ethic of care may be reflected by regulatory systems.

Overall, this book is a nice supplement to graduate education as well as professional development for macro practitioners. This book draws extensively from research conducted in the United States, starting with the term “whistleblowing.” For educational purpose, the use of this book would need to be coupled with additional research to process application in the United States. The most important contribution of this book is that it reminds social workers about the importance of minority views in helping to preserve integrity as a buffer against systems that, in effect, emphasize efficiencies over compassionate care.
Dr. Alcock is a professor emeritus at the University of Birmingham, United Kingdom. He has done research and written extensively on social policy for more than 30 years. He has researched in the areas of voluntary organizations and their role in welfare provision. His publications include *The Student's Companion to Social Policy, 5th edition*, a widely used text.

This book summarizes the development of welfare programs, especially in the United Kingdom, after World War II. It discusses recent efforts to reduce state involvement in welfare provision and proposals to change welfare provision. It argues that welfare is necessary to civil society.

The introduction provides the ethical and social arguments for providing for the welfare of all through individual and collective action. Without the provision of welfare for all, a decent and civil society is not possible. The author acknowledges that the provision of welfare is a complex issue. He argues that we need to understand the common good and promote collective action to sustain the common good.

In the chapter “What do we mean by welfare?” the author explains “…the dual nature of welfare as both an individual concern and the collective good” (p. 15). The author discriminates between welfare and well-being. Welfare addresses social problems or issues. Well-being addresses individual needs. The two are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but they do address different concepts. The author argues that societies have developed programs to address both in order to have a just and civil society.

The issues of health, education, and welfare are examined. “The provision of services to meet our key welfare needs is at the heart of public welfare and it constitutes the core of social policy” (p. 57). Societies have used both public provision and private provision to address these basic welfare issues.

It is argued that the key issue in welfare delivery is whether services are effective and accessible to those in need. The author posits that post-World War II services were primarily driven by “top down” management practices. Recently “bottom up” approaches have been developing. They represent the idea that those who receive the service should have a voice as to how the service is delivered. The chapter discusses both vertical redistribution and horizontal redistribution.

The chapter “Where should planning and delivery take place?” argues that local and community planning is important, as is supranational planning, to developing effective welfare programs. However, it asserts that national planning is crucial to effective welfare delivery. “It is national welfare planning that will continue to provide the only effective and legitimate basis for the collective investment and distribution that the public provision of welfare requires” (p. 112). The author argues that all residents and citizens benefit from various welfare programs. Although some programs are designed to address the needs of particular groups, it is important that welfare programs be available to all when the need arises.
Book review: *Why we need welfare: Collective action for the common good*

“There is much that we share, despite our differences, and collective welfare policy must recognize the need to balance responsiveness to difference with shared investment for all” (p. 131).

In the final chapters, the author discusses how the changing economy (globalization) and neoliberal philosophy have led to widespread attacks on and reductions in the welfare state. There is diminishing support for collective investment in welfare. “The main challenge that we face in promoting such investment is the need to reestablish popular support for collective, rather than individual, responses to the challenges welfare faces” (p. 157). The relationship between a civil society and a welfare state is established to assert that we need welfare programs. The civil society is where individuals meet collective organization. There is a need to rethink welfare and how it is to be accomplished, but civil society requires welfare.

The book does an excellent job of reviewing the development of the welfare state and establishing the need for welfare. It focuses primarily on the U.K., but many of its arguments are applicable to other welfare states. Because the summaries assume a fair amount of knowledge of the welfare state, I would not use it with undergraduates. I do think it could be a good starting point with graduate students to encourage them to think about how we develop or redevelop welfare programs necessary to maintain a civil society. Especially in the era of a Trump presidency, it seems important that we seriously explore how to maintain civil society.
Book Review

Reviewed by Charles Garvin, Ph.D., LCMSW, Professor Emeritus of Social Work, School of Social Work, University of Michigan


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Forte is professor of social work at Salisbury University in Maryland. He has written extensively on many subjects and in particular on issues regarding the development and use of theory in social work. His books on this topic include his 2006 book Human Behavior and the Social Environment: Models, Metaphors and Maps for Applying Theoretical Perspectives to Practice and his 2001 book Theories for Practice: Symbolic Interactionist Translations. He also has written many articles on this topic.

