Updating Ethics Expertise: Supervision of Ethics as a Communicative Action

Ana Frunză, Ph.D.
LUMEN Research Center in Social and Humanistic Sciences, Iasi, Romania
ana.caras.15@gmail.com

Antonio Sandu, Ph.D.,
“Stefan cel Mare” University of Suceava, Romania; LUMEN Research Center in Social and Humanistic Sciences, Iasi, Romania
antonio1907@yahoo.com

Abstract
In addressing ethics expertise, we are looking at the theory of communicative action, in order to stress the need for developing a new ethics expertise model: supervision of ethics. The paper is theoretical, grounded in the theory of communicative action, which we reinterpret in terms of social construction of ethics expertise, customized in social work practices. The ethics of communicative action focuses on an equal inter-subjective communicative action with morally passive patients, incapable of inter-action in any debate generating moral consensus. We argue the need for updating ethics expertise by bringing into practice this new model, which will be able to make professional and organizational values compatible, exercising a supplementary gatekeeping role in the transfer of political theories about the public good through the implementation of programs and practices.

Keywords: ethics expertise, supervision, supervision of ethics, social work, communicative action.

Introduction
The paper aims to present the supervision of ethics as a particular form of ethics expertise.

Supervision of ethics is developed as a form of communicative action that follows the consensus of people who are involved in ethical decisions. In the context of using communicative action as a consensus generator, we refer to the supervision of ethics as a communicative practice embodied in ethics expertise, that brings together practices from all other forms of ethics expertise, such as counseling of ethics, ethics audits, ethics committees’ activities, ethical consulting, ethical decision-making models and so on.

Communicative Action Theory
Habermas (1984) highlighted the idea that social actors seek to reach a common understanding and coordinate actions, based on consensus and cooperation, rather than being strategic-action-oriented strictly to achieve their objectives. Habermas (2000) believes communication is crucial for building the relationship with Otherness, an expression of consciousness underpinning the moral conscience of any form of social action. Habermas’s theory starts as a critique of the idea of the rationality of social actors, following the postmodern project of establishing linguistic turns (McCarthy, 1978), the game of language and interpretative agreement which deconstructs the claims of the universality.
of ethical and social metatheories. Habermas’s theory system is aimed at the empowerment of latent communication contained by modern institutions and rational analysis of the human capacity to deliberate critically in the pursuit of rational interests.

There is a distinction made by Habermas (1987) between moral agents – seen as subjects capable of communicative action and moral patients – subjects on whom moral action is exercised. The philosopher states three distinct types of action aimed at individual and social success. In the economic field, the search for success, manifested through wealth, generates instrumental activity (action), which is seen by Habermas as success in an unsociable plan (personal wealth). The second type of action is determined by the desire to gain success in the social sphere, where power can be manifested as influence, generating strategic activity (action). Communicative action, as a third type of action set out by Habermas in his critical reading of Weber on success, subscribes to sphere of mutual understanding (1984; 1987; 2000).

Habermas (1987) introduces a “paradigmatic turn” bypassing ethics in the field of consciousness, in a constituent frame of communication. Mediation is performed by acts of inter-relations through speech, and not by instrumental acts. Coordination through language positions requires actors to captivate practical-oriented auditors by improving communicative experience, seen as the inherent purpose of any speech (Mitrovic, 1999). As a result of communicative action, Habermas states that a model-generator consensus legitimates a force without coercion. The model is identified as one that is unifying, allowing the achievement of overcoming personal perspective through argumentative discourse. Interlocutors are in the process of negotiating interpretations, and thereby ensuring an interpretative world.

Based on the work of Habermas (1984, 1987, 2000), discourse ethics or communication ethics proposes an effective participation of all those involved (listening to all voices), a real ethical deliberation replacing the old theory of ethical decision. Characteristics of communicative action theory applied in ethics are represented by transformation of ethical universalism into particular rules of argument, derivation of moral norms of social processes outside the critical discourse records, the need for minimal interpretive consensus, and “relative” ethical standards (Bohman & Rehg, 2011). Communicative action consists of customized ethical debates giving rise to specific communication frameworks, specific moral norms, and codes of conduct.

Establishment of ethics, based on discursive dialogue and interpretive consensus, involves a number of challenges such as:

- disparities in power and games which manage deliberative context;
- ethical debates which need customization to each particular communicative context, which lengthens the time needed to obtain a decision;
- the possibility of distortion of the results due to the deliberately uneven argumentative ability to negotiate by participants
- admission of some unacceptable rules due to a particular deliberative consensus meeting (Morar, 2006).