This book consists of what the author terms lessons and each lesson is essentially a chapter. The book is divided into four sections. The first section has “chapters” (i.e. lessons) devoted to what the author sees as the role of social workers in engaging in theorizing, and he asserts that this is an essential professional role for them. The second lesson presents what a theory is. He divides theory into “empirical theory,” which conceptualizes things as they are and “normative theory,” which conceptualizes things as they ought to be (p. 50). Theories are further classified as to whether they arise from a positivist approach, an interpretive approach, or a critical approach, and these are defined. The next lesson focuses on the special aspects of theorizing in social work. The major point is that the practitioner should choose knowledge that is consistent with the mission of social work. He particularly favors Falck’s (1988) membership approach, which sees social work’s mission “to understand and help members of various-sized groups and social organizations improve the quality of their membership experiences” (p. 63).

The next lesson in this section discusses the sources of knowledge for social work. These sources are theoretical, research, practice, and what he calls “everyday” bases. The latter is knowledge drawn from what we learn from our culture as well as so-called “common sense.” The following lesson discusses differential use of knowledge based on the “level of abstraction.” He presents a “ladder of abstraction” which consists of eight levels ranging from paradigms and meta theories to “grand” and “middle range” theories, to practice theories, and ending with “observations.” The next lesson presents differences in theories related to the system levels of practice.

In the next section, Forte presents theory as “puzzle solving.” One of the first lessons in this section presents the kind of theory needed to solve a social work puzzle such as a paradigm, a school of thought, an explanatory theory, a practice theory or a theoretical orientation.

The next lesson presents the names of “exemplary” theorists and 56 are listed. The list consists of such people as Bandura, Foucault, Germain, Marx, Skinner, and Freud. Succeeding lessons present the key elements of a theory—essentially the “deconstruction” (a word used frequently in this book) of the theory into assumptions, concepts, and propositions (e.g., hypotheses) and the relationship among them. The processes of deduction and induction are also analyzed in several lessons.

The next section of the book helps readers to construct practical theories in the middle range. Succeeding lessons divide such construction into theories about causes and theories about processes. The last section focuses on critical thinking about theories. Of special relevance to this journal is Lesson 24, which enables readers to critique theories in terms of ethics.
and values. Lesson 25 emphasizes the standard of evidence with reference to theory. Lesson 27 further reflects the author’s commitment to value issues as he looks at theory in relationship to justice. Lesson 28 furthers this emphasis with regard to diversity issues in the use of theory and Lesson 30, which emphasizes moral issues. The author sees a strengths perspective as the one that is most consistent with his approach to the profession, and this is dealt with in Lesson 29.

Lesson 31 examines the historical and social context in which a theory is formulated and Lesson 32 considers the long-term impact of a theory. The book concludes with what the author calls a “coda,” which summarizes the main principles developed through the previous 32 lessons.

As the reader of this review can tell, I am impressed by the scope and depth of the book. If there is anything else one can explore about theorizing in all its aspects, I don’t know what that would be. The author, as I have stated, is deeply aware of ethics and value issues and in addition to lessons devoted to these, such issues are raised in almost every lesson as appropriate. He also wishes to facilitate the reader’s learning from the book through exercises and discussion questions after every lesson.

The author also has his biases and admits to these. For example, I don’t see in the same way as he does, contemporary Marxist theory. He also sees classic behaviorism, if applied in practice, as reducing people to animals. I don’t know of social workers who apply behaviorist ideas as expressed by Pavlov or Skinner, for example, but rather use theories which relate these “classical” ideas to theories that embody social work ethics and values.

My final thoughts deal with how this book may be used in teaching social work courses. I believe that all faculty should study this book and use it selectively in teaching. The book in its entirety might be a text for a doctoral course in theory building for social work. Specific lessons might be used in bachelor’s and master’s courses to teach students what theory is, as described in the book’s first section. This material could even be presented in first sessions of methods or human behavior courses.

If the book is revised, and I imagine it will be, the author might consider some devices to assist the reader such as a flow chart that incorporates all the lessons or a glossary of the major terms in the book such as deconstruction and construction. Overall, as I have implied, along with many other books and articles cited by the author on theory in social work, this book should become a “classic” social work text.
Book Review

Reviewed by Peggy Proudfoot Harman, MSW, Ph.D., Marshall University


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This edited work consists of 13 chapters divided into three sections focused on thinking, practicing, and planning in community development through the lens of emerging neoliberal political arenas. The book provides a world view of the latest discourse on community development written by scholars who study dynamics affecting the planning, design, and implementation of community development projects.

The introductory essay by Meade, Shaw and Banks highlights the influence of political power on community development. All three authors work as professors and are experts in community development throughout the United Kingdom. Their opening essay discusses the nuances of the meaning of community development throughout the world and expresses the need for “a critical vision of community that supports diversity while promoting dialogue across distance and difference” (p. 1). The authors explain that the purpose of the collection is to assist community developers by providing politically useful resources for working within neoliberal political environments. We are reminded that community development is “historically situated, ideologically contested, and a contextually specific set of practices” (p. 7). Contributors to this edited collection provide readers with insights into the nucleus of these elements specific to their own histories, ideologies, and contexts. The essays provide us with a glimpse of how community developers are engaging worldwide to work within the confines of neoliberal policies.

In “The politics of deploying community,” Newman and Clarke provide a basis for considering community development couched within the context of political translation and articulation. Newman and Clarke call on community developers to recognize that there are always competing projects and to consider that diverse political, sociological, and cultural resources are fluid which result in reshaping “the relationship to power and inequality” (p. 44).

Providing insight on the way community development is practiced in different settings, Kenny contributes a thesis on “Politics, Power, and Community Development.” Kenny maintains that the role of community developer should be framed in two different ways: one is based on “capacity building, social inclusion, and welfare delivery” (p. 60), and the other is based on social movements. Although Kenny is based in the United Kingdom, elements consistent within her treatise are also found in an essay from India by Jha, who discusses cases of how government services provided to those who are considered to be impoverished and disempowered ignore the root causes of disenfranchisement, creating communities that are bastions of “private, poor, and depoliticised individuals” (p. 78). Jha maintains that through collectivism, these communities can transform into politically powerful entities, challenge the concept of subjugation, and ultimately attain their own governance.

The section on practicing community development within the confines of changing political climates
draws from scholars located in various locations throughout the United Kingdom, Australia, South Africa, New South Wales, Taiwan, and the United States. These chapters are rife with material focused on how political elements have changed the face of the roles and practices of community developers and community development projects.

Chen discusses the “mobilization of community” (p. 98), describing how outside economic forces restructure entire communities and in the process develop community organizations designed to create a new Taiwanese “identity and democratic citizenry” (p. 97) which encourages political engagement. The “mobilization of the community” (p. 98) as Chen describes it, is sourced from many forces, both state and private, which have both positive and negative consequences. However, Chen recognizes that the process of empowering citizens through encouraging cultural identity and creative industry also has the benefit of enhanced economic opportunities through tourism.

These contributions highlight the need for community developers to be flexible within the confines of a continually changing world. Discussing each entry individually, requires more space than is provided for a singular book review. However, I encourage community developers and academics alike to read this work. It provides the reader with an interesting and in-depth discourse on how to think about the topic and gives solid examples of how various countries are thinking about community organizing and implementing community development projects.
Book Review

Reviewed by J. Porter Lillis, Ph.D., University of North Carolina at Pembroke

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This small text is devoted to helping the professional social worker and any other helping professional. It is the product of the editors’ MSW programs’ efforts to teach self-care to the students as a professional practice skill. It meets a growing demand for more articles on self-care.

The book is only four chapters, with appendices. The first two chapters introduce the concept in the social worker setting, provide an overview, and then explain how to use the self-care plan. The third chapter is a collection of 26 (A-Z) entries each titled with the corresponding letter of the alphabet. These are short essays (4-5 pages each); each has a Reflection/Discussion section and a Selected Resources section at the end.