Moral debate and negotiation are based on the identification of acceptance criteria of communicative action as moral action, focusing on avoiding arbitrariness and manipulation without moral claims of impartiality.

**Ethics Expertise—Delimitations**

Ethics expertise and moral expertise seem to be two different concepts that theorists define and debate separately, mainly based on different perceptions of what both ethics and moral mean. Schicktanz, Schweda, & Wynne claim that there
should be a distinction between ethics expertise and moral expertise (2012). Morality is defined as a set of principles and values, whose main role is the guidance of the individual life and social interactions, while ethics implies normative reflection, justification, or critique, in terms of validity, desirability, and legitimation. Schicktanz et al. admit that the differentiation between ethics and morality is far from easy: the concrete distinction between these two concepts asks for a distinction between secular morality (of individual non-experts) and ethical reflection (philosophical and academic) which cannot be done fully (2012).

Ethics expertise is seen by Bruce Weinstein (1994) as coming from four different directions: descriptive ethics expertise, meta-ethics expertise, normative ethics expertise, and expertise in living a good life. Ethics expertise is divided into epistemic ethics expertise, characterized as the cognitive ability of the individual that implies a theoretical knowledge of the field, and performative ethics expertise, which implies the possibility of excellence in a specific field, and the capacity for pragmatic action (Weinstein, 1994). We argue that there is a further difference between pragmatic and performative, whereas the performing represents the action of practicing ethics, in conditions where the ethicist is counseling in relation to ethical conduct. The ethical or non-ethical features of the ethicist’s practice or life are not taken into account in establishing the level of ethics expertise (Caras [Frunză], 2014b). Academic discourse on ethics expertise offers at least three different approaches to the concept. Peter Singer claims that ethics expertise requires a profound familiarization with theories, methods, and ethical arguments, as with their application in different situations (Singer, 1979), while Cheryl Nobel (1982), considers ethics expertise to include the manifestation of a moral wisdom. Another perspective on this concept exposes the ability of justifying the moral judgments in a coherent way: Schicktanz et al. (2012) indicate that trust given to ethics expertise, but also the retention of it, depends on the meta-ethics approach of those who recall ethics expertise (Caras [Frunză], 2014b).

We have considered all these perspectives on ethics expertise studied in this body of research, and we agree with some of these authors’ approaches. We consider the perspective of Steinkamp, Gordijn, & ten Have (2008) useful in further developing our own model of ethics expertise: we agree with the idea that ethics expertise is the practice that improves and offers specificity to ethicists in terms of their own expertise, thus contributing to improving non-ethicists’ perceptions of their moral competences. Ethics expertise offers perspectives on argumentative styles that are complementary to both ethicists and non-ethicists, contributing in the end to an awareness of ethicists’ professional development problems (Steinkamp et al, 2008).

Who Is Entitled to Be an Ethics Expert?
A possible inquiry into the justification for exercising supervision of ethics may occur especially in the conditions where the features of ethics expertise are not clearly differentiated from those of a person who is simply considered to be virtuous. This issue is discussed particularly when examples are raised of ethicists whose particular behavior in certain situations is considered unethical.

Eggleston (2005) treats the issue of ethics expertise from the Moore (1993) perspective and reflects on the nature of ethics expertise: is ethics expertise a theoretical knowledge, or a practical one? Appealing to the Nicomachean Ethics, Eggleston (2005) claims there is a pragmatic character to ethics, even if the concept of expertise has a rather theoretical connotation. In antiquity, Aristotle claimed that the interest and the scope of philosophical examination was not to identify what virtue is, but how one can become better and apply virtue.

In our opinion the Nicomachean Ethics is not entirely a practical treaty of ethics, Aristotle remaining in the theoretical sphere in expounding
upon ethics to his son Nicomach. A more practical implementation of moral values can then be seen in the Gospels, when Jesus Christ sends his disciples to do good deeds by helping the prisoners and caring for the sick people, having the unique moral rule: “Love your neighbor as yourself.”

In modernity, Moore (1993) opposes Aristotle’s view, claiming that the main aim of ethics is its knowledge, and not its practice. Eggleston (2005), agrees that ethics expertise can be rather theoretical: he suggests a hypothetical situation where a person who does good deeds, without thinking in a particular way of his or her virtuous behavior, or one who is able to teach others how to do good deeds, would be perceived as virtuous, but not as having ethics expertise as such. The association of the expertise concept with the one of philosophy in itself, allows Eggleston (2005) to sustain the epistemic character of ethics expertise, rather than the pragmatic one.