The real gem in this book is that the 26 essays are from different authors, with different voices, different views, and with vastly different experiences. The different topics of each essay, with their divergent insights, make a single text broadly representative of many issues and provide rich advice on self-care. “Self-care as a practice skill is as essential and basic as learning your ABCs.” (p 21.)

The intent is for the book to be read and used in whatever manner makes it most helpful: straight through, visiting specific topics, read alone or used and discussed by groups, used as staff development, etc. In this respect, the book is a very concise resource that can be used in varied ways for beginners and seasoned practitioners alike.

The primary message is that self-care should be understood to be a core competency, and as such, the editors “…have found that using a specific, structured, self-care plan is essential for ensuring intentional attention to self-care” (p. 19). Self-Care Planning Forms are located at the end of the book: one blank, the other filled out as an example. The authors use the acronym SMART (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic, and Time-limited) and advocate SMART planning to ensure self-care goals are “attainable and measurable.” Lastly, accountability measures are emphasized to include using accountability partners or groups in self-care planning.

For the purpose of reflection and providing self-care direction, this collection of short essays written by social workers and inclusion of a self-care plan outline does what it sets out to do. Awareness, Balance, Connection (just to name the A, B, and C), the titles, and the works themselves create a purposeful and probably much-needed pause. They call attention to the needs of the practitioners themselves with the aim of promoting individual—and thus overall—organizational wellness. For those concerned with “burnout,” this is both timely and essential.

“After all, what do we do for a living? We help others to take better care of themselves. To do this well and without impairment, we have to take care of ourselves” (p. 9).
Privilege: A Reader is currently in its fourth edition. Earlier editions include 2013, 2009, and 2003. The primary audience for this collection of articles is college students, who would be assigned to read this book as a supplement to a variety of courses in sociology, social work, African American studies, feminist studies, Native American studies, and perhaps psychology. Looking at reviews on amazon.com, a reader will notice extremely high praise from student readers. Most students called Privilege “life changing.” Paradoxically, a student who composed a contemptuous review on amazon.com demonstrated that the book had a profound impact on his thinking. Clearly, he did not appreciate the primary thesis in this volume, but the various chapters propelled him to think. I am sure that the Kimmel and Ferber giggled when they read this negative review.

I suspect that I am showing my age, but I found the book borderline trite. Huh? Yes, for someone who has been teaching and writing on this subject for 40 years, I found nothing new in it. The book referred to research that was completed when I was enrolled in a college course titled “Sociology of Women.” It was cutting-edge research in 1972, but I know that my mouth dropped open when I realized that the authors were presenting the material as something new and earthshaking. For example, in Collins’s chapter titled “Toward a New Vision,” she reports the results of perceptional research on the differential characteristics of “masculine” and “feminine.” She fails to cite the research, but I vividly recall reading this research in 1972. Years later as a professor, I referred to the same research in lectures. When the students realized that I was citing 1972 research, they rolled their eyes and I got the impression that they thought I was too old to teach. Although it is clear that the findings continue to be earthshaking, I wonder how today’s students would react if they realized how ancient some of these cited studies are? If Collins had reported on the lack of change in our overall perception of male/female characteristics, the chapter would have been more profound.

The question “What to do about white privilege?” remains unanswered in this volume. This does not suggest that no efforts are made. Several authors pointed out that we should make lists. Raising our consciousness about white privilege certainly is the first step. Within Kimmel and Coston’s chapter titled “Seeing Privilege Where It Isn’t,” they introduce a conceptual framework offered by Goffman in the early 1960s. For me, there is nothing new; but for college students, Goffman’s work can open their eyes to a totally new view of the world.

Within my experience and world view, the best avenue to understanding privilege is the concept of institutional racism/sexism. It is addressed in the book, but the presentation is highly superficial. Why? Institutional racism/sexism is a highly abstract concept that requires intensive analytic analysis, which is not entertaining. Clearly this book is entertaining and captures the attention and imagination of college students who read it.
To understand highly abstract concepts, it is critical to begin with an example of my own. Here is one: While teaching about institutional racism in a course titled “Introduction to Social Work,” a student said that she dearly loved her aging mother and took her to the best geriatric specialist she could find. They experienced a long drive to the Duke University Medical Center. When the physician walked into the room, my student recounted that she was both shocked and upset. She said, “I drove all this way to see a good doctor.” The student was expecting a white male physician in his 40s, but she got a female African American physician in her early 30s! The great irony for this example includes the fact that the student telling this story was African American. In her heart, this African American social work major believed that only white males in their 40s can be the best physicians. This is institutional racism! AND IS THE BASIS FOR “WHITE PRIVILEGE”!

There are some academic problems with this volume. The citations are inconsistent. In some chapters APA is used; in other chapters it is not. Most annoying was Pease’s chapter titled “Globalizing Privilege.” Although APA is used here, the editors failed to include a reference page. When I wanted to check his sources, none of them are printed as they should be. Clearly, the book needs better copy editing. In Gastfriend’s chapter titled “Reflections on Privilege,” specific data are presented, but no references are offered. For me, this is exasperating. For most college students, these problems would go unnoticed.

I did not like this book and would have never adopted it for any of my courses. HOWEVER, it is abundantly clear that students absolutely LOVE reading it. In reading student reactions on amazon.com, it is clear that EVEN for the one student who claims to hate the book, it propelled his critical thinking skills. Generating excitement among students makes this book a worthy reading requirement, which outweighs my reluctance to adopt it.

Reviewed by Elaine Spencer, MSW, RSW, Clinical Social Worker (Alberta), Red Deer College

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Merlinda Weinberg, Ph.D., is associate professor of social work at Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. She has an extensive practice history prior to her academic life, including “25 years as front-line social worker, manager, consultant and practitioner in private practice” (p. Preface). [Full disclosure: Dr. Weinberg’s work is quite well known to this reviewer, and Dr. Weinberg contributed a chapter to this reviewer’s recently published text *Social Work Ethics: Progressive, Practical and Relational Approaches* (Spencer, Massing, & Gough, 2017).] Dr. Weinberg has published an array of articles and book chapters, adding her voice to the critical progressive analysis of social work practice, with a focus on ethics, mothering, and commitment to practice assistance. See the Dalhousie University website for further information on her published works.

*Paradoxes in Social Work Practice: Mitigating Ethical Trespass* expands on the findings of an in-depth study Dr. Weinberg conducted with professional social carers about their construction of ethics in their work with young solo mothers. The primary premise of the text is, ultimately that complex understanding and commitment to ethical practice can aid us in realizing a society that is more socially just. Weinberg unravels practice and theory meanings and conflicts from the experiences of the workers in the study and deftly constructs mitigating strategies like “resistance practice” (p. 125) and “responsible traitors” (p. 130), instead of leaving us staring bleakly at the state of our chosen profession.

Using a combination of theories, well laid out in the opening chapters, Weinberg respectfully paints a thicker picture of “dilemmas and tensions that arise……making their [social workers’] practice difficult, complex, and fraught with angst both for their clients and themselves” (p. 4). A romp through Foucault’s philosophy and an examination of structural and postmodern approaches, along with an overview of both traditional and newer views of ethics, assists the reader in diving deeper into the understandings and meanings made of the study. To echo Weinberg’s review of limitations, there are no client voices in this study, which would have added another layer to this deftly constructed dissertation.

This text is about paradoxes and illustrates them in the overarching themes. It is a book about social workers’ efforts to assist young single mothers, yet there is linkage to how “we, as a society, treat and should be treating those most marginalized” (p. 27). It is a “tale of [Dr. Weinberg’s] anguish about the current state of social services” (p.26) and a dispute with Margolin’s and others’ excoriating critique of our profession. Weinberg lays out six distinct paradoxes and overviews the inevitability of ethical trespass while also laying out stories of resistance, and collaborative political action to allay cynicism and despair. Particularly encouraging was an entire chapter (Chapter Five) dedicated to mitigating trespass. In the style of other progressive pragmatists [my term, loosely applied here] (e.g., Baines, Turbett, and Fook), Weinberg deconstructs and makes plain a disconnect between the self-
identification of workers as anti-oppressive and the practice being largely focused on a conception of private troubles. I do no justice to the nuanced and fulsome examination and of the intricacies and variations on this theme yet regard the analysis of the workers’ experiences as perhaps of the most important offering from this text to students, practitioners, and educators alike.