Another issue which calls into question the specifics of ethics expertise has two possible approaches to it: the ethics expert’s interest either in doing Good, or in doing Justice. Both approaches raise questions about what is meant either by Good or by Just, and what is thus approved by ethics expertise. The orientation towards accomplishing the Good of the ethics expert will put him/her in the position of providing consultancy to agents on what is morally correct or not in the situations with which they deal, while the orientation of an expert towards Justice will lead him/her to use his or her expertise particularly in guiding action (Eggleston, 2005).

Moore’s (1993) ethics – as a successor to John Stuart Mill – is an ethics of Good, that Good is the notion on which all ethics depend, the work of ethics determining those things which have intrinsic value and also determining in what measure they have this value (Moore, 1993). Moore (1993) admits the importance of using the Good judgment in order to determine judgments on what is Just, stating that ethics are entitled to tell us what our duties are as individuals.

Synthesizing Moore’s approach, Eggleston (2005) exposes a series of characteristics specific to ethics expertise: the capacity to differentiate judgments between what is good or bad in good and bad judgments, and cause and effect judgments; the capacity to use intuition in order to do necessary judgments between good and bad, and the capacity to use empirical inquiry in order to make necessary judgments of cause and effect. These abilities are considered necessary for a person to be able to determine if a certain act is just/good or unjust/bad (Eggleston, 2005). Automatically, when we choose an action as being good – from a consequentialist perspective – to this action will be attributed the feature of just, or more exactly, of necessary to be done. This understanding of just is not defined by the strict compliance to normativeness, but through result, whose value might exceed, at some point, the value of the norm. Considering the abilities of the ethics expert given by Moore as raising implementation issues, Eggleston (2005) brings a set of clarifications to this approach. The ethicist described by Moore (1993) – a consequentialist – will not need to investigate the agent’s intentions, or to be sure of his or her future reasons which could compromise the ethical act. The real consequences of the ethical act will be those that matter for the practice of the ethics expert proposed by Moore (1993), no matter the tendencies or generalities associated with the act. Moreover Moore (1993) orients his attention toward ethical rules that are desirable for society’s development; the action grounded in these rules promotes significations and arrangements such as life, liberty, and the security of property, which are considered as intrinsic goods no matter the social circumstances (Eggleston, 2005).

Schicktanz and his collaborators (2012) propose a series of clarifications of the concept of ethics expertise, characterizing the critical evaluation of expertise as the dialectic between social science and ethics in the field of applied ethics, thus approaching the inclusion and exclusion of the public’s perspective on these ethics. Schicktanz and his collaborators (2012) argue that “the public understanding of ethics” starts the explication of ethics’ grounds as a
participative paradigm and of its normative reasons. The concept of “public understanding of ethics” implies an ongoing public preoccupation regarding scientific and technological progress; this includes all other forms of argument, justification, and normative judgment on, for example, the moral problematic in medicine, such as questions related to the morality of using human embryos in medical research, or respect for the patient in medical practice. This concept of the “public understanding of ethics” can be used for naming the social research of a public vision of the role of ethics and ethicists in different social and political contexts, fields whose ethics are insufficiently studied (Schicktanz, Schweda and Wynne, 2012). Friele (2003) shows that the roles of the ethics expert are mainly the analysis, logical testing, and submission to an ethical validity test of diversely used arguments to sustain an ethical decision. Ethics experts also have to observe the utility of such arguments as a means of discursive augmentation. The roles of ethics experts are to be found in the professional activities of the ethicist, practiced in the teaching of professional ethics, in participating as expert witnesses in the field in certain trials, or in their activity within ethics committees (Friele, 2003).

From this public understanding of ethics at the level of communities, as is approached by Schicktanz et al. (2012), to a more specific ethics expertise, there is necessarily a significant qualitative leap. This leap makes the shift from the exercising of one’s own moral behaviors to the achieving of a metaethical reflexive capacity, followed by the capacity to transfer achieved competences and expertise from the ethics field to professional practice. This leap constitutes the professionalization of ethics expertise. Therefore, ethics expertise requires rigorous training in the field of moral philosophy, as an imperative condition for an ethics expert, especially because his or her role is to offer counseling to those specialists whose professional expertise does not involve ethics exclusively.