These are the six paradoxes that light up the complexities of ethics in practice (pp. 1-4):

1. Care and Discipline
2. More than one “Client in a Case”
3. Non-judgmentalism vs. Need to Make Judgments
4. The Setting of Norms vs. Encouraging “Free Choice” and Client Empowerment
5. Self-disclosure as Necessary and Risky for Clients
6. Equality vs. Equity

Weinberg argues, in her conclusion, “multiple paradoxes are endemic to the social work field and result in no completely adequate solutions” (p. 155). Ultimately, this text is of tremendous use to all of us who query the narrow, proscriptive, binary conceptualizations of ethics in social work practice. It will be of particular help to upper-level learners and experienced practitioners with interest in the challenging confluence of postmodern theory and structural thought. The text lays out the complexities of real-life practice and has the power to deeply affect learners and practitioners to more rigorous self-critique and practice. To this reviewer, the examples, drawn from Weinberg’s study participants, of acts of resistance, the description of strategies of a “responsible traitor” (p. 130), and the clarity of conceptualizations on how to mitigate trespass were the juicy fruits of this deceptively dense tree.
Book Review

Reviewed by Elaine R. Wright, Ph.D., Brescia University

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From the Anthropology, Culture and Society book series, *Faith and Charity: Religion and Humanitarian Assistance in West Africa* is described by the series editors as scholarship “about large issues, set in a (relatively) small place, rather than detailed description of a small place for its own sake” (p. vii). With this objective in mind, the ethnographic case studies represented by the authors in this edited collection are representative of spaces and places within a specified area on the planet that illustrate the myriad nuances and potentialities of the evolving state of affairs of faith-based organizations doing charitable work in a globalized world.

The authors found in this volume are predominantly affiliated with Canadian universities as faculty, doctoral candidates, or researchers. A few selections included in the book are from members of university departments from Côte d’Ivoire. As an editor and contributing author to the text, LeBlanc brings substantial experience and knowledge with a breadth of publications and international research projects focused on religion, development, and social transformation in postcolonial African societies. Co-editor and contributing author Audet Gosselin also brings perspective from his background as a historian and sociologist concentrating on religion, development, and political culture in Burkina Faso.

This book is primarily focused on the efforts and evolution of religious organizations in social development and humanitarian aid in the current neoliberal economic and political environments of Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire. The chapters address faith-based nongovernmental organizational (fbNGO) activities of Catholic, Evangelical, and Islamic entities, with the latter highlighted in the majority of the case studies in the book. Organized in two parts, the discussions in the text are centered on a) the history and dimensions of faith-based social development especially in postcolonial settings and b) examples of the impacts of NGO-ization and professionalization on religious group identity and practices in the region.

The chapters are evenly divided between case studies of communities in Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire, with NGOs in Senegal also included in one chapter. The editors explain that portraying the issues and experiences of fbNGOs in these countries provides a unique opportunity for study of two nations with an intertwined history and comparable trajectory of religious pluralism and its influences in their politics and social development over the past century. Many of the studies also consider the long-term and/or recent relationship of the different religious groups to each country’s government and political parties as well as to international organizations and private donors.

The introductory chapter describes how the shifting political landscape and structural adjustment programs of African countries led to varying degrees of austerity and privatization of state-owned industries in Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire. In a response to how these measures created political instability, as well as a gap in financing for services such as social welfare and education, religious organizations were challenged to examine how
best to continue and/or be revitalized by charity work in light of the now under-resourced and often unserved needs of their communities. To maintain viability in a market economy and to respond to interest in membership seeking social change, faith-based groups have explored the benefits of how a nonprofit status can enhance investment in social assistance programming, networking for religious and social entrepreneurial initiatives, participation in the public arena for shaping socio-political agendas, and new venues for further establishing a presence in the community.

The NGO-ization of religious organizations brings attention to and re-evaluation of the identity, purpose, and agency of faith-based groups as they adapt to changing social, political, and economic realities identified in *Faith and Charity*. Does the transition of religious actors into fbNGOs require participation in previously secular and governmental activities in order to meet the needs of individuals and communities? How does this change in status impact the values and ethics of providing humanitarian assistance locally and globally? How do the motivations for civic engagement and volunteerism shift within a neoliberal market ideology? Does the status as an fbNGO yield untapped opportunities for recruitment to the faith? Where do the boundaries between religious activism (including proselytization), social action, and social development begin and end in a nonprofit environment? How do gender, language, collectivist versus individualist cultures, etc., impact socioreligious dynamics of fbNGOs? These questions, ethical dilemmas, and more are probed and pondered in the variety of scenarios presented by the book’s authors.

Social work practitioners and educators concerned with globalization, humanitarian aid, and community development would find the book replete with content that assists with understanding related issues and challenges within but also applicable beyond the borders of Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire. Because of its unique focus, the material would be particularly useful for learning more about the impact and integration of faith-based organizations in social development in this region as well as the larger relationship between religion and civil societies across the globe.
Both major political parties in recent decades seem to have abandoned the poor. Most recently the preoccupation has been with the “disappearing” middle class and the focus on inequality between the middle and upper classes.

But in June of this year, the Republicans organized a Task Force on Poverty, Opportunity, and Upward Mobility and produced A Better Way, a paper that lays out the broad goals of a plan for reducing poverty and creating opportunity for the poor. (House of Representatives 2016).

With a poverty rate of 15 percent, a child poverty rate of 21 percent (US Bureau of the Census) and a sudden awareness of extreme income inequality, this would seem natural, but not for conservatives. The interest largely emerged from a Republican movement called reform conservatism This new wave of conservatism says that the core problem is weak mobility from the bottom of the income ladder and wage stagnation for the middle class… But economic and social policy can make a difference …making family life more affordable, upward mobility more likely, and employment easier to find according to Ross Douthat. (Douthat, 2013)

The conservative solution to the problem (American Enterprise Institute, 2014) is a plan that compels the receiver of social benefits to become a patient in a highly intensive therapeutic relationship in order to become rehabilitated and thus self-sufficient.

In this view, our safety-net is now fragmented into numerous benefit programs that are not coordinated, not evaluated, and lack accountability for the program or its recipients. Each program has its own “tax rate” (the rate at which benefits are reduced when the client goes to work.) Combining these reductions creates a situation where people become mired in dependency rather than undertaking or increasing work effort and becoming self-sufficient. Paul Ryan, Speaker of the House has said:

We don’t want a dependency culture. Our concern in this country is with the idea that more and more able-bodied people are becoming more dependent upon the government than upon themselves (Meet the Press, 2014).

The Opportunity Grant calls for at least eleven social welfare programs like cash assistance, food stamps, housing assistance, and Medicaid to be combined and given to the states as a block grant. This means fixed rather than open-ended funding which largely exists now. States, after creating a plan to be approved by the federal agency would then decide how they want to spend the money. State programs would be monitored by a third party
to periodically assess how and whether their stated program goals are being met. Programs would be locally focused and involve communities, non-profit agencies, churches, and other non-government institutions—to act as providers. Getting people to work is the operative intent in order to facilitate the over-all goal of getting them off assistance and out of poverty.

This is in contrast to the current safety-net where programs are separately managed and funded by states and the federal government, and is accountable to the federal government for following federal program rules. Federal funding is for the most part, “open-ended” where money is allocated to the states on a basis of need, and so is flexible and responsive to need.

In return for assistance, arguably the most radical part of the Opportunity Grant plan, is the client’s obligation. The family receiving assistance would need to agree to ongoing intense monitoring by state therapeutic workers who would work with the client to forward the goal of self-sufficiency. Progress toward this goal would be constantly evaluated until the family gets off assistance which is the objective of the therapy. The family would be explicitly and directly held accountable for ending assistance.