Supervision of Ethics—A New Approach to Ethics Expertise

We call supervision of ethics the practice embodied in ethical expertise that brings together practices from all other forms of ethics expertise, such as counseling of ethics (Sandu & Caras [Frunză], 2013b), ethics audits (Caras [Frunză], 2014a), ethics committees (Caras [Frunză] & Sandu, 2013), ethical consulting, ethical decision-making models, and so on. These forms of expertise exercise a supplementary gatekeeping role in the transfer of political theories about the public good through the implementation of programs and practices (Sandu & Caras [Frunză], 2014), and making organizational values compatible with professional values.

We will focus on the pragmatic perspective (Caras [Frunză] & Sandu, 2014) that places supervision of ethics as a complementary process to ethical expertise’s classical functions, partially taking over ethical gatekeeping and the interpretive facilitation agreement between the professional, the organization, and the client.

The intervention of a supervisor of ethics could be beneficial in ethical training of a specialist whose knowledge does not necessarily imply a previous systematic training in ethics. A supervisor of ethics would fulfill the role of an expert and also of an interpreter of the values with which the specialist operates. In the supervision of ethics practice, a Kantian influence can be observed in the gatekeeping role of the supervisor in a deontological interpretation. In the sphere of applied sciences, and even more in applied philosophy, the focus was on the analysis of moral thinking, neglecting the moral conduct which reflects the existing bias in meta-ethics on the rational character of human action. Habermas’s (1987) version of a discursive ethics is based on the Kantian tradition. Like Kant, Habermas considers morality as a sum of unconditional moral obligations: prohibitions, positive obligations, and allowed things governing the interaction between people. Habermas associates morality with respect for autonomous agents, as does the Kantian
Updating Ethics Expertise: Supervision of Ethics as a Communicative Action

approach: an individual can follow his or her own conscience and show respect for other agents like him or her. Differences between Kantian autonomy and the Habermasian one underlie the practical reason approach, Habermas having a dialogic approach to practical reason.

We propose a model of ethics expertise, based on Habermas’s theory of communicative action, in a generally postmodern and specifically deconstructionist paradigm. In connection with relational autonomy construction, we will expose the main supervision of ethics functions, as follows:

- The function of ethics policies’ gatekeeping.
- The function of the mediator in achieving a reflective balance in the organization in the interests of each party involved.
- The function of ethics construction in organizations.
- Function of ethical conformity monitoring.
- Function of counseling of ethics, support and consultancy.
- The administrative and deliberative function. (Caras [Frunză], 2014b; Caras [Frunză] & Sandu, 2014)

The convergence between interpretative consensus at the level of practical activities with the content of interpretative consensus on values can be verified by the ethics supervisor from the perspective of an epistemic and axiological compatibility between them. The necessity of achieving the above-mentioned convergence leads to the gatekeeping function of supervision of ethics results, facilitating ethical policy-making. In this context, by establishing a consensus on organizational values, a supervisor of ethics will have a role not only in the construction of public policies, but also in their implementation. Exercising a gatekeeping function ensures the relationship between constitutive ethical values and operational ethical values as the shift between those moves towards the practical ethical principle. A supervisor of ethics acts within a triadic construct to facilitate communicative action, and to intervene in the relations between an organization, professionals, and the clients of the services provided by the organization through the specialist. In this hypothesis, the supervision of ethics will accomplish the function of mediation, by obtaining reflective equilibrium between the interests of the stakeholders within an organization. We identified the function of constructing ethics within an organization, which involves development of an ethical standard in consensus with the development needs of the organization, by promoting the highest ethical standards. Also, the supervisor of ethics has an important role in the process of empowerment of professionals, helping them to balance conforming to their own principles of professional practice, and maintaining consensus with the vision and mission of the organization. Once an ethical framework has been constructed, the adherence of professionals to an organizational culture, the function of monitoring ethical conformity, intervenes. This ensures the procedural compatibility of methodology with ethical standards, and also the monitoring of those to be respected by the practitioners who work in fields with explicit ethical impact. Supervision of ethics can contribute to the improvement of professionals’ ethical practices, by implementing the ethics audit at the level of organizational culture and of ethics policies. An ethics audit as a paradigmatic model for ethics expertise targets the monitoring of the ethical climate, verifies that the organization’s practices are in accordance with the mission, values and vision stated in its statutes and its code of ethics, and identifies potential risk areas when change is necessary (Caras [Frunză], 2014b).