Although novel for these times, moral oversight of those receiving assistance is not new. It is a throwback all the way to the 1870s when the price of getting economic relief was rehabilitation by the Charity Organization Society, a professional organization of charity workers who felt that too many poor people were getting indiscriminate and unsupervised assistance. Up until then what was called “outdoor relief” was casual and required little input from those receiving it. But things changed when the COS “friendly visitors” started to intervene and attempt to reform those whose poverty was said to be due to their own immoral and shiftless ways. Their mission was to build character and enforce self-reliance with the goal of reducing the relief rolls.

In 1935 as a result of the Depression, the Social Security Act which included Aid To Dependent Children (ADC) was passed. This program assisted children deprived of a father’s support. ADC mothers were not expected to work—the avowed purpose of assistance was so that they could stay home to properly take care of the children.

But by 1962, the welfare rolls had grown astronomically (Rein, 1982) and some families were exhibiting problematic behavior. The solution, starting with the 1962 amendments to the welfare legislation, created social services to be given to these families by the welfare worker in an effort to “strengthen the family and promote self-sufficiency.” Such services were implemented by one-to-one counseling. The strategy of providing services that were to rehabilitate the assistance family continued with the 1967 amendments and ended in 1975 with the Title XX Social Services Block Grant. Social services were clearly designed to get families off welfare by changing their moral behavior.

So the Opportunity Grant’s innovative way to get people off assistance is not new but is a continuation of this tradition in the history of social welfare benefits.

Social services did not eliminate the ever-growing welfare rolls and in 1996, President Clinton “ended welfare as we know it,” and the new program Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)—a block grant to the states, replaced now Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). In TANF, work for welfare families was no longer encouraged through social services. It became mandatory. States were required to have a predetermined percentage of their clients involved in work or work training or their federal funds would be cut. Welfare grantees had to work for a predetermined number of hours each week or their grants could be eliminated.

Although TANF welfare agencies practice monitoring to ensure work effort as the law requires, it appears much less onerous than what the Opportunity Grant envisions in the way of therapeutic oversight for each family receiving benefits from any one of a dozen programs.

Families being forced into personal rehabilitation is intrusive and turns legal benefits for those in need into contract assistance i.e.,
assistance is no longer a right as defined by law but a discretionary contract as defined by the giver, and requires some specified actions in return for assistance. Assistance as a right is different as it depends on the status of the group as being needy and not on an obligatory arrangement with the giver.

The need to rehabilitate those getting benefits also implies the culture of poverty argument where the irresponsibility of the family is said to be influenced or created by the culture of the community that it lives in. Paul Ryan has famously said:

There is a culture in our inner cities in particular, of men not working and just generations of men not even thinking about working or learning the value and the culture of work. (Ryan, 2014).

So, back to the times of Moynihan and the anthropologist Oscar Lewis in the 1960s and the studies of ghetto life where culture was the causative culprit of immoral behavior. These residents of low income communities had to reject the negative influences of their surroundings and be made moral and productive. Such theories have long ago been refuted. Just as what was believed then, the current basic conservative idea is to change the client and not the system, though it is clear that at this time, economic conditions such as unemployment and low wages are responsible for the high rate of beneficiaries of welfare programs.

We know that social services as a way to reduce the AFDC rolls did not succeed as the caseload continued to increase and few recipients in those years went to work. (Gabe, 2014 pp 22, 23) What did promote work was the change from AFDC to TANF where work became a required goal for cash recipients. At that time, single mothers—responding to this straightforward objective, encouraged by the expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (for those working) and by the availability of jobs in a flourishing labor market—greatly increased their work effort and abandoned welfare. In the early 1990s about 30 percent of single mothers were on welfare. By 2013 only 7 percent received this cash assistance. In the 1990s, 12 million people were on welfare—down to about 4 million now. (Gabe, pp 23, 75).

Although counseling and therapeutic intervention can be effective and appropriate in helping with emotional problems, it is clear that trying to change people’s character as a condition for getting economic assistance, is not the solution to poverty and dependency.

References
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