From the perspective of Reamer (2006), an ethics audit should include two dimensions: 1) ethical reflection on the current knowledge of ethics in the field and 2) the relevance of this knowledge to daily practice and the identification of ethical risks and ethical decisions. Organizations whose practices are ethics audited should allocate
resources for reflection on current knowledge, each specialist making a proper inventory of knowledge in ethics, and later, after determining the level of knowledge, the organization should be able to relate this level of knowledge to their daily practice. The ethics auditor identifies the organization’s ability to comply with their ethically acceptable values, giving the organization a number of proposals to improve its practice and operation (Caras [Frunză], 2014a).

Directly correlated to the ethics audit is a discussion addressing the function of counseling of ethics, support, and consultancy. The implementation of this function implies ethical training of organizations’ personnel, in order to apply ethical standards in daily practice. At the level of ethics committees, the supervisor of ethics can have the role of an ethical ‘lawyer,’ in the client’s favor, fulfilling an administrative-deliberative function. A supervisor of ethics would also have an activity-reporting brief to acknowledge good conduct or sanction the misconduct of the person being supervised. Together with experts from complementary social services, the supervisor of ethics, as a member of a committee, would intervene in the administrative-deliberative process of maintaining ethical acceptability in favor of the beneficiary of the services.

From the perspective of communicative action theory, then, the role of supervision of ethics should be to facilitate the arrival of a consensus on ethical action in practice. There is also a distinction between the supervision of ethics, aimed at supervising ethical practices in terms of methodology, and ethical supervision that focuses on the practical application of the professional ethics of supervisors in their own daily activities (Caras [Frunză], 2014b; Caras [Frunză] & Sandu, 2014).

**How Could Supervision of Ethics Work in Social Work Practice?**

Social intervention can represent a form of communicative action. Social intervention, as part of social work, can be treated from a psychological perspective as a form of psychotherapy derived from current existential humanistic, personal, problematical (Parrish, 2010), or sociological perspectives, which concern social therapy, of social reintegration and the social worker as a specialist in applied sociology. Social services’ clients perceive themselves as beneficiaries of those services, because they see the increase in the quality of their lives as faster than in a social system operation (Dominelli, 1997). We observe a distinction between social practice and communicative practice, which we see as being correlated to the distinction between social/strategic action and communicative action. Social action aims at efficiency in a social plan, through social change, while communicative action follows an interpretative consensus and the identification of best practice.

In our vision, social services are grounded in social action, because they are directly interested in the efficiency of transforming social spaces, while supervision, both in a classical professional sense and supervision of ethics, is grounded in communicative action. Strategic action and instrumental action can be seen as forms of social action, which aim at the institution of the relationship of power. What Habermas calls efficiency, we interpret as the institution of the relationship of power (Foucault, 2005), especially in terms of the power of influence – soft power (Nye, 1999; 2004; 2011). The communicative action in itself, we see as a normalization of power relationships, being opposite and complementary to other types of action.

The character of the communicative action of social work is formed by the relationship between the beneficiary and the social worker, centered on social change. This relationship is based on behavior modification, as the influence of the social services on the social environment of beneficiaries facilitates their social integration. We can see in social work activity all the interpretative interests mentioned by Habermas:

- *Instrumental activity* aims at obtaining resources, including financial ones, for the individual. From this perspective we
consider the social benefits, which are established as forms of obligatory social solidarity. These social benefits are defined as financial transfers, as familial and social allowances, and facilities. Social benefits transpose in practice the social policies that aim for social justice and equity, being nothing else but a deconstruction of *charity*, at the level of the welfare state.

In our opinion social work practice is an implementation of the ethical principles that dominate the community at the level of social policy, without an ethical reflection on the ethical considerations of the practice in itself. We can see an analogy between Eggleston’s (2005) distinction between the virtuous individual and the ethics expert, the first being analogous to the social worker, who has practical knowledge of how to implement social equity, but who needs also the guidance of a supervisor of ethics to be a gatekeeper of ethics policies. Such a gatekeeper facilitates practitioners’ reflections on the ethical values of their own practice and on the social significance of that practice.

- **Strategic activity** aims at obtaining social success and power as influence. From the social work perspective, we refer to the programs of social integration of diverse categories of vulnerable people through measures, prevention, or support actions, in order to limit their risk factors and to develop their personal capacities, or their familial capacities to deal with their vulnerabilities (Sandu & Caras [Frunză], 2013b).

- **Communicative action** aims at the inter-comprehensive understanding of social actors; it exemplifies the rehabilitation based on community, and on community and social development programs. The most appropriate model of this communicative practice is the process of counseling in social work. The purpose of counseling, as it was initiated by Carl Rogers in the field of non-directive psychotherapy, and used further in social intervention techniques (client-centred techniques) (Zastrow, 2010), constitutes the development of clients’ autonomy and capacity as moral agents.

Along with the communicative relationship between the client (beneficiary) and the social worker, we can identify a communicative triad, formed at the level of the beneficiary – social worker – supervisor relationship. From the communicative action theory perspective, the role of the supervision of ethics could be to facilitate a consensus with regards to ethical action, within the social intervention between the organization providing social services, the social worker or case manager, the beneficiary, and other stakeholders. An example of communicative action implementation is using a tool named an “eco map” – specific to social work - which allows the identification of the types of relationship of the beneficiary with his family members, or with the community (Miftode, 2010).

As an example of supervision’s usefulness as a form of ethical gatekeeping in establishing policies for redistribution-based social work, we expose a hypothetical ethical dilemma: two development regions, A and B, simultaneously require funds from the government, through a budget supplementation based on two projects. The administration of Project A, which aims to create jobs, could be motivated by the capacity for sustainable development existing in the region. The project of region B aims at the development of social work for the long-term unemployed, motivated by the large number of unemployed people, by reduced employability within the region, and by the risks of social exclusion or self-exclusion among the long-term unemployed. The decision maker – the administrator of the funds intended for community development – must balance both proposals and choose the one that fulfills higher ethical criteria. Both projects require
a central redistribution of existing resources, in order to help equally the beneficiaries of those regions. The role of the supervisor of ethics is to analyse the relative priority of each redistribution. Both projects are grounded on the principle of social solidarity, being different only from the point of view of the consequences. Both projects aim to support a target group formed from unemployed people. The first project creates the possibility of sustainable development, while the second one aims at solving social problems in the short or medium term, but with the possibility of a perpetuation of dependency on social services. From the justification perspective, neither of the target groups is more entitled to the benefits of redistribution, because it cannot be claimed there is a causal relationship between the subjects’ status and their actions. Unemployed people from either project cannot be held responsible for the lack of jobs. From a strict Rawlsian perspective, group B would have the priority, justified by the fact that it is the most disadvantaged group, as long-term unemployed. In group A, the beneficiaries can be both long-term unemployed people and other disadvantaged people, such as young graduates, and therefore the vulnerability level would be, at first analysis, smaller.

By analyzing their marginal opportunities, group A would have the bigger chances, in the long term, of getting out of their vulnerable status, and therefore this group would be more entitled to the benefit of this chance, the entitlement, as the Rawlsian distribution, being rational and based on good will. The decision cannot be equitable to both groups: one of the groups must be favored, and the other one rejected. In our opinion we have no criteria for decidability in any of the distributive paradigms, the ethical dilemma being placed on the horizon of a series of equal values, equal chances, and the chance for a better life for one of the groups. The decision must consider the larger social interest and from the libertarian perspective the greater social interest is the prospect of development. Therefore, the entitlement is in favor of the first group, although not through its own position, but through the contextual perspective of the proposed project. Maybe the most claimed ethics are the utilitarian ethics, at the level of long-term consequences, which would put the choice in the first group’s favor, or on the contrary, the short-term utility for the second group and the resulting social peace might be preferred. Both situations transfer the decision into the public-interest sphere, which transcends the relative equity of the target groups. The role of the supervisor of ethics, as ethics gatekeeper, is to provide counseling to those who have to make this sort of decision, relating to the ethical context of the decisions’ potential to the framing of the public reason in a moral context.

**Instead of Conclusions**

Overall grounding in communicative action is given by the fact that supervision aims at a practice of reflection on specialists’ own action strategies, in terms of professional efficiency – in professional supervision and ethical values of an action in itself, and also of utility and its consequences, both at the level of the supervision of ethics. Efficiency in the social plan of communicative action is generated by the subsequent possibility of the identification of new interpretative practices.

**References**


Caras (Frunză), A., & Sandu, A. (2013). Ethical evaluation of social services and the need for ethics committees. Procedia—Social and Behavioral Sciences, 92, 142-149.


Schicktanz, S., Schweda, M., & Wynne, B. (2012). The ethics of ‘public understanding of ethics’—Why and how bioethics expertise should include public and patients’ voices. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 15, 129-139.


